Cloning and the LGBTI Family: Cautious Optimism by Aloni, Erez
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications
2011
Cloning and the LGBTI Family: Cautious
Optimism
Erez Aloni
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, aloni@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Erez Aloni, "Cloning and the LGBTI Family: Cautious Optimism" (2011) 35:1 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 1-80.
EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM 
1 
CLONING AND THE LGBTI FAMILY:  
CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
EREZ ALONI 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 3 
II. CURRENT OPTIONS FOR CREATING LGBTI FAMILIES AND THE
ASSOCIATED BARRIERS............................................................................. 7 
A. Adoption............................................................................................. 8 
B. Using Assisted Reproduction Technologies ................................ 14 
C. Co-Parenting .................................................................................... 17 
D. Conclusion........................................................................................ 18 
III. CLONING OFFERS NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE
GENETICALLY-RELATED CHILDREN .................................................... 18 
A. What Is Cloning? ............................................................................. 19 
B. Arguments in Favor of Reproductive Cloning ............................ 22 
C. Conclusion........................................................................................ 24 
IV. CLONING CAN BENEFIT THE LGBTI COMMUNITY BY
ALLOWING LGBTI PEOPLE TO CONCEIVE GENETICALLY-
RELATED CHILDREN................................................................................ 24 
A. Lesbian Couples .............................................................................. 25 
B. Gay Male Couples ........................................................................... 26 
C. Transgender and Transsexual Individuals .................................... 28 
D. Intersex Individuals ......................................................................... 32 
E. Does Cloning Contradict Queer Politics or Reproduce the 
Privileges of Genetics?.................................................................... 33 
F. Conclusion........................................................................................ 35 
V. CLONING AND QUEER THEORY ............................................................. 36 
A. Traditional Arguments Against Reproductive Cloning ............. 38 
1. Cloning Is Unsafe and Inefficient ............................................ 39
2. Cloning Is Harmful to Children ............................................... 40
3. Cloning Is Commodification .................................................... 42
4. Cloning Is Eugenics ................................................................... 42
 Lecturer in Law and S.J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The idea to 
utilize queer theory in the context of cloning regulation originated from a seminar I took 
with Anita L. Allen, whose wisdom and support made this work possible. I am indebted to 
Seth F. Kreimer, Carolyn Brunelle, Yis Tigay, and Lior Ben-Avraham for their invaluable 
comments and insights, and to Kimberly Mutcherson for excellent comments on an earlier 
draft. Many thanks also to the editors of the NYU Review of Law & Social Change. I am 
especially grateful to Editor-in-Chief Amalea C. Smirniotopoulos and Executive Editor 
Drea Kutik for their exceptional editorial work and for challenging me and providing useful 
critique, and to Senior Articles Editor Amanda Conley for hours of discussion, for her 
great suggestions in the queer theory section, and for her insistence that I pursue the equal 
protection argument. The analysis and conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views of 
any of the above mentioned individuals. All errors and omissions are mine. 
EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM 
2 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 35:1 
5. Conclusion .................................................................................. 43
B. Heterosexist Arguments Against Cloning.................................... 43 
1. Arguments That the Heterosexual Family Is the Only
“Real” Form of Kinship............................................................ 43 
2. Arguments That Cloning Threatens the Elementary
Structure of Kinship—Exogamy and Incest Taboo............... 47 
3. Arguments That LGBTI People Will Purposely Clone
Queer Children .......................................................................... 51 
4. Arguments That Cloning Is Not a Natural Form of
Reproduction ............................................................................. 56 
C. Conclusion........................................................................................ 58 
VI. A RIGHT TO CLONE?: CLONING AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR
AN EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE............................................................... 59 
A. The Current Ban on Funding Research Cloning and 
Potential Future Bans ..................................................................... 59 
B. LGBTI People Are Disparately Impacted by the Current 
Limitations and Would Be Similarly Harmed by a Total 
Ban on Reproductive Cloning ....................................................... 62 
1. Federal Funding Ban................................................................. 62
2. Total Ban on Cloning ................................................................ 67
C. The Current Funding Limitations and Any Future Ban on 
Cloning Human Beings Infringes on LGBTI Individual’s 
Fundamental Right to Reproduce................................................. 68 
D. Laws That Discriminate Against LGBTI People Merit 
Heightened Scrutiny........................................................................ 71 
1. Federal Funding Ban................................................................. 71
2. Total Ban on Cloning ................................................................ 73
E. There Is No Legitimate State Interest to Support the 
Current Funding Ban or Any Future Cloning Ban ..................... 73 
1. Federal Funding Ban................................................................. 73
2. Total Ban on Cloning ................................................................ 76
F. Conclusion........................................................................................ 78 
VII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 78
One might well wonder . . . what consequences of the 
human genome project raise these kinds of anxieties in 
contemporary cultural life, but it seems a displacement, if 
not a hallucination, to identify the source of this social 
threat, if it is a threat, with lesbians who excavate sperm 
from dry ice on a cold winter day in Iowa when one of them 
is ovulating.1 
1. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT 
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I.  
INTRODUCTION 
Despite innovations in assisted reproductive technologies in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, individuals and couples in the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI)2 community who wish to 
create families that include children face many hurdles in both law and 
informal practice.3 The cloning of Dolly the sheep from an adult somatic 
sheep cell in 1996 signaled the possibility of new opportunities for 
members of the LGBTI community to have genetically-related children 
with minimal reliance on third parties. Cloning is thus heralded as a 
solution to some of the obstacles the LGBTI community faces today.4 
The suggestion that cloning might enable non-heterosexual couples to 
produce offspring has triggered debate both inside and outside the LGBTI 
community.5 Much of this discussion centers on the potential dangers and 
benefits of this new technology. Yet important legal and political questions 
 
CRITIQUE 229, 251 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) [hereinafter Is Kinship 
Always Already Heterosexual?]. 
2. I use the term “LGBTI” to describe individuals who self-identify as lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and/or intersex. I do not include individuals who self-identify as 
“queer” in this group because those who identify as queer often do so precisely to claim 
freedom from a stable sexual identity; appropriating them into a list of identity categories 
would therefore be at odds with this goal. I also do not include “questioning” in the 
acronym because I believe we should all question the existing categories and binary view of 
sexuality. When I intend to refer only to a specific segment of the community, I use a more 
specific word to do so; however, at times, I use the term “gay” (especially “gay rights”) 
interchangeably with LGBTI for the sake of clarity in writing. In doing so, I do not intend 
to erase or obscure other identities. I also frequently make reference to the LGBTI 
“community,” which is a theoretical construct much more than it is a reality. “Alternative” 
sexualities and gender identities are defined and grouped together by virtue of what they 
are not: straight or heteronormative. Thus, a monolithic “community” of LGBTI 
individuals does not exist in any meaningful way. At times, the multitude of interests within 
this “community” converge; at other times, they diverge significantly. Acknowledging this 
to be the case, I nevertheless refer to a “community” throughout this paper, and I attempt 
to be clear about those times when interests within the community are most likely to 
diverge, particularly vis-à-vis cloning. Finally, I have tried to adhere to the Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance Against Defamation’s recommendations on terminology as much as possible. See 
GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE 
6–14 (2010), available at http://www.glaad.org/document.doc?id=99 (describing 
recommended terminology). 
3. I use the term “family” in this paper primarily to describe two-parent families that 
include children. I recognize that this usage is not unproblematic, and that many family 
arrangements do not look like this. However, because this paper is focused on cloning and 
other reproductive options, I have chosen to use the term in this way rather than 
consistently referring to “two-parent families with children.” 
4. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving Nature or 
Dooming the Species, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 528 (2003) (noting that a “possible 
benefit of cloning would be to assist single individuals and same-sex couples in their efforts 
to reproduce”) . 
5. See infra Part V. 
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about the funding and regulation of cloning research are bound up in these 
philosophical and moral debates. The U.S. government currently bans the 
use of federal funds for such research.6 While President Barack Obama 
overturned the former presidential administration’s ban on embryonic 
stem cell research for cell-based regenerative therapies, he has made it 
clear that he will not support lifting the ban on research related to 
reproductive cloning.7 
In this article, I argue that, because reproductive cloning may offer the 
LGBTI community the chance to have genetically-related children, bans 
on federally funded research that would help refine and ensure the safety 
and efficacy of these procedures unconstitutionally deny LGBTI people a 
right that is not denied to similarly situated opposite-sex couples, who 
enjoy generous support from the state in their efforts to conceive either 
“traditionally” or by using assisted reproductive technologies. I contend 
that these barriers to cloning research are in large part the result of fear-
 
6. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Constraints on the Regulation of Cloning, 9 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 495, 495 (2009) (stating that federal funding for 
experimentation with human embryos has been banned since 1995). In 2009, the National 
Institutes of Health issued guidelines for the use of stem cell research, effective as of July 7, 
2009, and made it clear that funding for this research cannot be used for human 
reproductive cloning. Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,170, 
32,175 (Nat’l Inst. of Health July 7, 2009) (“Research using hESCs derived from other 
sources, including somatic cell nuclear transfer, parthogenesis, and/or embryos created for 
research purposes, is not eligible for NIH funding.”). For a more in-depth discussion of 
funding for research cloning, see generally Catherine D. Payne, Stem Cell Research and 
Cloning for Human Reproduction: An Analysis of the Laws, The Direction in Which They 
May Be Heading in Light of Recent Developments, and Potential Constitutional Issues, 61 
MERCER L. REV. 943 (2010). Some states have also passed laws banning the use of state 
funds for cloning research. See, e.g., The Human Cloning Funding Prohibition Act, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 333.26403 (1998) (“A person shall not use state funds to engage in or 
attempt to engage in human cloning.”). 
7. President Barack Obama, Signing of Stem Cell Executive Order and Scientific 
Integrity Presidential Memorandum (Mar. 9, 2009) (“[W]e will ensure that our government 
never opens the door to the use of cloning for human reproduction. It is dangerous, 
profoundly wrong, and has no place in our society, or any society.”), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-As-Prepared-for-Delivery-
Signing-of-Stem-Cell-Executive-Order-and-Scientific-Integrity-Presidential-Memorandum. 
 Embryonic cells have the unique ability to develop into nearly any cell type, which 
makes them promising for use in the treatment of injuries and diseases such as Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s, heart disease, and kidney failure. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH 1 (1999), 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/execsumm.pdf. One of the central controversies 
surrounding stem cell research involves the source of embryonic stem cells. Embryonic 
stem cells can be derived from four different sources: (1) existing stem cell lines, (2) 
aborted or miscarried embryos, (3) unused in vitro fertilized embryos, and (4) embryos 
created through therapeutic cloning. Thus, while stem cell research and its applications do 
not necessarily involve therapeutic cloning, one way to create stem cells is via therapeutic 
cloning. See Embryonic and Fetal Research Laws: Stem Cell Research, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx? 
tabid=14413. 
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mongering, misinformation, and confusion. The promise of this new 
reproductive technology challenges the normative regulation of sex and 
reproduction in our society, threatening both “traditional” family 
structures and male dominance. Perhaps because of this, discussions about 
the potential harms of cloning have escalated to become, in some quarters, 
a masked rhetoric for homophobic assertions that cloning—particularly 
when used by the LGBTI community or by other “nontraditional” 
families—will undermine the traditional heterosexual family structure.8 In 
the midst of broader, arguably less politicized debates over the safety and 
ethics of cloning, homophobic and traditionalist arguments have gained 
legitimacy. Some opponents of cloning claim that the practice will 
adversely affect the welfare of society in general and cloned children in 
particular, especially if those children are born to gay parents.9 Others 
suggest that cloning will be detrimental to future generations by 
diminishing genetic diversity,10 and that cloning will allow the LGBTI 
community to deliberately produce gay offspring in order to “preserve 
their kind.”11 In making these arguments, opponents present cloning as a 
practice that drastically departs from natural reproduction and is therefore 
inherently suspect.12 
 
8. See infra Part V. 
9. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Paradox of Cloning, WKLY. STANDARD, May 26, 
1997, at 23–24, 26 (“More troubling is the possibility that a lesbian couple will use cloning 
to produce a child. Do we wish to make it easy for a homosexual pair to have children? . . . 
Cloning humans, if it can occur at all, cannot be prevented, but cloning unmarried persons 
will expand the greatest cultural problem our country now faces.”). 
10. See STEPHEN E. LEVICK, CLONE BEING: EXPLORING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 229–30 (2004) (“The partial merger of the genomes of two individuals 
to constitute a new and unique one may well be the basic biological fact underpinning the 
rest. Cloning puts into conflict the ‘selfish’ genes of the individual with the need for the 
survival of community and society absolutely necessary for the survival of humans as a 
social species.”). 
11. LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 86 (1998) 
(suggesting that gay-rights organizations have argued that “should homosexuality be shown 
to have a genetic basis, homosexuals would have an obligation to reproduce through 
cloning, to preserve their kind”). 
12. These opponents of cloning find themselves alongside unexpected bedfellows: 
some feminist scholars argue against cloning on the grounds that it may further exploit 
women by providing men with “the absolute power over reproduction” that they have 
always wanted. Andrea Dworkin, Sasha, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES 
ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 73, 76 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998). 
Dworkin goes on to note, however, that cloning may also allow women to reproduce 
themselves, leading to an “all-female world, which would, probably, end at least rape, 
prostitution, incest, and forced pregnancy.” Id. See also Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic 
Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L. J . 843, 856 (2007) (“Cloning and 
other genetic technologies are not necessary to ameliorate women’s inequalities with men, 
and indeed . . . one can easily imagine how these technologies might someday be used to 
undermine women’s equality.”). While a discussion of feminist approaches to cloning 
technologies is beyond the scope of this paper, it bears noting that not all feminists have 
responded to cloning in the same way. Since Dolly was created, some have questioned 
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These arguments lack merit or empirical support and are grounded 
largely in homophobic assumptions. In the face of this fear-mongering, I 
present a more realistic and systematic assessment of the potential benefits 
cloning offers to LGBTI individuals. I argue that, while cloning does pose 
some potential risks that must be taken seriously, it can provide many 
benefits to society as a whole, and to the LGBTI community in particular, 
if properly regulated by law. The LGBTI community might be well-
advised to consider lobbying for increased funding and regulation of 
cloning, in hopes that new technologies may make it possible to create 
alternative family options and new forms of kinship. 
While I argue that cloning would offer great benefits to LGBTI 
individuals, it is important to emphasize that many LGBTI families are 
satisfied with the current ways available for creating families. Further, my 
argument is not intended to privilege or encourage genetic relations over 
other forms of kinship. Rather, I argue that the choice to be genetically 
related to one’s children should be available equally to LGBTI and 
heterosexual people. 
Indeed, there are still a number of troubling issues related to cloning 
that the LGBTI community and its allies should consider. For example, 
given the expense of the procedure,13 is cloning a viable option exclusively 
for those families with the resources to pay for a genetically-related child 
and therefore only marginally beneficial to the community as a whole? 
Will having the option to clone place further pressure on LGBTI couples 
to imitate the heterosexual family, leading to a sense of shame or failure if 
they refuse to do so? What implications might cloning have for LGBTI 
rights more broadly? Does lobbying to fund cloning research 
inappropriately privilege the notion of a genetically-related family over all 
other family arrangements? Might cloning adversely affect the adoption 
market, leaving prospective adoptees homeless? If two men wish to clone a 
 
whether cloning might lead to a true feminist utopia—a world without men. Ann Northrop, 
a columnist for the New York gay newspaper LGNY, caused a stir when USA Today 
quoted her saying that because cloning gives women “complete control over reproduction,” 
it could, “[if] carried to its logical extreme, eliminate men altogether.” Anita Manning, 
Pressing a “Right” to Clone Humans, Some Gays Foresee Reproduction Option, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 6, 1997, at 01.D (quoting Northrop). Northrop later tempered her comments, 
explaining that “while some women might go so far as to refuse to replicate men at all, 
which would be an interesting concept, at the very least it would change the balance of 
power somewhat.” Id. The idea that women could use parthenogenesis in order to 
procreate without men is much older than Dolly. As early as 1915, in her famous book 
Herland, Charlotte Perkins Gilman described an island composed only of women who 
reproduced themselves asexually using parthenogenesis and lived a life free of war and 
domination. See generally CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, HERLAND (1915). 
13. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Cloning’s High Cost, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2001, 10:19 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/26/1126cloning.html (stating it may cost $1,000 per 
egg—and may require 100 eggs—to perform therapeutic cloning; however, some of these 
costs are associated with compensating the egg donor). 
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child together, they must rely on a surrogate egg donor; will cloning 
therefore only further perpetuate the exploitation of women to the benefit 
of gay and transgender women in need of eggs? 
The structure of this article is as follows: Part II examines the 
difficulties that members of the LGBTI community face when trying to 
build families that include children and concludes that each currently 
available method of reproduction has some disadvantages, either because 
they require some involvement of third parties and/or because they do not 
allow for the creation of a child who is genetically related to both partners. 
Part III provides an overview of the science of reproductive cloning and 
summarizes the arguments in favor of cloning generally. In Part IV, I 
discuss the benefits that cloning offers to different groups within the 
LGBTI community and suggest that cloning provides new opportunities 
both for this community and more generally for all couples who seek to 
reproduce. Drawing on insights from queer theory, Part V examines and 
critiques the assumptions underlying key arguments against the use of 
reproductive cloning. In Part VI, I question the constitutionality of a ban 
on funding cloning research and suggest that a ban on human reproductive 
cloning may violate the guarantee of equal protection by discriminating 
against LGBTI individuals. The article concludes with a discussion of the 
role that cloning should play in LGBTI politics and legal strategy. 
II.  
CURRENT OPTIONS FOR CREATING LGBTI FAMILIES AND THE 
ASSOCIATED BARRIERS 
According to recent research, more than half of all gay men and forty-
one percent of lesbians in the United States want to have children.14 When 
deciding whether and how to become parents, the LGBTI community 
faces greater obstacles and must ask different questions than fertile, 
opposite-sex couples wishing to have a baby. Should they adopt or use an 
egg or sperm donor? If they decide to use a donor, should they choose 
someone they know or rely on an anonymous donor? If both partners are 
able, which should gestate the child? Should they choose surrogacy? The 
questions and available options differ depending on the sex, gender, and 
sexual orientation of the person (or people) involved. Although some 
options may offer more advantages than others, all can present significant 
legal and social hurdles to building the LGBTI family. Ian Wilmut, the 
creator of Dolly the sheep, argues that using methods as risky as 
reproductive cloning cannot be justified “given the range of alternatives on 
 
14. GARY J. GATES, M.V. LEE BADGETT, JENNIFER EHRLE MACOMBER & KATE 
CHAMBERS, THE WILLIAMS INST. & URBAN INST., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY 
AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/FinalAdoptionReport.pdf. 
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offer: adoption, surrogacy, and a huge range of infertility treatments.”15 
For the LGBTI family, however, the currently available options are not 
without their own serious drawbacks and risks. 
A. Adoption 
An estimated two million LGBTI individuals in the United States are 
interested in adopting.16 Adoption is an appealing option since it does not 
pose any health risks to the adoptive parent(s) and provides children in 
need with loving homes. Nevertheless, the adoption process can be 
challenging for LGBTI couples who wish to start a family. Some states 
prohibit gay couples from adopting.17 Even when adoption is available, it is 
often prohibitively expensive. In some instances, families may be limited to 
“open” adoptions, which can be frustrating to those who prefer not to 
maintain contact with the birth parents.18 Finally, the waiting period to 
adopt can be anywhere from a few months to several years.19 I discuss 
these obstacles further, as well as the other disadvantages of adoption, 
 
15. IAN WILMUT & ROGER HIGHFIELD, AFTER DOLLY: THE USES AND MISUSES OF 
HUMAN CLONING 222 (2006). 
16. GATES, BADGETT, MACOMBER & CHAMBERS, supra note 14, at 5. LGB parents are 
major players in the adoption field in the United States. An estimated 65,500 children are 
living with LGB parents, and these parents raise four percent of all children in the United 
States. Id. at 3. 
17. See infra notes 26–27. 
18. Today in the United States, open adoption or semi-open adoption is a standard 
practice, particularly in private adoptions. See, e.g., Open Adoption, MAMA’S HEALTH, 
http://wwww.mamashealth.com/adopt/openadopt.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). In an open 
adoption, the adopted child has the opportunity to develop a relationship with her birth 
family. Anita L. Allen, Open Adoption is Not for Everyone, in ADOPTION MATTERS 47, 
47–48 (Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt,\ eds., 2005) Prospective adoptive parents are 
often encouraged to agree to an open adoption in order to be more desirable to the birth 
parents. This arrangement usually requires the adoptive parents to meet—sometimes 
through long periods or even in perpetuity—with the biological parents. Id. at 49 (providing 
a fictional illustration of a couple that choose open adoption because they were “[f]earful of 
not being selected to adopt. . . . ”). This arrangement can be very emotionally, socially, and 
practically complex for everyone involved. Anita L. Allen suggests that open adoption 
rituals—such as face-to-face meetings between the adoptive and biological parents—make 
adoption less appealing to those who place a high value on intimacy and privacy in their 
families. Id. at 61. On this basis, some LGBTI individuals and couples might want to avoid 
the outside interference and potentially probing questions about their sexual orientation 
and partnership and therefore prefer to rely on other options for building a family. As with 
heterosexual couples, many LGBTI individuals would prefer to live their lives without the 
need to share their children and their family intimacy with their adopted child’s biological 
parents. 
19. See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1432 (2006) (noting that, while “there are many applicants for every 
healthy, white infant in the United States, resulting in a wait as long as seven years,” 
African-American infants are readily available for adoption); What is the Waiting Period to 
Adopt?, ADOPTION SERVS., http://www.adoptionservices.org/adoption/adoption_waiting_ 
period.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (“For a healthy US-born Black or bi-racial 
(Caucasian/African-American) infant the estimated wait is approximately 2 to 6 months.”). 
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 First and foremost, adoption does not provide LGBTI parents with 
the opportunity to have genetically-related children or to experience 
childbirth. Adoptive parents may face stigma or social shame because their 
families differ from traditional models.20 Research suggests that many 
people place significant value on having a genetically-related child, at least 
in part because they see the child as the successor to their “dynasty,”21 
holding a place in an ancestral line that reaches backward and forward in 
time.22 Additionally, those individuals who are able to do so may want to 
experience pregnancy.23 Thus, for those who want a genetically-related 
child or who desire the experience of pregnancy and childbirth, adoption 
may not be the best option. Some couples might also be concerned that 
adopted children are likely to face greater emotional and social obstacles. 
Research suggests that adopted children may be more likely than their 
nonadoptive counterparts to suffer from emotional difficulties and 
learning problems.24 Nontraditional couples—many of whom are already 
acutely aware of what it feels like to be stigmatized—might be even more 
 
20. See VIVIAN B. SHAPIRO, JANET R. SHAPIRO & ISABEL H. PARET, COMPLEX 
ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 17 (2001) (“When the family 
history differs from ‘mainstream’ family models, prejudice and family isolation often 
become part of the subjective experiences of children and parents.”). 
21. See S. Camporesi & L. Bortolotti, Reproductive Cloning in Humans and 
Therapeutic Cloning in Primates: Is the Ethical Debate Catching Up with the Recent 
Scientific Advances?, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 1, 3 (2008) (“The assumption here is that, if 
potential parents want to reproduce by cloning, they do so in order to be able to pass on 
their genes to their prospective children . . . .”); Carson Strong, Cloning and Infertility, 7 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 279, 281–82 (1998) (arguing that an infertile couple 
may wish for a genetically-related child because this will “enable them to participate in the 
creation of a person,” serve as a representation of their mutual love, and provide them with 
a “link to future persons”). See also Charlotte Witt, Adoption, Personal, Identity, and 
Genetic Essentialism, in ADOPTION MATTERS, supra note 18, at 135, 135–36 (noting that the 
genetically-related family is a socially constructed ideal reinforced by feminist theorists and, 
ironically, the adoption community). 
22. See, e.g., MARY L. SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT 
MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, 
AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS’ RIGHTS 90 (2001) (“Having a child genetically 
related to one member of the couple gave a sense of continuity both to the genetically 
related parent and to the spouse who would see his or her partner reflected in their child. 
The genetic tie linked the parents not only to their child, but also to the generations that 
preceded them and, through the possibility that their child would have children, to those 
following them.”). 
23. See SUZANNE M. JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GAY PARENTHOOD 91 (2002) (stating that “eighty-eight percent of the 
primary lesbian mother families [surveyed] conceived their own children” and that “[m]any 
mentioned their strong desire to give birth to their own children as the reason for choosing 
this option”); Strong, supra note 21, at 281 (noting that people may value having genetically 
related offspring because it “involves experiences of pregnancy and childbirth”). 
24. See JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that “adopted children, as 
a group, show higher rates of emotional difficulties and learning problems than do 
nonadopted children,” and that poor prenatal care may trigger later problems). 
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sensitive to the social difficulties that adopted children face.25 
For those LGBTI couples or individuals who do wish to adopt, the 
process often presents serious legal challenges. Mississippi explicitly 
prohibits same-sex couples from adopting.26 Other states have passed 
statutes stipulating that only married couples may adopt, a requirement 
intended to prevent gay and lesbian parents from adopting.27 There may be 
some indication, however, that things are changing. In Florida, a thirty-
three-year-old law prohibiting adoption by LGB individuals was recently 
struck down as unconstitutional.28 In 2008, Arkansas voters approved a 
ballot initiative that prohibits adoption by cohabiting couples,29 but it was 
held unconstitutional by the Arkansas Supreme Court in April 2011.30 
Even when LGBTI individuals are permitted to adopt under state law, 
they may face additional obstacles. Many adoption agencies refuse to work 
with gay couples.31 If a social worker is required to make a home visit, 
lesbian or gay partners may pretend to be roommates for fear that their 
sexual orientation will preclude them from adopting.32 In other instances, 
 
25. Of course, this could cut both ways: LGBTI parents may be more sensitive to their 
children’s experience of discrimination, but they may also be more concerned about 
compounding this discrimination with the added stigma of having nontraditional parents. 
26. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2007) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is 
prohibited.”). 
27. For example, in Utah “a child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in 
a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.” 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2008). In many states, family court judges decide 
whether to permit LGB adoptions on a case-by-case basis with a focus on the “best interest 
of the child.” See HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS 1 (2011), http://www.hrc.org 
/documents/parenting_laws_maps.pdf (“In many states the status of parenting law for 
LGBT people is unclear. The determination of parenting rights is always made on a case-
by-case basis and it is ultimately the decision of the judge whether to grant the adoption 
petition.”). For a comprehensive review of adoption laws by state, see THE LIBERTY 
COUNCIL, SAME-SEX ADOPTION LAWS BY STATE, http://www.lc.org/profamily/samesex_ 
adoption_by_state.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
28. In 2010, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision 
holding the ban unconstitutional under the state constitution’s equal protection clause 
because it found there was no rational purpose to the ban. Fla. Dep’t of Children & 
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 91–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The Florida 
Department of Children and Families announced that it will not appeal the ruling. John 
Couwels, Florida Won’t Appeal Ruling Stopping Adoption Ban by Gay Men, Lesbians, 
CNN (Oct. 12, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-12/us/florida.gay.adoptions_1_adoption-
ban-frank-martin-gill-appeal?_s=PM:US. 
29. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304 (Supp. 2009) (“A minor may not be adopted or placed 
in a foster home if the individual seeking to adopt or to serve as a foster parent is 
cohabiting with a sexual partner outside of a marriage which is valid under the constitution 
and laws of this state.”). 
30.  Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Cole, No. 10-840 (Ark. Apr. 7, 2011) 
(finding that Initiated Act No. 1 violated LGBTI couples’ fundamental right to privacy), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/DHS_v_Cole_ Opinion.pdf. 
31. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 90. 
32. Gerald P. Mallon, Assessing Lesbian and Gay Prospective Foster and Adoptive 
Families: A Focus on the Homestudy Process, 86 CHILD WELFARE 67, 74–75 (2007). 
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one member of the couple may attempt to “pass,” presenting herself as a 
single person who wishes to adopt. In still other cases, an agency may be 
aware of the couple’s sexual orientation but turn a blind eye to it.33 Birth 
parents may also refuse to place their child with gay parents.34 Thus, gay 
parents may fare better when they are able to conceal their sexual 
identities from birth parents, a task made easier when the birth parents are 
not involved in the adoption process.35 Gay parents may face problems in 
international adoptions as well, because some countries prohibit placement 
of children with LGB parents.36 Those agencies that are willing to work 
with LGBT couples may still require these couples to meet higher 
standards than their heterosexual counterparts before being considered 
suitable adoptive parents.37 Many agencies appear to prefer adoptive 
parents who comply with traditional gender roles, treating “feminine” 
lesbians and “masculine” gay men differently from prospective parents 
who present in non-gender-traditional ways.38 In light of these hurdles, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that many LGBTI individuals feel they are 
considered undesirable candidates for adoption and are therefore reluctant 
to participate in a process that delves into their private lives and leaves 
them feeling judged.39 
 
33. John D. Matthews & Elizabeth P. Cramer, Envisaging the Adoption Process to 
Strengthen Gay- and Lesbian-Headed Families: Recommendations for Adoption 
Professionals, 85 CHILD WELFARE 317, 327–28 (2006) (noting that many adoption agencies 
operate under a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy). 
34. See id. at 323 (finding that about one quarter of responding agencies had worked 
with birth parents who objected to placing a child with gay parents). 
35. See David M. Brodzinsky, Charlotte J. Patterson & Mahnoush Vaziri, Adoption 
Agency Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Prospective Parents: A National Study, 5 
ADOPTION QUARTERLY 5, 20–21 (2002). Brodzinsky, Patterson and Vaziri’s research 
suggests that international adoption agencies view adoption by LGB parents favorably. Id. 
This is surprising, as many foreign countries prohibit adoption by LGB parents. Id. at 20. 
The authors speculate that there are three possible ways for agencies to negotiate this 
contradiction. Id. at 21. First, the adoption agency may conceal the sexual orientation of the 
prospective family. Second, some agencies may adopt a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and 
not ask the prospective parents about their sexual orientation. Id. Third, agencies can 
disclose the parents’ sexual orientation, but this may impede the adoption of some children 
by appropriate LGB parents. Id. 
36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC 
INFORMATION FOR CHINA (Jan. 23, 2009), http://adoption.state.gov/country/china.html 
(“Chinese law permits adoption by married couples, defined as one man and one woman. 
They must adopt the child jointly.”). 
37. Lori Ross, Rachel Epstein, Corrie Goldfinger, Leah Steele, Scott Anderson & 
Carol Strike, Lesbian and Queer Mothers Navigating the Adoption System: The Impacts 
on Mental Health, 17 HEALTH SOC. REV. 254, 255 (2008). 
38. See id. at 256 (“In order to successfully negotiate the adoption process, it has been 
suggested that lesbians (and by extension, gay men) must present themselves as similar to, 
or indeed the same as, heterosexual applicants, that is, to be ‘the good lesbian.’”) (citing 
Stephen Hicks, Good Lesbian, Bad Lesbian: Regulating Heterosexuality in Fostering and 
Adoption Assessments, 5 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 157, 162 (2000)). 
39. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 91–92. For a discussion of similar issues 
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Even if a couple surmounts these legal and emotional obstacles, other 
issues remain. Adoption costs vary depending on the agency the couple 
uses. Adoption may cost $2,500 or less, if the couple adopts through a 
public agency, or as much as $30,000 if the couple adopts through an 
independent domestic agency.40 The price of international adoption 
depends on the country of origin, ranging from $25,000 (including travel 
expenses) for a child from Ethiopia to more than $50,000 for a Russian 
child.41 As there is some evidence to suggest that gay men earn less on 
average than their heterosexual counterparts,42 there is good reason to be 
concerned that adoption is economically prohibitive for at least a portion 
of the LGBTI community. 
Finally, even if an LGBTI individual is able to adopt a child, legal 
barriers may prevent the parent’s same-sex partner from being recognized 
as the child’s parent. When one partner is a legal parent of a couple’s child 
(often by virtue of biological relation) but the other is not, the couple may 
initiate a second-parent adoption, a legal process by which one partner can 
become an adoptive parent without terminating the rights of the other.43 
Second-parent adoption is an important option for LGBTI people because 
without it the partner of the biological parent will not have any parental 
rights.44 In the absence of second-parent adoption, a child might be left 
 
confronted by transgender individuals, see SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. & TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANS REALITIES: A LEGAL 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 13 (2003) 
(“[T]ransgender people who are attempting to become adoptive or foster parents face 
discrimination from public and private adoption and foster care agencies.”). 
40. Cost of Adopting, ADOPTION.COM, http://statistics.adoption.com/information/statistics-
on- cost-of-adopting.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
41. Cost of Adoption Update: 2008-2009, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, http://www.adoptive 
families.com/articles.php?aid=2076. 
42. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48 
INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 726, 737 (1995) (finding that from 1989 to 1991, “behaviorally 
gay/bisexual men earn[ed] eleven to twenty-seven percent less than behaviorally 
heterosexual men”). See also Dan A. Black, Hoda R. Makar, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J. 
Taylor, The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 449, 463 
(2003) (suggesting that unmarried gay men typically earn less than married straight men, 
but that lesbian women earn more on average than heterosexual women). 
43. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender and 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 SO. CAL. L REV. 1177, 1192, 1213–15 (discussing the 
process of second-parent adoption and its significance for nonmarital families). 
44. Additionally, while in many states the law provides that the non-biological parent 
of a child born through artificial insemination is the child’s legal parent, these statutes 
typically apply only to heterosexual married couples. Thus, when a same-sex couple uses 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) to have a child together, the child will be legally 
connected to the biological mother only. See id. at 1179 (“[I]n 2010 only four states and the 
District of Columbia have statutory ART provisions that extend the consent [to artificial 
insemination] = legal parent rule to non-marital children. Moreover, three of these five 
jurisdictions have provisions that, by their literal terms, are limited to heterosexual 
couples.”). Some transgender individuals who try to establish their paternity through 
artificial insemination laws face the same problem, since many of the artificial insemination 
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without a legal guardian if her documented parent dies, or the 
undocumented parent can lose her parental rights if the couple separates 
and a custody battle ensues.45 While many states allow second-parent 
adoption,46 Kentucky,47 Wisconsin,48 Nebraska,49 and Ohio50 have held that 
second-parent adoption by same-sex partners is not allowed. Recently, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that second-parent adoption by 
nonmarried partners is illegal, potentially invalidating all previous such 
adoptions in the state.51 
 
laws refer specifically and are limited to male and female parents. Thus, the Illinois 
Appellate Court held that the Parentage Act of 1984, under which a child born from 
artificial insemination to two married parents retained his right to parentage with both 
parents even if the marriage was subsequently held invalid, did not apply to transsexual 
males. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005) 
(“[The section of the Parentage Act] which confers a presumption on a ‘man’ to be the 
natural father of a child . . . is based on the premise that the parties who are involved are a 
man and a woman. As we have previously determined, petitioner is not a man within the 
meaning of the statute, and that, therefore, the statute does not apply.”). 
45. State courts have taken different positions on the rights of non-adoptive parents in 
cases where a couple had children together but one of the parents did not adopt the child 
and the legal parent subsequently died or the couple separated. Compare Janice M. v. 
Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 74 (Md. 2008) (holding that “de facto parenthood is not 
recognized in Maryland”), and In the Matter of C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393, 402 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that a woman lacked standing to seek any contact with the child 
born to her former same-sex partner), with In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W. Va. 
2005) (holding that the same-sex partner of a deceased woman had standing to intervene in 
custody proceeding under the “exceptional cases” provision, as the partner was the child’s 
psychological parent, unusual and extraordinary circumstances existed, and awarding the 
partner permanent custody served the best interests of the child). 
46. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000–9007 (West 2004) (describing the process of 
second-parent adoption and its availability to domestic partners); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (2008) (“Applicants [for second-parent adoption] shall not be 
rejected solely on the basis of homosexuality.”). 
47. S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 815–20 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the 
stepparent adoption of a child by the same-sex domestic partner of the child’s biological 
mother without the termination of the biological mother’s parental rights was prohibited by 
statutes; adoption statute only allowed a stepparent adoption without the termination of a 
biological parent’s rights if the stepparent was married to the biological parent, and same-
sex marriages were prohibited by statute). 
48. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684–85 (Wis. 1994) (holding that the 
same-sex partner of the child’s adoptive mother is not permitted to adopt the child, as this 
would terminate the adoptive mother’s parental rights). 
49. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Neb. 2002) (holding that a 
same-sex partner cannot adopt the partner’s child without terminating the other partner’s 
parental rights). 
50. See In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that a parent’s parental rights are terminated upon adoption of the child by a non-
spousal partner). 
51. Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010). The case generated publicity 
in part because the non-biological mother petitioner in the case, Julia Boseman, was the 
first openly gay member of the North Carolina General Assembly. 
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B. Using Assisted Reproduction Technologies 
Broadly defined, assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are “non-
coital methods of conception that involve manipulation of both eggs and 
sperm” that allow individuals to reproduce without heterosexual 
intercourse.52 Common ART methods include artificial insemination, in-
vitro fertilization (IVF),53 and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).54 
ARTs came into common use in most developed countries in the mid- to 
late twentieth century.55 The main advantage of ARTs over adoption for 
LGBTI couples is that one partner will be genetically related to the child—
an advantage that is significant for some families.56 For example, gay male 
couples may conceive a child who possesses genes from one parent by 
combining one partner’s sperm with a donated egg and relying on a 
surrogate mother to gestate the child. Lesbian couples may use ART to 
include both mothers in the biological components of childbirth: one may 
donate the egg while the other gestates the child.57 Nevertheless, even with 
all of the ART options currently available, most LGBTI couples cannot 
currently conceive a child who is genetically related to both parents and 
must continue to rely on donated eggs or sperm to use ARTs.58 
 LGBTI ART users must decide whether to use an anonymous or 
known donor to supply eggs and/or sperm. Finding an egg or sperm donor 
can be a fraught and complicated process. While the nature/nurture debate 
is still going strong, choosing half of the genes for one’s child can make a 
 
52. Linda Beckman & S. Marie Harvey, Current Reproductive Technologies: 
Increased Access and Choice?, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 2 (2005). Federal law defines ART as 
“all treatments or procedures which include the handling of human oocytes or embryos, 
including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, [or] zygote intrafallopian 
transfer.” 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (2006). 
53. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 327 (2006) 
(describing IVF as “fertilization of an egg by sperm outside of the womb in a petri dish in 
order to produce an embryo that can be placed either in the potential birth mother’s 
reproductive organs or in cryopreservation for future use”). 
54. Id. (describing PGD as “a biopsy on a cell taken from an embryo to determine its 
genetic characteristics and condition prior to implantation”). PGD is a technique that can 
identify genetic defects in pre-embryos. 
55. Id. at xi, 8. 
56. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Beyond Cloning: Expanding Reproductive Options 
for Same-Sex Couples, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 651, 653 (2000-2001) (“Gay couples have the 
same strong interest as heterosexual couples in raising children with whom they have 
biological ties.”). 
57. Suzanne Pelka, Sharing Motherhood: Maternal Jealousy Among Lesbian Co-
Mothers, 56 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 195, 196 (2009). This option is both complicated and 
expensive because it requires at least one cycle of IVF (which involves hormonal therapy 
and anesthesia) to transfer the egg from one woman to the other. 
58. This may not be the case for some transgender and intersex individuals, or for any 
other LGBTI-identified couples whose biological configurations allow them to contribute 
both egg and sperm. 
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potential parent feel like she is gambling with the child’s identity and 
health.59 Some couples may thus prefer to use a known donor to avoid both 
the potentially complicated process of finding the right anonymous donor 
and at least some of the risks inherent in anonymous donation.60 Although 
most sperm banks offer a great deal of information about donors,61 
personal acquaintance with the donor can provide answers to questions 
about the donor’s character, behavior, and appearance—factors that most 
parents wish to consider before selecting the genes they will pass along to 
their child. Furthermore, some parents may prefer to select a donor they 
can contact in case of an emergency or even contact down the road with 
questions about family history if unexpected health concerns arise. If the 
child were to need an organ transplant later in life, parents who chose a 
known donor would be able to contact her.62 Not only would she be more 
likely to be an appropriate donor for the child, but she may also be more 
inclined to assist because of her relationship with the family.63 
 
59. Some diseases may be transmitted through donated sperm without the donor’s 
knowledge simply by passing on a deleterious gene. A donor who finds out years later that 
he is a genetic carrier of a particular disease is not obliged by current law to report this to 
the recipient parents. Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed 
Donation Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER & L. POL. 379, 390 (2009) (“Should a 
donor later develop a serious medical condition that may have been genetically passed on 
to an ART-conceived child, he is not required to contact either the sperm bank, the 
recipient mother, or the child.”). See also Johnson v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (denying relief in parents’ claim against a sperm bank that they 
allegedly negligently provided them with material from a donor with a history of kidney 
disease). Choosing an egg donor presents its own unique obstacles, as the business of egg 
donation is unregulated and consumers are faced with a variety of choices in their quest to 
find the perfect egg. Notably, one couple even offered to pay $50,000 for an Ivy League egg 
donor with high SAT scores. David Tuller, Payment Offers to Egg Donors Prompt 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at D5. 
60. Some couples choose to use the sperm of the non-gestating partner’s relative so as 
to allow for some genetic similarity with both parents. While such an arrangement has clear 
advantages, particularly when the parents need to immediately contact the donor in cases 
of medical emergency, many couples may feel uncomfortable with the ambiguity such 
decisions create, such as when the child’s uncle is also her biological father. 
61. Some of the information collected by sperm banks is required by Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.55 (2008) (requiring sperm banks 
to conduct a physical examination and to collect the medical history of the donor and to 
retain these records). The California Cryobank provides web-based information about 
potential donors’ ethnic origins, education level, areas of study, and religion, as well as 
audio interviews and photos from their early childhood. See CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK, 
http://www.cryobank.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
62. In some circumstances, children or their parents may also be able to identify and 
contact anonymous donors. See Ethics Comm. of Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Informing 
Offspring of their Conception by Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 529 
(2004) (explaining that, while most sperm banks maintain non-identifying records about the 
donors’ characteristics and medical history, “[a] growing number of sperm banks and 
programs make gametes available from donors who agree to be identified now or in the 
future”). 
63. A further complication with unknown sperm donors is that some children may 
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Still, choosing a known donor is not without its disadvantages. 
Disputes over parental rights may arise between the couple and the donor, 
and the law in this area is not well settled.64 Even when decisions about 
parental rights are made collaboratively in advance of childbirth, 
disagreements can arise down the road and litigation may ensue. Many 
potential LGBTI parents are thus understandably wary about entering into 
such agreements for fear that they will later face problems that could strain 
their relationship and adversely affect the child. 
Couples who want children but cannot carry a child themselves may 
rely on a surrogate mother in addition to an egg donor, which can create 
additional complications. ART using surrogacy can be quite expensive: 
after payment to the surrogate carrier, to a separate egg donor, for the IVF 
cycles, for agency and attorney fees, and for medical insurance and medical 
care during the pregnancy, the total cost can reach or exceed $120,000.65 
Additionally, the use of surrogate contracts may present a variety of legal 
hurdles. In some jurisdictions, for example, surrogate parenting 
agreements are not enforceable.66 Thus, if a surrogate carrier changes her 
 
eventually wish to find their biological donor fathers. Most sperm banks keep the identity 
of the donor anonymous. Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, 
Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2010) (noting that donor 
anonymity is the prevailing norm). However, there is much debate over this issue, and it is 
possible that laws on sperm donation and anonymity may change in the future. See id. at 
1205–18 (describing current legal debates regarding donor anonymity in the United States 
and abroad). In the United States, potential parents have the option to choose an open 
identity donor who voluntarily agrees to be contacted by offspring when they reach 
eighteen. See Joanna E. Scheib & Rachel A. Cushing, Open-Identity Donor Insemination 
in the United States: Is It on the Rise?, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 231, 231 (2007). In a 
relatively recent study on the topic, over eighty percent of participants conceived by an 
unknown donor indicated that they were at least moderately likely to request to meet their 
parents when they turned eighteen. J. Scheib, M. Riordan & S. Rubin, Adolescents with 
Open-Identity Sperm Donors: Reports from 12-17 Year Olds, 20 HUM. REPROD. 239, 239–
52 (2004). Tracing one’s origins is becoming easier as technology develops. In Britain, a 
fifteen-year-old boy succeeded in finding his original donor using a genealogy DNA test. 
He tracked the donor from his Y chromosome, which is passed from father to son virtually 
unchanged. Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCI., Nov. 
5, 2005, at 6. 
64. Compare C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (holding that a 
lesbian couple who solicited sperm from one member of a gay male couple could not 
extinguish the biological father’s parental rights in part because they had not complied with 
Ohio’s statutory requirements for establishing a legal relationship between donor and 
mother), with Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that 
sperm donor had no parental rights). The seemingly contradictory outcomes in these cases 
may be at least partially explained by the fact that in the former case, the parties decided 
that the sperm donor would be a “male role model” for the child, while in the latter, the 
parties agreed that the man would be simply a sperm donor, without any parental rights. 
65. See, e.g., DEBORAH SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 213 (2006) (estimating costs of 
various assisted reproduction techniques). 
66. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–218 (2006) (“No person may enter into, include, 
arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract.”); 
D.C. CODE § 16–402 (2001) (banning surrogacy agreements). 
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mind and decides not to turn over the child to the contracting couple, the 
couple may not have any legal recourse. Some couples may also be 
concerned about what role, if any, the surrogate mother will play in their 
family.67 
Thus, while ARTs may provide LGBTI individuals with an appealing 
alternative to adoption, the many possible complications related to their 
use suggest that they are, at best, an imperfect solution for couples who 
wish to have a genetically-related child. 
C. Co-Parenting 
Some LGBTI individuals and couples choose to build their families 
through co-parenting arrangements. Co-parenting arrangements often 
begin when an individual or couple wishing to have a child seeks a co-
parent through their own social networks, in online advertisements, or 
through centers that help match future parents.68 For example, a man and a 
woman, at least one of whom identifies as LGBTI, may conceive a child 
together and then share parenting responsibilities.69 There are a variety of 
ways to structure this kind of arrangement. In some cases, the man and the 
woman might live together or in close proximity to one another. The child 
might live in one parent’s house while still being parented by the other(s), 
or might alternate between homes. 
The health and safety risks and the prohibitive costs often associated 
with adoption and some ARTs are not present in co-parenting 
arrangements. Typically, the co-parents use artificial insemination to 
conceive (though other options are available) and the child is genetically 
related to both parents.70 There are likely fewer surprises as well, as co-
parenting involves no unknown donor and no hidden costs. 
Nevertheless, co-parenting is yet another imperfect solution for 
LGBTI couples who want children. Even if the parties know one another 
beforehand, raising a child together can lead to disputes and cause serious 
rifts in the relationship,71 just as it can in more “traditional” parenting 
 
67. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 101. 
68. See Susan Hogben & Justine Coupland, Egg Seeks Sperm. End of Story . . . ? 
Articulating Gay Parenting in Small Ads for Reproductive Partners, 11 DISCOURSE & 
SOC’Y 457, 478 (2000) (defining co-parenting and describing ads seeking co-parenting 
arrangements). See also GAY FAMILY OPTIONS, http://www.gayfamilyoptions.com (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2011) (offering assistance in finding co-parents and other partners for the 
purpose of creating a family). 
69. See Hogben & Coupland, supra note 68, at 478. 
70. See, e.g., Deborah Dempsey, Conceiving and Negotiating Reproductive 
Relationships: Lesbians and Gay Men Forming Families with Children, 44 SOCIOLOGY 
1145, 1152–54 (2010) (describing co-parenting arrangements in Australia). 
71. See, e.g., Denise Balkissoon, One Big Gay Family, TORONTO LIFE, Feb. 2009, 
http://www.torontolife.com/features/one-big-gay-family/?pageno=1 (“Parenting power 
struggles—disagreements over the child’s diet, clothes, activity schedule and so on—can 
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situations. Moreover, co-parenting involves its own legal risks. Once the 
child is born, one parent may seek more or less involvement than initially 
agreed upon. Disputes may arise over money, education, living 
arrangements, or any number of other parenting issues.72 If a previously 
single parent enters into a relationship, that partner may seek to acquire 
guardianship, further complicating the contractual arrangement. 
D. Conclusion 
While many of the difficulties noted throughout this section are also 
faced by infertile opposite-sex couples who want to have children, the 
LGBTI community encounters additional problems unknown to most 
opposite-sex partners, as these heterosexual couples are much more likely 
to find their efforts at building families supported by social and legal (if not 
biological) norms. But another option may be on the technological 
horizon. Cloning may provide solutions to some of the more common 
problems associated with LGBTI adoption, co-parenting, and ARTs. As I 
discuss in the following section, cloning is not without its drawbacks. 
Nevertheless, it remains a real possibility that this emerging technology, if 
properly researched and regulated, could solve many of the most common 
problems faced by same-sex and other “nontraditional” couples when 
deciding whether and how to become parents. 
III.  
CLONING OFFERS NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE GENETICALLY-
RELATED CHILDREN 
The creation of Dolly the sheep in 1996 sparked heated political, 
philosophical, legal, cultural, and moral debate.73 Dolly was the first 
mammal to be cloned from an adult somatic cell. She was created after 277 
attempts74 at using somatic cell nuclear transfer technology (SCNT), a 
form of cloning.75 The vast majority of Americans are against the use of 
 
lead moms to demote ‘daddy’ to ‘donor.’ One gay Toronto father, H, has fought a series of 
legal disputes with a pair of lesbian co-mothers over their six-year-old daughter.”). 
72. See Co-Parenting, THE LESBIAN AND GAY FOUND., http://www.lgf.org.uk/co-
parenting (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (“Once you have found a suitable partner, contacting a 
legal representative is advisable. It would be a good idea to draw up a ‘parenting 
agreement’ covering the important aspects of childcare such as money, living arrangements, 
schooling etc.”). 
73. See generally BRENT WATERS & RONALD COLE-TURNER, GOD AND THE EMBRYO, 
RELIGIOUS VOICES ON STEM CELLS AND CLONING (2003) (surveying religious perspectives 
on cloning); ARLENE JUDITH KLOTZKO, THE CLONING SOURCEBOOK (2001) (discussing 
ethical and policy issues related to cloning and medical research). See also SILJA VÖNEKY & 
RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN CLONING (2004) (discussing 
interdisciplinary approaches to the ethics of cloning). 
74. WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 6. 
75. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., SCIENTIFIC AND 
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reproductive cloning.76 The scientific community is more divided on this 
issue, and distinguished scholars from a variety of disciplines support its 
use. In the following sections, I define cloning and discuss the potential 
benefits of reproductive cloning for the population at large, drawing on a 
variety of perspectives. After suggesting that cloning holds great promise 
for people who experience reproductive difficulties, I turn to examine the 
benefits to the LGBTI community in particular. 
A. What Is Cloning? 
In its most basic form, cloning is reproduction without sex, or asexual 
reproduction. In “traditional” sexual reproduction, the merging of egg and 
sperm in the uterus results in the birth of a new organism. Through 
cloning, an organism is created from a single cell.77 In the process of SCNT, 
genetic material from recipient eggs is removed and replaced with the 
nucleus of a donor cell.78 SCNT can be used for both reproductive cloning 
and therapeutic cloning.79 Therapeutic cloning is a form of nuclear 
transplantation used to produce stem cells in a lab.80 The product of this 
process is then used to make a stem cell line for further study, without the 
 
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 28 (2002). There are two methods 
of reproductive cloning: somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), as discussed in this article, 
and embryo splitting. See Jacques Cohen & Giles Tomkin, The Science, Fiction, and the 
Reality of Embryo Cloning, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN CLONING 11, 14–16 (Michael C. 
Brannigan ed. 2001). SCNT requires two cells: a donor and an egg cell. The egg cell is 
enucleated and the DNA from the donor is transplanted. Yet some m-DNA from the egg 
remains; this m-DNA is responsible for energy metabolism of the cell. Therefore, in SCNT, 
the new individual is not an exact copy of either the donor or the recipient because m-DNA 
from the egg remains. The use of embryo splitting, however, does produce an exact 
genotypic duplicate of the original fertilized ovum. See JOHN CHARLES KUNICH, THE 
NAKED CLONE: HOW CLONING BANS THREATEN OUR PERSONAL RIGHTS 6 (2003). Other 
methods of cloning technology, which are beyond the scope of this paper, are not currently 
being used for reproductive cloning. See, e.g., Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein 
Controversy: The Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 227, 284–89 
(1999) (discussing various types of cloning). 
76. In 2001, ninety percent of Americans thought that human cloning was a “bad 
idea.” Jeffrey M. Jones & Joseph Carroll, Americans Oppose Idea of Human Cloning, 
GALLUP.COM (Dec. 6, 2001), http://www.gallup.com/poll/5098/americans-oppose-idea-
human-cloning.aspx. A survey conducted the following year by the Genetics and Public 
Policy Center found that seventy-six percent of Americans oppose scientists working on 
ways to clone humans. K. Hudson, J. Scott & A. Kalfoglou, Public Awareness and 
Attitudes about Reproductive Genetic Technology, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER, 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/pub.reports.php?action=detail&report_id=9%20 (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2011). 
77. AARON D. LEVINE, CLONING: A BEGINNERS GUIDE 2 (2007). 
78. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 53, at 247. 
79. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 28. 
80. Some scientists prefer the term “research cloning” rather than “therapeutic 
cloning” because they believe it more accurately describes the present state of research and 
reflects the fact that embryos are being cloned not for use in current therapies in humans 
but for research on potential future therapeutic uses. See, e.g., LEVINE, supra note 77, at 92. 
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intent to transfer the cloned cells and resulting embryo to the uterus for 
purposes of procreation.81 In the future, these lines could also potentially 
be used for clinical applications, such as repairing damaged or defective 
tissues.82 Reproductive cloning, on the other hand, is the deliberate 
production of genetically-identical individuals.83 Reproductive cloning 
involves implanting a blastocyst (an early-stage human embryo) formed by 
a nuclear transplantation procedure in a uterus, where it initiates the 
process of forming a fetus.84 Through SCNT for human reproductive 
cloning, researchers could use a cell from one individual to create another 
genetically-identical person. While therapeutic cloning is fairly well 
accepted, particularly within the scientific community, reproductive 
cloning is extremely controversial.85 This Article focuses on reproductive 
cloning and, unless otherwise noted, I use “cloning” to refer solely to 
human reproductive cloning.86 
In practice, reproductive cloning looks quite different from its 
 
81. John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 609, 611 
(1999) [hereinafter Two Models of Human Cloning] (“[T]herapeutic cloning clones a 
person’s cells to the blastocyst stage with no intent to transfer the cloned cells and resulting 
embryo to the uterus, as would occur with reproductive cloning. Embryonic stem . . . cells 
would then be removed from the embryo in order to obtain cells or tissue for research and 
eventually transplantation.”). 
82.  Id. Stem cells produced by therapeutic cloning could be used to treat disorders 
ranging from leukemia to Parkinson’s to Alzheimer’s. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 
53, at 248. Therapeutic cloning could also be used to create embryonic stem cells. An 
embryo might be cloned for the purpose of obtaining transplantable organs. This would 
allow for the creation of stem cells to repair organs without fear that the person’s immune 
system will reject the organ. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Monkey Cloning a Reason to Pause, 
Not Panic, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 13, 2007 5:51:22 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
21755931/. Put differently, people might one day use their own stem cells to repair 
themselves. 
83. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 24 (noting that, with SCNT, 
the clone will carry almost the same DNA as the cell donor, with the exception of the m-
DNA). 
84. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 53, at 247–48. But see Christine Hauskeller, 
Science in Touch: Functions of Biomedical Terminology, 20 BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY 815, 
826 (2005) (explaining that the only difference between therapeutic and reproductive 
cloning is whether the clone is implanted in the uterus, yet this difference is used to create a 
binary distinction between good (therapeutic) cloning and bad (reproductive) cloning). 
85. Hauskeller, supra note 84, at 826. 
86. Reproductive cloning has potential beyond its use for human reproduction. As the 
scientists who cloned Dolly explained, “When we created Dolly, we were not thinking 
about rooms full of clones . . . We were not thinking about helping lesbians to reproduce 
without the help of a sperm bank or about multiplying movie stars. We were certainly not 
thinking of duplicating dictators.” WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 3. Instead, 
reproductive cloning may be useful in other, less obvious areas, such as food production 
and medicine. The cells of an animal that produces human proteins that can cure stomach 
ailments, for example, could be mass-produced, providing widely available treatments for 
stomach pain. LEVINE, supra note 77, at 84–89. Species facing extinction might even one 
day be saved by cloning. Id . at 78–82. 
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portrayal in films and in the public imagination.87 A cloned human being is 
not a photocopy of another.88 Despite their shared genetic identity, clones 
will not be identical in physical or behavioral characteristics, because DNA 
is not the sole determinant of appearance or personality.89 Like all human 
embryos, a cloned embryo must be implanted into the womb of another 
human being and gestated for roughly nine months.90 Beginning in utero, 
the experience of the cloned person and the donor will diverge.91 While the 
recipient’s nuclear DNA will be the same as the donor’s, part of the egg 
still remains. A small portion of about sixty genes from the egg will not be 
removed; this is mitochondrial DNA (m-DNA), which is responsible for 
energy metabolism.92 Dolly, for example, comprised nuclear DNA from a 
Finn Dorest sheep and m-DNA from a Scottish Blackface.93 The cloned 
individual inherits the DNA in the egg’s mitochondria, which creates 
differences in the physiology and functioning of systems that have high 
energy demands including the muscles, the heart, and the brain.94 As a 
result, scientists predict that a cloned person and her source counterpart 
will typically be less similar to one another than identical twins.95 
It is worth mentioning that cloning might be combined with a gene 
splicing technique, allowing the couple to use cells from both partners, 
reduce the number of chromosomes in each cell’s nucleus by one half, and 
fuse the two adult cells with an enucleated egg.96 Then, in the regular 
process of SCNT, the enucleated egg would be implanted in uterus, 
resulting in a cloned child who shares a mix of genes from both parents. I 
discuss the possibility of this method further in Part IV(B). 
Developments in cloning technology are occurring far more quickly 
than changes in the laws regulating cloning research. Important 
 
87. See GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO’S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING? 39, 39–43 (1998) 
(surveying cloning in science fiction); HWA A. LIM, MULTIPLICITY YOURS: CLONING, STEM 
CELL RESEARCH, AND REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 129–30 (2006) (“[T]here have been no 
shortages of novels and movies on cloning.”). 
88. LIM, supra note 87, at 121 (“There is a critical difference, however, between 
photocopying graphic materials and cloning (genetic copying) organisms . . . . [T]he 
development of a clone involves not only nature (the genetic makeup), but also nurture 
(the effects of environmental factors). Thus an exact duplicate of the original is almost 
impossible.”). 
89. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 26. 
90. Yuriko M. Shikai, Don’t Be Swept Away By Mass Hysteria: The Benefits Of 
Human Reproductive Cloning and Its Future, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 259, 273 (2004) (“[A]ny 
embryos resulting from cloning must be implanted in a woman’s uterus and carried to term 
one at a time.”). 
91. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 26. 
92. LIM, supra note 87, at 191. 
93. WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 242. 
94. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 26. 
95. Id.; LEVINE, supra note 77, at 3. 
96. Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 654–56. 
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breakthroughs in research have been made in the years following Dolly’s 
creation. Following on the heels of Dolly, a bull, piglets, a merino sheep, a 
cow, dog, cat, and other mammals were successfully cloned.97 Scientists 
suggest that cloning a human being will be easier than cloning other 
mammals, since humans do not possess the genes that appear to cause the 
growth of dangerously large embryos in the wombs of other cloned 
mammals.98 In 2006, a group of researchers attempted to implant a cloned 
embryo in a human uterus.99 While unsuccessful, it was the first reliable 
report of an attempt at human reproductive cloning, and scientists have 
noted that “the possibility of human cloning . . . is now much closer to 
becoming a reality.”100 
Despite these advances in the science of cloning, safe and usable 
reproductive cloning techniques are not yet available, and the science of 
reproductive cloning is still in its infancy. Although healthy embryos are 
occasionally created, the cloned embryos of mammals are commonly lost 
during early stages of development for reasons that remain unknown.101 At 
present, we have no way of knowing when cloning will be safe and efficient 
enough to be of practical utility. 
B. Arguments in Favor of Reproductive Cloning 
Reproductive cloning may allow infertile couples to have a genetically-
related child with minimal aid from a gamete donor. Infertility is a major 
problem in the United States today, and the number of couples who turn 
to ART is steadily increasing;102 cloning would be an alternative to ART 
for these couples. Single individuals who wish to have children could also 
 
97. LIM, supra note 87, at 175–76; James Kanter, Scientists Produce First Cloned 
Fighting Bull, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/ 
business/global/30got.html?_r=1&ref=cloning. 
98. J. Keith Killian, Catherine M. Nolan, Andrew A. Wylie, Tao Li, Thanh H. Vu, 
Andrew R. Hoffman & Randy L. Jirtle, Divergent Evolution in M6P/IGF2R Imprinting 
From the Jurassic to the Quaternary, 10 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 1721, 1726 (2001). 
99. Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 1–2. Prior to this attempt, only 
unreliable reports of cloning had been made. See, e.g., Brian Dakss, Eve: First Human 
Clone?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 27, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/28/tech/main 
534594.shtml. 
100. Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 1. 
101. Susan M. Rhind, Jane E. Taylor, Paul A. DeSousa, Tim J. King, Michelle 
McGarry & Ian Wilmut, Human Cloning: Can it be Made Safe?, 4 NATURE REVS. 855, 855 
(2003). 
102. See Gulcin Gumus & Jungmin Lee, The ART of Life: IVF or Child Adoption? 2 
(Feb. 2010) (Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 4761), 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp4761.html (discussing the increase in ART use, and 
noting that “over the last several decades, age-related infertility has become increasingly 
prevalent as a relatively larger portion of women have deferred childbearing due to 
effective birth control methods, safe and legal abortions, better access to college education, 
and greater participation in the labor market”). 
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benefit from reproductive cloning, as this procedure eliminates the 
potential hassle of finding a third-party donor or the anxiety that the 
child’s genetic parent might later claim parental rights.103 As discussed 
above, the options currently available for “nontraditional” couples to have 
a genetically-related child are far from perfect.104 Nevertheless, because the 
complexity and expense of cloning, the availability of other options, and 
widespread opposition to cloning may discourage many from using the 
technology,105 it is likely that cloning would be as a last resort option, used 
by couples only after attempting to conceive with other ARTs.106 
Cloning might also be used to avoid the transmission of harmful 
genetic traits to children.107 Individuals who are aware that they may pass 
on harmful genes to their offspring might choose to clone their partner to 
ensure that their child will not possess the undesired gene, while still 
avoiding the use of a third-party donor.108 Alternately, individuals may 
 
103. See Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 636, n.124 
(noting that cloning could offer “the convenience of not having to risk having a child with a 
genetic father who might later claim rearing rights”). 
104. See supra Part II. 
105. But see Eric A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning, 
in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 12, at 233, 234 (noting that, while the perceived 
weirdness of cloning “might be thought to depress demand,” the effect is “probably only 
transitional . . . . [I]f it is a source of potential substantial net benefits, its use will spread, 
and when some critical mass is reached, the aversion will drop away and a more rapid 
diffusion will begin.”). 
106. Daar, supra note 4, at 527 (“Because of its complexity and likely expense, 
[cloning] would serve as a last resort for most couples who desire to parent a genetically 
related child . . . .”). But see Posner & Posner, supra note 105, at 257 (arguing that it is 
impossible to determine the demand for human cloning because it depends on many 
variables that are not yet known). Robertson, however, argues that Eric and Richard 
Posner “reach their conclusion by making two assumptions that appear highly 
counterfactual.” First, they assume that one could produce a child more quickly through 
cloning than through sexual reproduction. This is incorrect, since nine months of gestation 
is required in both sexual and asexual reproduction. Second, 
they incorrectly assume that all infertility would lead to a demand for cloning 
rather than to a demand for the other treatments and alternatives for dealing 
with infertility . . . The Posners also err in thinking that persons with gametic or 
nongametic infertility that cannot be treated by conventional methods would 
always choose cloning over childlessness, adoption, or gamete donation. Because 
of the special meanings and complications raised by cloning, only a (small) subset 
of this group of infertile couples is likely to choose cloning as the solution to their 
reproductive problem. 
Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 625–27. 
107. Daar, supra note 4, at 527–28. 
108. See The PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 79 (2002) (“Human cloning could allow couples at risk of 
generating children with genetic disease to have healthy children . . . . [I]f both parents 
carried one copy of a recessive gene for the same heritable disorder, cloning might allow 
them to ensure that their child does not inherit the known genetic disease (without having 
to resort to using donor gametes or practicing preimplantation or prenatal genetic diagnosis 
and elimination of afflicted embryos or fetuses) .”). 
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decide to clone an already existing child (who carries the mix of both 
genes) who they know does not carry the harmful gene. 
C. Conclusion 
The science of cloning is still in its infancy and requires continued, 
systematic research to reach its full potential. In the following Part, I argue 
that cloning offers hope for those who are unable to bring children into the 
world through sexual reproduction. The LGBTI community may be 
uniquely poised to benefit from advances in this technology. 
IV.  
CLONING CAN BENEFIT THE LGBTI COMMUNITY BY ALLOWING LGBTI 
PEOPLE TO CONCEIVE GENETICALLY-RELATED CHILDREN 
Reproductive cloning offers unique benefits to members of the 
LGBTI community by providing additional—or, in some cases, the only—
opportunities to conceive genetically-related children. Some gay rights 
activists recognized the potential benefits of reproductive cloning 
immediately after the birth of Dolly and were accordingly quick to support 
it.109 One group of queer activists in New York, called the Clone Rights 
United Front, demonstrated against proposed state legislation that would 
ban nuclear transplantation research and human cloning on the grounds 
that reproductive cloning offers many opportunities to LGBTI individuals 
wishing to become parents.110 In 2003, Clonaid—a group that bills itself as 
“Pioneers in Human Cloning”—announced (inaccurately) that a Dutch 
lesbian couple had given a birth to a cloned child, and that they had 
received many other requests from gay couples looking to clone 
children.111 
Admittedly, not everyone advocates the use of cloning by the LGBTI 
community. Even within the community, people express concerns about 
the use and utility of cloning.112 However, these perspectives are in the 
 
109. See Jack Nichols, First Cloning Rights Group Led by Gay Pioneer, GAY TODAY, 
Feb. 27, 1997, http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garchive/events/022897ev.htm; Jack Nichols, 
“Support Cloning” Say Top-Name Lesbian & Gay Activists, GAY TODAY, Mar. 3, 1997, 
http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garchive/events/030397ev.htm. 
110. See Christopher Rapp, Gay Clones, HETERODOXY MAG., April/May 1997, 
http://www.clonerights.com/hetrodoxy.htm. 
111. Press Release, Clonaid, Clonaid Team Ready for Human Parthenogenesis (May 
4, 2004), http://www.clonaid.com/news.php?default.0.2 [hereinafter Clonaid Press Release]. 
The cloned child announced in 2003 was born by using one mother’s DNA and the other 
mother’s womb, rather than through gene splicing. See Gina Kolata, Experts Are 
Suspicious of Group’s Claim of Cloned Human’s Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at A16 
(reporting widespread scientific skepticism about Clonaid’s claim that they had succeeded 
in cloning the first human being). Clonaid’s stated mission, however, is to give birth to a 
child with the genes of both parents. Clonaid Press Release, supra. 
112. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC., GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
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minority. Those who support cloning generally point out that LGBTI 
individuals have a special interest in reproductive cloning and, therefore, 
should have a right to use it.113 The primary debate among cloning 
advocates both inside and outside of the community is over whether 
cloning can, in fact, benefit the LGBTI community, and whether such 
benefits would be equitably distributed.114 In this Part, I argue that cloning 
can significantly benefit LGBTI couples and individuals, although the high 
cost of the procedure may make it inaccessible to some. 
A. Lesbian Couples 
Lesbian couples would likely derive significant benefits from advances 
in reproductive cloning. Even without gene splicing technology, cloning 
would obviate the need for these couples to rely on a sperm donor.115 
Furthermore, cloning offers both mothers the opportunity to participate in 
the genetic creation of the child: one partner donates the egg, thus 
contributing m-DNA to the clone, while the other contributes the nuclear 
DNA.116 Either woman could then potentially gestate the fetus. 
Additionally, combining cloning with gene splicing would enable lesbian 
couples to have a child with equal portions of DNA from each parent.117 
 
LGBTQI COMMUNITY: MYTHS AND FACTS, Apr. 17, 2004, http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/ 
article.php?id=1963 (“Our resources are far better spent advocating for equal access to 
existing means of family building, legal protections for GLBT parents and children, and full 
social acceptance of GLBT families.”). See also Jeremy Laurance, Gay Groups Split Over 
‘Engineered Babies’, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Sept 26, 2000, at 8, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-wellbeing/health-news/gay-groups-split-
over-engineered-babies-698589.html (discussing reactions from gay rights groups in the 
United Kingdom). 
113. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Edward Stein, Queer Clones, in CLONES AND 
CLONES, supra note 12, at 95, 109 (“Queer cloning can be viewed as the next logical step in 
queer people’s formation of families of choice.”); Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 653 
(“Despite the value of gay reproduction, laws designed to prevent human cloning could 
have the inadvertent effect of preventing genetic reproduction by same-sex couples. Laws 
banning cloning or impeding cloning research define cloning in a way that would include 
genetic reproduction by same-sex couples, especially male-male couples.”). See also 
GREGORY E. PENCE, CLONING AFTER DOLLY: WHO’S STILL AFRAID? 114–15 (2004) (noting 
that cloning is “surprisingly easy to justify . . . because it would be just another tool in our 
reproductive tool kit for creating families and better humans”). 
114. See, e.g., Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 99 (“In the short term, therefore, 
queer cloning would only be available to the wealthiest women.”); Theresa Pinto Sherer, 
Can Two Men Make a Baby?, SALON (Jan. 31 2001), http://www.salon.com/life/feature/ 
2001/01/31/eggs (reporting that the author asked a gay friend if he would use cloning if 
available and he answered, “Perhaps, if it weren’t prohibitively costly”). 
115. See, e.g., Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 634 (“For 
lesbians, [reproductive cloning] offered the unique advantage of reproduction without the 
need of a male, which is an important goal for some lesbians. It also allowed a woman to 
reproduce alone, for she herself could provide the m-DNA and cytoplasm, nuclear DNA, 
and gestation needed to produce a child.”). 
116. Id. at 635. 
117. Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 99 (“With cloning. . . if [a lesbian] wants to 
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B. Gay Male Couples 
Scholars disagree over whether cloning technologies are (or are likely 
to be in the near future) advanced enough to be useful for gay male 
couples. The main controversy surrounds the availability of gene splicing 
techniques. With more research, gene splicing might be used to create a 
zygote that contains genetic materials from two men.118 While several 
studies suggest that this might soon be a possibility,119 others in the 
scientific community claim that viable gene-splicing technology is too far in 
the future to be a practical option.120 Some scholars argue that, without 
gene splicing, cloning would provide little for gay men that is not already 
 
mix her genes with those of her life partner or a close friend, gene-splicing could do the 
trick.”). 
118. See, e.g., id. at 118 (“With the advent of gene-splicing, same-sex unions could not 
only produce children, but also produce children who are genetic hybrids of the parents, 
just like those produced in different-sex unions.”). In 2000, Calum MacKellar, a lecturer in 
bioethics and biochemistry at the University of Edinburgh, argued that the genetic 
techniques used in the creation of Dolly may one day make it possible for two men to 
conceive a child with shared genes. The process would still require a woman’s egg and a 
surrogate mother, but a child could be made by combining the DNA of both fathers. See 
Calum MacKellar, Children with Two Genetic Fathers, EUR. BIOETHICAL RES., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080328082126/http://www.bioethics.org.uk/2_fathrs.htm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
119. In a 1999 experiment, scientists used chimeras reconstructed from asexual 
reproduction and bovine embryos fertilized in vitro. See generally A. Boediono, T. Suzuki, 
L.Y. Li & R.A. Godke, Offspring Born from Chimeras Reconstructed From 
Parthenogenesis and in Vitro Fertilized Bovine Embryos, 53 MOLECULAR REPROD. & DEV. 
159 (1999). A “chimera” is defined as “[a]n organism, organ, or part consisting of two or 
more tissues of different genetic composition, produced as a result of organ transplant, 
grafting, or genetic engineering; a bizarre human-animal amalgam or hybrid.” KUNICH, 
supra note 75, at 163 (2003). In 2004, Japanese researchers created a mouse that had two 
mothers but no father. See Tomohiro Kono, Yayoi Obata, Quiong Wu, Katsutoshi Niwa, 
Yukiko Ono, Yuji Yamamoto, Eun Sung Park, Jeong-Sun Seo & Hidehiko Ogawa, Birth of 
Parthenogenetic Mice That Can Develop to Adulthood, 428 NATURE 860, 863 (2004). The 
investigators fused one mouse egg to another whose DNA was altered to change the 
activity of two imprinted genes. In essence, the gene activity in the modified egg resembled 
that of sperm. Id. The most relevant breakthrough, however, occurred in January 2008. In 
this experiment, human embryos containing DNA from two women and one man were 
created by British scientists. Three-Parent Embryo Formed in Lab, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 
2008 11:13 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7227861.stm. Ten embryos were created from 
three DNA donors and started to develop normally, but they were destroyed within six 
days. Id. This research suggests that a technique that allows for genetic modification (gene 
splicing to create an embryo by mixing the DNA of two males) is likely to be possible 
around the same time that reproductive cloning becomes safe and efficient. See Martin H. 
Johnson, Reproduction in the Noughties: Will the Scientists Have All the Fun?, 198 J. 
ANATOMY 385, 390 (2001) (arguing that a technique to create a child from the mix of the 
DNA of two lesbians or gay males, even if not perfect, could become available and would 
be safe in the near future). 
120. See Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 637, n.126 (“A 
chimera created with the genes of two different males would make each a genetic father of 
the child, but such a procedure is too distant in the future to be a practical option.”). 
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offered by other ARTs.121 Because gay men, unlike fertile lesbian couples, 
would still have to rely on a third party to gestate the child and donate an 
egg, cloning would be no different from other forms of IVF.122 
However, I suggest that, even without the benefits of gene-splicing 
technology, gay men may have a compelling interest in reproductive 
cloning.123 Cloning would allow them to have a child with almost the same 
DNA as one father and little third-party DNA (only the m-DNA from the 
egg donor).124 Therefore, the “gambling” factor associated with choosing 
the right egg would be avoided.125 
Importantly, even if gene-splicing technology were perfected, gay men 
would still need to rely on egg donation and gestation. Because cloning by 
gay men requires a surrogate mother to gestate the child, the procedure 
raises ethical questions. Some feminists argue that surrogacy arrangements 
exploit female bodies,126 commercialize the birth process,127 and reinforce 
 
121. Id. at 636–37 (noting that gay men have a weaker argument in favor of the use of 
reproductive cloning because they will still need to enlist a foreign egg and gestating 
mother). 
122. Assuming, that is, that incubation technology—an artificial womb that will 
replace a woman’s womb—will not be available in the near future. See Frida Simonstein, 
Artificial Reproductive Technologies and the Advent of the Artificial Womb, in 
REPROGEN-ETHICS AND THE FUTURE OF GENDER 177 (Frida Simonstein ed. 2009) 
(suggesting that, while an artificial womb seems a remote possibility, it may be only a 
matter of time until someone finds a way to develop one). 
123. Eskridge and Stein argue that cloning would also allow gay men to procreate 
without worry of transmitting HIV to their children. However, it is not clear that 
prevention of HIV transmission is a persuasive reason for gay men to use cloning to have 
children, given the other options available to reduce or eliminate the risk of HIV 
transmission in the process of reproduction such as sperm washing and IVF. Cf. Eskridge & 
Stein, supra note 113, at 96–97 (noting that all individuals, regardless of sexual orientation, 
would benefit from the ability to avoid transmitting AIDS to their offspring). 
124. Daar, supra note 4, at 529 (arguing that cloning “may alleviate . . . [gay males’] 
worries [about potential claims of parental rights by egg donors and genetic surrogates] by 
eliminating gamete donors from the procreation equation”); Jessica Lin Lewis, Predicting 
the Judicial Response to an Asserted Right to Reproductive Cloning, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 
523, 524 (2008) (“In the case of gay males, the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer would 
reduce the biological contribution of an ‘outsider’ to enucleated egg donation and 
surrogacy.”). 
125. As explained above, the egg in the cloning process has minimal effect on the 
child’s genetic makeup. In SCNT, the DNA of the egg is removed (with the exception of 
the m-DNA) and a cell nucleus from the DNA donor is transferred into the egg. Therefore, 
the clone shares the DNA of the DNA donor and not that of the egg donor. See supra Part 
II. 
126. See generally Rosalie Ber, Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy, 21 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 153 (2000) (arguing that gestational surrogacy is a form 
of slavery and prostitution). 
127. See Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile 
Women or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
113, 154 (1997) (“Allowing compensation to a surrogate constitutes the sale of children 
thereby making ‘surrogate babies’ commodities and items of manufacture. As a result, 
surrogacy violates human dignity by placing a market value on the leasing of a womb and 
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the image of women as “reproductive machines.”128 As other feminists 
point out, however, when surrogacy arrangements are properly and 
sensitively handled, they can serve to support women’s autonomy and 
liberation by allowing them to exercise free choice.129 The arguments for 
and against surrogacy are voluminous and exceed this Article’s scope, but 
it is important to note that surrogacy arrangements already exist and will 
likely continue with or without cloning. 
C. Transgender and Transsexual Individuals 
Transsexualism is defined by the American Heritage Medical 
Dictionary as “[t]he desire to change one’s anatomic sexual characteristics 
to conform physically with one’s perception of self as a member of the 
opposite sex.”130 It is often used to describe someone who is “intending to 
undergo, is undergoing or has undergone gender reassignment 
treatment.”131 Transgender, on the other hand, is an umbrella term that 
includes a wide range of identities, all of which concern “people who live, 
or desire to live, a large part of their adult life in the role and dress of that 
gender group which would be considered to be in opposition to their sex as 
designated at birth.”132 Thus, gender reassignment treatment or the desire 
for it does not determine whether a person is transgender or not.133 In this 
paper, I use the term “transgender” to refer to individuals who have 
undertaken “light” changes to alter their biological sex, such as taking 
hormones, while I use the term “transsexuals” to refer to individuals who 
have taken more serious medical steps toward changing their biological 
sex. Accounting for the particular needs of transgender and transsexual 
individuals is not easy. As with any group of people, individual needs vary 
widely. For the purposes of this section, however, I will discuss transgender 
 
obtaining a child.”). 
128. See Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 102 (“Some gay men, including the 
authors of this essay, are feminists and would be ethically concerned about . . . surrogacy as 
. . . reinforcing gender stereotypes of women as ‘breeders.’”). 
129. Id. (“On the other hand, many feminists powerfully defend surrogacy as freedom 
to deploy their bodies; some of the same prochoice arguments that support the right to 
abortion also support the right to surrogacy.”); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 
785 (Cal. 1993) (“The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to 
gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for 
centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and professional status 
under the law. To resurrect this view is both to foreclose a personal and economic choice on 
the part of the surrogate mother.”). 
130. Definition of Transsexualism, FREE ONLINE MED. DICTIONARY, http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/transexual (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting AMERICAN 
HERITAGE MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2007)). 
131. See STEPHEN WHITTLE, RESPECT AND EQUALITY, TRANSSEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xxiii (2002). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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and transsexual individuals in two broad groups based on their gender or 
sex transition—female to male (FtM) and male to female (MtF)—and then 
briefly describe issues shared by most transgender people. 
It is important to emphasize that the sexual orientation of transsexual 
and transgender people varies greatly, just as it does with non-transfolk; 
some identify as gay, some bisexual, some asexual, and some 
heterosexual.134 Some may identify more generally as simply “queer.” For 
the purposes of discussing the transgender community in the context of 
cloning, I assume that everyone in the community is heterosexual; thus, 
when I describe how couples might use cloning, I hypothetically assume 
they have opposite-sex partners. This is a problematic but necessary 
assumption for the purposes of this section. 
Transgender people are faced with a variety of personal, legal, 
medical, and social problems if they wish to have children.135 Some 
transgender individuals believe that they will not be good parents due to 
the difficulties or trauma they have experienced in their own lives,136 or 
feel that infertility is the “price” they pay for undergoing transition.137 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some may be concerned that their 
transsexuality will be passed on to their offspring.138 Many transgender 
people are uninsured139 and do not have the money required to address 
 
134. Nick Neave, HORMONES AND BEHAVIOR: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 122 
(2008). 
135. See generally Sheelagh McGuinness & Amel Alghrani, Gender and Parenthood: 
The Case for Realignment, 16 MED. L. REV. 261 (2008) (discussing the medical and legal 
barriers that currently prevent transgender people from becoming parents). 
136. P. De Sutter, K. Kira, A. Verschoor & A. Hotimsky, The Desire to Have 
Children and the Preservation of Fertility in Transsexual Women: A Survey, 6 INT’L J. 
TRANSGENDERISM (2002) [hereinafter De Sutter, The Desire to Have Children] (“Other 
individuals believe they would not be good parents and would therefore choose not to have 
children anyway. They believe the psychological trauma they had to go through because of 
their gender dysphoria would impair a normal parent-child relationship.”), available at 
http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijtvo06no03_02.htm. 
137. Paul De Sutter, Gender Reassignment and Assisted Reproduction: Present and 
Future Reproductive Options for Transsexual People, 16 HUM. REPROD. 612, 612 (2001) 
[hereinafter De Sutter, Gender Reassignment]. 
138. De Sutter, Kira, Verschoor & Hotimsky, The Desire to Have Children, supra 
note 136 (“One woman had the opportunity to freeze sperm, but deliberately chose not to 
as she was afraid that her transsexualism might be a genetic condition. There were two 
other members of the family on her mother’s side who also were transsexual, and she did 
not want to risk passing on a genetic condition to her child, and to put a child through what 
she had endured in her life, as she put it. This is an interesting remark, because several 
respondents expressed this fear.”). 
139. See MINTER & DALEY, supra note 39, at 16 (reporting that many transgender 
people in San Francisco do not have basic health insurance and that even those who have 
insurance encounter difficulties in finding a doctor who is familiar with health care for 
transgender people); JESSICA M. XAVIER, THE WASHINGTON TRANSGENDER NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT SURVEY 5 (2000) (reporting that forty-seven percent of transgender 
individuals in Washington, D.C. had no health insurance). 
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reproductive issues.140 For this group, cloning—particularly if it could be 
made cost-effective or even government-subsidized—may hold significant 
potential. 
Many FtM transsexual individuals (“trans men”) often have surgery 
not only to shape their bodies, but also to remove their internal female 
reproductive organs.141 Additionally, because of concerns about the 
increased risk of ovarian cancer in FtM transsexuals, some doctors 
recommend that trans men have their ovaries removed a few years after 
beginning hormone therapy.142 Surgeries chosen by trans men who want to 
remove their female reproductive organs may include hysterectomy (the 
removal of the uterus) and Bilateral Salpingo Oophorectomy (the removal 
of both ovaries and fallopian tubes).143 FtM transsexuals are infertile after 
these sex reassignment surgeries (SRS) due to the resulting lack of 
reproductive organs.144 If a trans man has a biologically female partner, the 
couple can elect to have her artificially inseminated by a sperm donor. In 
such a scenario, the trans man will not have any genetic connection to his 
offspring. Cloning, on the other hand, would allow the trans man to have a 
genetic child. The female partner could contribute the egg and gestate the 
child conceived from the DNA of the trans man. 
Some FtM transsexuals may want to have children before they go 
through SRS. If they choose this route, they will need to postpone surgery 
or opt to have children at a younger age.145 Cloning would obviate the need 
 
140. See De Sutter, Kira, Verschoor & Hotimsky, The Desire to Have Children, supra 
note 136 (“One respondent said that she had inquired whether sperm freezing was an 
option at the time of her treatment, and that this had seemed to be very difficult and 
expensive, so she had regretfully dropped the whole idea.”). NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUITY & NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: 
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 1 (2009), http:// 
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets?transsurvey_prelim_findings.pdf 
(finding that fifteen percent of transgender respondents lived on $10,000 or less per year 
and that transgender individuals experienced twice the rate of unemployment as the 
population as a whole). 
141. Katherine Rachlin, Factors Which Influence Individual’s Decisions When 
Considering Female-to-Male Genital Reconstructive Surgery, 3 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 
(Sept. 1999), http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijt990302.htm 
(“Many FTMs will choose to have to have their female reproductive organs removed 
(ovaries, uterus, and/or vagina) and may have more masculine genitals constructed.”). 
142. R. NICK GORTON, JAMIE BUTH & DEAN SPADE, MEDICAL THERAPY AND HEALTH 
MAINTENANCE FOR TRANSGENDER MEN: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 53 
(2005), http://www.nickgorton.org/Medical%20Therapy%20and%20HM%20for%20Transgender 
%20Men_2005.pdf. 
143. See generally Katherine A. O’Hanlan, Suzanne L. Dibble & Mindy Young-Spint, 
Total Laparoscopic Hysterectomy for Female-to-Male Transsexuals, 110 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1096 (2007) (comparing the results of various surgical procedures elected by 
trans men). 
144. Cf. Guy Trebay, He’s Pregnant. You’re Speechless, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at 
ST1 (discussing a pregnant trans man who elected not to have his ovaries removed). 
145. There are many reasons that transsexuals may want to start reassignment early in 
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to make these choices. They could undergo SRS whenever it makes the 
most sense for them to do so, without worrying about losing the ability to 
produce eggs (though they may need to rely on a surrogate if they lose the 
ability to gestate themselves). A single trans man may choose to freeze his 
eggs before undergoing SRS—a common practice today146—and would 
then have the option to clone children using those eggs (avoiding the need 
for sperm donation) or to take advantage of other ARTs. It is clear that 
FtM transsexuals would benefit from reproductive cloning and have good 
reason to support funding for cloning research and regulation. 
FtM transgender individuals who undertake “light” changes to alter 
their biological sex could also benefit from cloning. If these individuals 
take hormones for a prolonged period of time, the hormones may 
permanently affect their ovaries, making it difficult or impossible to 
produce eggs or become pregnant.147 If a FtM transgender individual has a 
female partner, the couple could create a child together through cloning. 
In such a scenario, the transgender partner would contribute nuclear DNA 
and the female partner would provide an egg (that includes the m-DNA) 
and gestate the child. Thus, cloning would allow such a couple to avoid 
sperm donation and to have a child who is (at least to some extent) 
genetically related to both partners. This method would mirror lesbian 
couples’ use of cloning. 
For MtF transsexuals and transgender men who become female (trans 
women), the long-term use of estrogen is likely to result in infertility.148 A 
trans woman may no longer produce sperm and, because she never 
acquires female reproductive organs, she is effectively infertile. Trans 
 
their lives. Some wish to start treatments before their secondary sex characteristics begin to 
develop to avoid having to reverse them later, some may wish to continue their education 
in their preferred gender role, and some prefer to have more time to consider their 
reassignment without dealing with the unwanted effects of puberty. WHITTLE, supra note 
131, at 173. 
146. Id. at 169. 
147. See Wylie C. Hembree, Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, Henriette A. Delemarre-van de 
Waal, Louis J. Gooren, Walter J. Meyer, III, Norman P. Spack, Vin Tangpricha & Victor 
M. Montori, Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical 
Practice Guideline, 94 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3132, 3144 (2009) 
(“Specific to the FTM [transgender] person, testosterone will result in . . . temporary or 
permanent decreased fertility . . . .”) 
148. Carl W. Bushong, Richard A. Martin & Kimberly L. Westwood, Transgender 
Medical Feminizing Program: Typical Results of Male-to-Female Hormone Therapy, 
TRANSGENDERCARE, http://www.transgendercare.com/medical/resources/tmf_program/tmf_ 
program_6.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2010); De Sutter, Gender Reassignment, supra note 
137, at 613 (“It is well known that feminizing hormonal therapy will induce 
hypospermatogenesis in transsexual women, and ultimately will lead to azoospermia. This 
azoospermia may be considered irreversible after some time, and furthermore gender 
reassignment surgery with removal of the testes obviously leads to irreversible sterility. The 
only option, therefore, is to perform sperm preservation by freezing a number of semen 
samples, preferably prior to starting hormonal therapy.”) 
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women may therefore elect to have a sample of their sperm frozen and 
stored prior to beginning hormone therapy.149 While this would be the 
most practical solution, trans women sometimes do not discuss their future 
fertility options with a physician.150 Further, between twenty-nine and 
sixty-three percent of MtF transgender individuals in urban areas engage 
in unsupervised hormone therapy.151 Further complicating the problem is 
the fact that many transgender people lack access to medical care and are 
often discriminated against in medical settings.152 
Even if a trans woman freezes sperm before beginning hormone 
therapy, if she has a male partner, she will still need to rely on an egg 
donor and surrogate mother to reproduce. Thus, trans women in 
heterosexual relationships would derive similar benefits from cloning to 
those afforded to gay male couples. Since a trans woman loses her ability 
to produce sperm, if she has not frozen sperm prior to beginning hormone 
therapy, cloning would provide her with the only means for a genetic tie to 
her offspring. Trans women therefore have a particularly strong interest in 
reproductive cloning, as it may be their only opportunity to have a genetic 
child. 
D. Intersex Individuals 
Intersex is a broad term used to describe individuals who are “born 
with . . . reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the typical 
definitions of female or male.”153 It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
analyze each possible variation of sexual anatomy individually. Intersex 
people may be infertile for a variety of reasons,154 and reproductive cloning 
 
149. WHITTLE, supra note 131, at 169. 
150. See De Sutter, Kira, Verschoor & Hotimsky, The Desire to Have Children, supra 
note 136 (“Although sperm freezing is quite readily available, many transsexual women are 
still uninformed about this possibility and are not counseled about the possibility of 
preserving their reproductive potential.”). 
151. Nelson F. Sanchez, John P. Sanchez & Ann Danoff, Health Care Utilization, 
Barriers to Care, and Hormone Usage Among Male-to-Female Transgender Persons in 
New York City, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 713, 713 (2009). 
152. See Willy Wilkinson, Public Health Gains of the Transgender Community in San 
Francisco: Grassroots Organizing and Community-Based Research, in TRANSGENDER 
RIGHTS 192, 193–94 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price Minter eds., 
2006). 
153. What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). See also Stephen F. 
Kemp, The Role of Genes and Hormones in Sexual Differentiation, in ETHICS AND 
INTERSEX 1, 5–6 (Sharon E. Sytsma ed., 2006) (surveying the various different types of 
intersexuality, including the lack of sex organs or hormones). 
154. Of course, some people born intersex are infertile not because of their biology, 
but because of the surgeries performed on them at birth to “normalize” them. See, e.g., 
Nancy Ehrenreich, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective 
Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 73, 109 n.218, 122 
(2005). 
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would likely be very useful for many intersex individuals.155 For example, 
women with Turner syndrome have XO chromosomal patterns, unlike 
most of the population who have either an XX or XY pattern.156 These 
individuals can carry a baby because they have a uterus, but they still 
require egg donation because they lack ovaries to produce eggs.157 Cloning 
could allow women with Turner syndrome to have a child who carries their 
DNA. Moreover, since they are capable of carrying the child themselves, 
they would not need to rely on a surrogate and could therefore reproduce 
without third-party involvement. 
E. Does Cloning Contradict Queer Politics or Reproduce the 
Privileges of Genetics? 
Before delving into the debates over cloning and its relation to LGBTI 
families in the next Part, I pause to address the question of whether the 
child—and specifically the genetically-related child—offers the best site 
from which to understand and promote LGBTI families. Two problems 
arise. First, by focusing on cloning technologies’ unique benefits to the 
LGBTI community, the analysis I undertake necessarily privileges a 
genetically-related family over all other family arrangements. Second, to 
the degree that I conclude, however cautiously and critically, by suggesting 
that the LGBTI community should challenge bans on cloning and cloning 
funding, I inevitably advocate that queer politics should focus squarely on 
the (genetically-related) child. These two problems are not unrelated. Both 
risk buying into the very heteronormativity that I attempt to expose and 
challenge in this article—heteronormativity that drives anti-cloning 
rhetoric and, ultimately, forms the basis for contemporary homophobia. 
The first problem is unavoidable. Only by writing a fundamentally 
different article could I avoid privileging the genetically-related family; an 
article about cloning is inherently about genetic relations. Whether we, as 
a society, place too much emphasis on these relations is a valid and 
important question that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. 
The second problem, while also largely unavoidable, merits 
elaboration here. Prominent queer theorist Lee Edelman has suggested 
 
155. Although therapeutic cloning is not a part of this paper, it is worth noting the 
benefits this procedure offers for intersex people. Therapeutic cloning provides a source of 
otherwise unavailable transplantable cells. For example, it would greatly improve the 
efficacy of genitoplasty surgery by allowing surgeons to use genetically engineered tissues 
that closely resemble the tissues or structures a person might have had naturally. See 
Justine Schober, Ethics and Futuristic Scientific Developments, in ETHICS AND INTERSEX, 
supra note 153, at 311, 313 (noting that such structures and tissues would be less likely to be 
rejected by the host tissue). 
156. Julia A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with Binary Sex 
Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 51, 58. 
157. Id. 
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that the concept of kinship need not and perhaps should not be premised 
on children at all.158 By locating queer politics in the all-pervasive figure of 
the child, which is first and foremost a heteronormative figure signifying 
hope and survival,159 we risk doing nothing more than perpetuating existing 
social structures—a result that is decidedly not queer.160 Furthermore, 
positioning children at the center of political debates enables all sides to 
mobilize rhetoric about the (harmed, saved, corrupted, protected) child to 
justify their arguments.161 The innocent child in need of protection, for 
example, can be called upon to represent the optimism of the future, 
juxtaposed against the specter of the queer—the embodiment of a 
relentlessly narcissistic, harmful, and future-negating drive.162 Similarly, in 
debates over gay marriage and gay adoption, this image of the innocent 
child can be called upon to uphold discrimination against any group 
defined in opposition to its innocence. 
At the same time, however, it is worth asking which is more 
heteronormative: focusing on the figure of the child, or rejecting that focus 
out of hand on the basis of its hegemonic meaning. Rather than treating a 
queer politics centered on the child as merely reproducing—or literally 
cloning—the dominant culture, perhaps a focus on the child provides the 
LGBTI community with the opportunity to work within rather than 
against society, reshaping it to better accommodate queer desires and 
fighting attempts to restrict reproduction to a heterosexual model. 
Cloning technologies may be uniquely positioned to offer a new kind 
of reproductive “future” for LGBTI people—one that is neither identical 
to nor wholly apart from the culture of the past. In the long term, cloning 
offers the potential to achieve greater political goals than simply enabling 
LGBTI individuals to look and behave more like heterosexuals. It has far-
reaching implications that fundamentally challenge the binary system of 
sexuality. As the LGBTI community mobilizes cloning to undermine the 
 
158. See LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE 11–19 
(2004). 
159. See id. See also LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO 
WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 4–5 (1997) (arguing that the public 
sphere in America has become the “intimate public” sphere, populated with conservative 
and “traditionalist” patriotic ideas concerning “pornography, abortion, sexuality, and 
reproduction; marriage, personal morality, and family values” and questioning why “the 
most hopeful national pictures of ‘life’ circulating in the public sphere are not of adults in 
everyday life, in public, or in politics, but rather of the most vulnerable, minor or virtual 
citizens—fetuses, children, real and imaginary immigrants—persons that, paradoxically, 
cannot yet act as citizens.”). 
160. EDELMAN, supra note 158, at 17 (“Queerness can never define an identity; it can 
only ever disturb one.”). 
161. For example, anti-gay campaigns use the “Save Our Children” rhetoric, while 
same-sex marriage advocates emphasize the harm experienced by children when their 
parents are treated as second-class citizens. Id. at 18–22. 
162. Id. at 27. 
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heterosexual monopoly on kinship, it will not necessarily be forced into the 
position of begging for seats at the heterosexual table. To the contrary, the 
use of cloning by the LGBTI community might dramatically loosen 
heterosexual control of reproduction. In this way, cloning might offer a 
more radical politics instead of one that simply reproduces the 
heterosexual matrix. Cloning could diminish the dominance of any 
particular culture, destabilizing the queer community by leaving it with 
nothing more to resist. 
F. Conclusion 
Since cloning is not yet regulated, it is unclear whether it would be 
more accessible to LGBTI people than adoption or ART are currently. 
Nevertheless, cloning appears to have significant advantages for LGBTI 
people over adoption, ART, and co-parenting arrangements. If cloning 
was legal and widely available, it would eliminate the potential hassle of 
having to prove parental eligibility to a social worker or biological parent 
who might discriminate against LGBTI couples.163 It further offers LGBTI 
individuals the opportunity to create a family with minimal third-party 
involvement. It allows LGBTI individuals to have the highest level of 
autonomy in creating—and, in some cases, even raising—children, and 
forecloses the need to make agreements with co-parents or biological 
donor parents that may or may not withstand legal scrutiny. If gene 
splicing becomes an option, it would provide LGBTI individuals with a 
means of giving birth to children with a mixture of genes from both 
partners. The option to clone could thus reduce potential legal disputes 
with third parties, such as claims for parental rights of known donors and 
lawsuits from biological parents wishing to enforce open adoption 
provisions. 
Unfortunately, cloning is unlikely to be much more financially 
attainable than other methods of reproduction currently available to 
LGBTI families. In fact, if cloning becomes available, it will likely be very 
expensive. Thus, even if the technology were widely available, it would be 
inaccessible to many families if it is not covered by insurance. At present, 
IVF is covered only by a very limited number of insurance policies;164 it is 
likely that insurance policies will also fail to cover cloning as well. It is thus 
unlikely that cloning would mitigate the additional financial challenges 
 
163. Of course, this assumption is realistic only if reproductive cloning is less 
aggressively regulated than adoption. It seems likely that it would be, given that ART is 
currently free of almost any limitations while adoption requires a lengthy and potentially 
exhausting process. 
164. While several states require private insurance companies to include IVF 
treatments in their coverage, only about fourteen percent of large group plans cover IVF 
treatments. Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1215, 1217 (1997). 
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often associated with the creation of LGBTI families, though it certainly 
provides many other worthwhile benefits. 
VI.  
CLONING AND QUEER THEORY 
As described above, cloning could potentially benefit couples who 
cannot produce through sexual means, particularly LGBTI couples. It is, in 
part, precisely because of these benefits that many scholars have argued 
against cloning in general, and cloning in the LGBTI community 
specifically. 
The possibility that cloning will expand family combinations beyond 
the traditional nuclear family has alarmed defenders of traditional family 
structure.165 Cloning makes it increasingly possible to dissociate 
reproduction from physical intimacy, allowing for radical new ways of 
thinking about the reproductive process. By providing opportunities for 
reproduction without sex—and even without partners—cloning may 
appear to threaten the very fabric of our society. Without a sexual 
connection uniting them, families might one day look very different. Single 
women would be able to have children without men—even without sperm. 
Two platonic friends could have a child together without sexual contact. 
Cloning threatens to further destabilize the traditional concept of the 
nuclear family in which a married heterosexual couple “naturally” 
conceive and give birth to related children. Some scholars have thus used 
fears about non-normative family arrangements to argue against the use of 
cloning.166 
But is cloning likely to actually bring about such a sea change? The 
many ARTs already in common use allow opposite-sex couples to have 
genetically-related children without having sexual intercourse. They allow 
single individuals to have genetically-related children without ever having 
intercourse or choosing a partner. To the degree that cloning creates more 
discomfort than traditional ARTs, it must be about something other than 
reproduction without sexual contact. 
I suggest, therefore, that the outcry in response to cloning stems from 
a fundamental commitment to traditional, heterosexual models of 
 
165. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 72 (“[T]he major threat cloning produces is a 
further weakening of the two-parent family.”); Charlene Kalebic, The Constitutional 
Question of Cloning Humans: Duplication or Procreation? An Examination of the Human 
Right to Procreate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 229, 266 (1998) (“Cloning undermines the 
traditional family, which is a reflection of biological relations, by the state constructing a 
‘family’ of biologically unrelated individuals, connected only by contract.”). 
166. See, e.g., Daniel R. Heimbach, Cloning Humans: Dangerous, Unjustifiable, and 
Genuinely Immoral, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 633, 650–51 (1998) (arguing that “human cloning is 
inherently immoral because it violates the moral institution of parenthood” and “violates 
the moral institution of marriage”). 
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reproduction. While valid concerns about the safety and efficacy of cloning 
do exist, as I discuss at length below, they are insufficient to explain a 
response of the degree and kind that cloning has provoked. Reproductive 
cloning has been vociferously attacked based in large part on its 
associations with the LGBTI community.167 While much of the outcry over 
cloning remains covertly heterosexist—latent homophobia lingering just 
beneath the surface of concerns about “the family”—some scholars 
publicly and explicitly promote heterosexist ideas, arguing that the benefits 
cloning could provide the LGBTI community should be grounds for 
outlawing the practice altogether.168 In this Part, after considering the more 
traditional anti-cloning arguments, I examine those arguments that are 
based on the need to regulate “moral” or “ethical” behavior and rely on 
assumptions about what kinds of behavior are “natural” and beneficial to 
society as a whole. In these arguments, the concept of the “natural” is 
defined against and in relation to culturally-constructed frameworks and 
beliefs about identity, sexuality, gender expression, and family structure. 
By shifting the focus to the “artificial” (here, the clone), the concept of the 
“natural” remains untheorized and pure, with little or no attention paid to 
the fact that what we today think of as natural is itself culturally mediated. 
The equation of “natural” with biological is therefore problematic, and 
arguments that conflate these concepts must be critically analyzed. 
Throughout this Part, I will analyze arguments against cloning by 
drawing from queer theory.169 This framework has significant potential to 
 
167. See, e.g., KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 68 (“More troubling is the possibility 
that a lesbian couple will use cloning to produce a child.”). 
168. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the 
Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679, 681–83 (1998) [hereinafter Kass, The Wisdom 
of Repugnance] (arguing that the gay rights movement, by treating “male and female [as] 
not normatively complementary and generatively significant,” has decreased the moral 
repugnance of cloning in the public discourse). Cf. Laurence Tribe, On Not Banning 
Cloning for the Wrong Reasons, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 12, at 221, 226–27 
(asserting that behind Kass’s arguments lies his fear of undermining the traditional family, 
and that cloning for Kass is “the technological apotheosis of Murphy Brown and Ellen 
DeGeneres, the biomedical nemesis of Dan Quayle, Phyllis Schlafly, and Pat Robertson”). 
169. Queer theory developed out of gay and lesbian studies, and the use of the term 
queer emphasizes the deconstruction of the essentialist identity categories of gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual. ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 72–77 (1996). The 
nominal shift from gay and lesbian studies to queer theory expresses a larger move within 
the field to consider more complex and fluid notions of identification and desire. Many 
queer theorists consider identity to be a “culturally restricted principle of order and 
hierarchy, a regulatory fiction.” JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 33 (Routledge Classics 
ed., 2006) (discussing leading queer theorists’ views of identity). Over the past twenty years, 
a great deal of academic work has challenged fundamental assumptions about gender roles 
and the regulation of sex and sexual orientation. See generally FEMINIST AND QUEER 
LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero eds., 2009); DONALD E. HALL, 
QUEER THEORIES (2003); TAMSIN SPARGO, FOUCAULT AND QUEER THEORY (1999); THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER (Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale & David M. 
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shed new light on these debates. Queer theories offer a radical critique of 
gender and sexual essentialism and of heteronormativity in general.170 
While some of the critiques of cloning that I address in this paper apply 
beyond the community of LGBTI individuals and families, queer theory 
remains a useful approach because it challenges the very idea of a 
“natural” truth or ideal against which new social practices are evaluated.171 
I start, therefore by presenting the key arguments against cloning, before I 
turn to examine the heterosexist arguments against cloning. 
A. Traditional Arguments Against Reproductive Cloning 
Critiques of cloning tend to coalesce around four main themes: cloning 
is unsafe and inefficient; cloning threatens the well-being of cloned 
 
Halperin eds., 1993). David Halperin, co-founder of GLQ: The Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies, explains that while gay identity is rooted in the choice to identify one’s sexuality in 
a particular way, “queer identity need not be grounded in any positive truth or in any stable 
reality . . . it acquires its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm.” DAVID M. 
HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 62 (1995) (noting that the 
word “queer” does not name a natural or preexisting thing, but rather a relation to the 
norm). Donald E. Hall echoes this argument, noting that queer identity defines itself 
against the normal and is a broad concept encompassing multiple identities. HALL, supra, at 
5, 14–16 (“[T]he concept ‘queer’ emphasizes the disruptive, the fractured, the tactical and 
contingent. . . . Simply put, there is no ‘queer theory’ in the singular, only many different 
voices and sometimes overlapping, sometimes divergent perspectives that can be loosely 
called ‘queer theories.’”). 
 This commitment to disidentification and shapelessness makes it difficult to define 
what exactly queer theory is, and perhaps that is precisely the point. Some scholars suggest 
that “queer” is “a rather amorphous term and still emergent enough as to be vague and ill-
defined.” Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, 
Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace, in QUEER THEORY 6, 6 (Iain Morland & 
Annabelle Willox eds., 2005). They suggest that, from queer theory, queer philosophy will 
emerge, along with the recognition that queerness is a universal experience of being. 
Randall Halle, What is Queer Philosophy?, in PHILOSOPHY IN MULTIPLE VOICES 81, 81–84 
(George Yancy ed., 2007). In keeping with the spirit of indeterminacy, it is important to 
note that there is no single queer theory but rather multiple “queer theories,” sometimes 
resulting in overlapping and divergent views. HALL, supra, at 5. Traditional theory cannot 
be “queered” simply by challenging its dominant premises, as such an approach would 
allow queer theory to operate only within the predetermined boundaries already set by 
traditional theory. Instead, queer theory attempts to shift “the image of thought . . . to 
thought without an image,” a position not “of judgment or critique, but a virtual line of 
sense.” See Claire Colebrook, How Queer Can You Go? Theory, Normality and 
Normativity, in QUEERING THE NON/HUMAN 17, 22 (Noreen Giffney & Myra J. Hird eds., 
2008). Queer theory offers a critique of substance and subjectivism, identifying its 
orientation as “essentially queer,” and challenging the supposed neutrality or 
undifferentiated nature of life. Id. at 23. 
170. See, e.g., Halle, supra note 169, at 84 (discussing both queer theory and the term 
“queer” as an identity category). “Heteronormativity” is a term coined by Michael Warner. 
See MICHAEL WARNER, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 
xxi (1993) (explaining that heteronormative culture “thinks of itself as the elemental form 
of human association, the very model of intergender relations, as the indivisible basis of all 
community, and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn’t exist”). 
171. See supra note 169. 
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children; cloning commodifies children; and cloning will be inappropriately 
used to design and improve the human race. While concerns regarding 
safety and regulation are valid, claims about other possible threats from 
cloning are largely unfounded and have been thoroughly refuted by social 
and legal scholars. I discuss each of these claims, and the responses to 
them, in turn. 
1. Cloning Is Unsafe and Inefficient 
National reports from two major U.S. scientific bodies—The National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission172 and The National Academy of 
Science173—raise questions about the safety of cloning techniques and the 
likelihood of physical harm to cloned children, egg donors, and women 
who gestate cloned embryos. On this basis, both reports conclude that 
attempts to clone human beings are unethical.174 It is nearly impossible for 
the scientific community to improve the safety of cloning, however, since 
the United States bans the use of federal funding for reproductive cloning 
research. Without adequate funding, research needed to make the 
procedure safer is stalled.175 So long as this ban remains in effect, it is 
unlikely that cloning will become safer—a fact that makes the ban on 
funding unlikely to be raised anytime soon. 
But perhaps this catch-22 exists because safety concerns are merely a 
red herring. Kerry Lynn Macintosh notes that, while promising but 
dangerous medical procedures tend to be highly regulated, they are rarely 
banned outright.176 Moreover, if safety were truly the primary concern, 
governmental committees would have no reason to examine other 
 
172. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION iii (1997), 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_commissions/nbac_cloning.pdf. 
173. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 93–94. 
174. Id. at 4 (“Because medical and scientific findings indicate that cloning procedures 
are currently not safe for humans, cloning of a human through the use of nuclear 
transplantation technology is not now appropriate. The panel believes that no responsible 
scientists or physicians are likely to undertake to clone a human.”). The President’s Council 
on Bioethics has also concluded that reproductive cloning is not safe and recommended 
cloning be outlawed. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 99–105 
(“[C]loning-to-produce-children is not now safe . . . concerns revolve around potential 
dangers to the cloned child, as well as to the egg donor and the woman who would carry the 
cloned child to birth.”). The Committee found that most attempts to clone animals were 
not successful, and that the few animals who were born suffered health problems. Id. at 92. 
The Committee emphasized that unlike the egg donor and the gestating mother, the clone 
did not consent to be born this way yet must endure these life conditions. Id. at 94–95. The 
Committee also expressed concern for the gestating mother based on the high probability 
that the pregnancy will end in abortion or face serious complications. Id. at 90 (citing 
animal studies). 
175. See generally LIM, supra note 87, at 317–58.  
176. KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH, ILLEGAL BEINGS: HUMAN CLONES AND THE LAW 44–
45 (2005). 
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arguments against cloning in such depth;177 lack of safety would close the 
discussion, and research would come to a halt.178 It is likely, therefore, that 
the concerns unrelated to safety, discussed below, explain a great deal of 
the public’s, and even the scientific community’s, reluctance to rigorously 
pursue reproductive cloning research. 
2. Cloning Is Harmful to Children 
Fears that a cloned child will be bereft of individuality are rampant 
among opponents of cloning.179 Religious critics claim that it is impossible 
for the cloning process to produce a person with a soul.180 Other detractors 
fear that a cloned child will perceive herself as “manufactured” or even 
“handmade” and therefore less human.181 Lori B. Andrews argues that 
cloned children are likely to be exposed to limited experiences and 
opportunities, as well as to lack a sense of “independent self,” because 
they would be expected to follow the path of the individual from whom 
they have been cloned.182 
As Anita L. Allen points out, these sorts of fears are unfounded and 
even “silly,” as “[t]here is no reason to think that clones would be 
inherently soulless or inferior to other human beings.”183 The cloned child 
will not be a photocopy of the cell donor, as she will not be completely 
 
177. For example, after concluding that reproductive cloning is not safe and therefore 
not ethical, the President’s Council on Bioethics notes that “for some people, the discussion 
of ethical objections to cloning-to-produce-children could end here. . . . But there is more to 
be said.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 96. The committee then 
goes to discuss many of the other ethical concerns that I address later in this article. 
178. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 44–45. 
179. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 101–15 (describing 
how cloning children will create “(1) problems of identity and individuality; (2) concerns 
regarding manufacture; (3) the prospect of a new eugenics; (4) troubled family relations; 
and (5) [negative] effects on society”); George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an 
Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 273 (1998) (arguing that the cloned child will only be an 
echo of the parent, “cursed by its parent never to speak first, but only to be an echo of the 
parent’s already-lived life”) . 
180. See, e.g., Shahar Ilan, Does a Clone Have a Soul?, HAARETZ, Aug. 4, 2005, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=608432&contrassID=19 (“[T]he 
Creator only gives man a soul at the moment when sperm meets ovum.” (quoting Rabbi 
Moshe Botschko)). 
181. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 38. See also Jeffrey Kluger, Will We Follow the 
Sheep?, TIME, Mar. 10, 1997, at 70 (“You’re putting a human into a genetic straitjacket. For 
the first time, we’ve taken the principles of industrial design—quality control, 
predictability—and applied them to a human being.” (quoting Jeremy Rifkin)). 
182. See Lori B. Andrews, Mom, Dad, Clone: Implications for Reproductive Privacy, 7 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 176, 181–83 (1998) (noting that parents may raise 
the child as if its genetic code were its destiny and that thus “cloning could undermine 
human dignity by threatening the replicant’s sense of self and sense of autonomy”). 
183. ANITA L. ALLEN, THE NEW ETHICS: A TOUR OF THE 21ST CENTURY MORAL 
LANDSCAPE 160 (2004). 
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genetically identical to the donor, much less have identical life 
experiences.184 Indeed, a cloned child will likely be less identical to her 
donor than monozygotic (MZ) twins who share the same DNA are to each 
other: while clones and their donors might have different m-DNA, twins 
always share the same m-DNA, making them far closer “copies” than 
Dolly and her mother.185 Additionally, unlike a cloned child and her donor 
parent, most twins share the same environment—the same womb, the 
same home, at the same time and place. Even conjoined twins, who share 
nearly everything, develop very different personalities.186 A cloned child 
will be born in a different place and time than her donor. These influences 
would, in turn, create a different human being with a different personality, 
set of coping mechanisms, and responses to the world. In addition, in the 
future it may be possible to safely use genetic modification techniques in 
conjunction with cloning to create individuals with unique nuclear DNA.187 
If this were an option, most of the concerns regarding the similarity of the 
cloned child and parent would be irrelevant, since, as in sexual 
reproduction, the cloned child would be born with the mixed genes of both 
parents. 
In addition to the actual differences that will distinguish a cloned child 
from her parent, it is also unlikely that there will be social forces that will 
negatively shape the cloned child’s perception of herself. In social practice, 
no one treats twins as unnatural. Because there is also no reason to believe 
that cloned individuals would be easily identifiable—they would look like 
any other human being—there is no reason to believe that they would be 
treated differently than other children. 
 
184. The word “photocopy,” which is often used by detractors of cloning to 
pejoratively describe the procedure, conjures up images of a machine process whereby an 
exact copy of an original is made. See, e.g., COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra 
note 75, at 26. But a photocopy is a two-dimensional reproduction transferred from one flat 
piece of paper to another. By contrast, a mammal created from a clone cell is a highly 
complex, three-dimensional organic being that is continually shaped by its environment, life 
experiences, and myriad other factors.  
185. Ian Wilmut, the leader of the group that cloned Dolly, states that “[s]trictly 
speaking, Dolly was not a clone because of this difference in mitochondrial DNA. . . .” 
WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 242. See also Stephen Jay Gould, Individuality, 
Cloning and the Discomfiting Cases of Siamese Twins, in CLONING: RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE 
OR TECHNOMADNESS? 98, 101 (Michael Ruse & Aryne Sheppard eds., 2001). See also LIM, 
supra note 87, at 326. 
186. That was the case, for example, with Eng and Chang, a famous set of conjoined 
twins born in Siam (giving rise to the term “Siamese Twins”), who displayed completely 
different personalities. Gould, supra note 185, at 102. Gregory E. Pence similarly argues 
that research on the behaviors and lives of twins shows that they are certainly not 
interchangeable—for instance, the girlfriend of one twin will not necessarily be attracted to 
the other twin. See PENCE, CLONING AFTER DOLLY, supra note 113, at 48. 
187. Carson M. Strong, Reproductive Cloning Combined with Genetic Modification, 
31 J. MED. ETHICS 654, 654 (2005). 
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3. Cloning Is Commodification 
Opponents of reproductive cloning further argue that the high costs of 
this technique will turn children into commodities. Since the process of 
cloning comes with such a high price tag, critics worry that cloned children 
may become products to be traded in the market.188 However, the similarly 
high cost of other ARTs has not caused parents or society to treat children 
produced through such procedures as manufactured products.189 In light of 
the legal prohibitions and strong cultural taboos against selling humans or 
organs, a market for cloned children seems unlikely. 
Others argue that cloning is a form of replication rather than 
reproduction and that cloned children will thus be treated inhumanely as 
merely “product[s] of technological manufacture.”190 However, this is 
unlikely to be the case. It is true that society used to judge children by the 
conditions under which they were conceived or born—marginalizing, for 
example, the children of unmarried mothers.191 Today, however, people in 
the United States are evaluated on the basis of their personal 
characteristics and accomplishments (or, unfortunately, by their race, class, 
gender, and other group characteristics) rather than on how they entered 
the world.192 
4. Cloning Is Eugenics 
Finally, opponents point out that cloning could facilitate eugenics 
programs designed to improve the human species.193 But at least one 
scholar argues that cloning will not offer any opportunities for engineering 
 
188. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 106–07 (2002) 
(arguing that cloned children “would be products of a designed manufacturing process, 
products over whom we might think it proper to exercise ‘quality control’” and that “[o]ne 
possible result would be the industrialization and commercialization of human 
reproduction”). 
189. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 18–19. 
190. Jorge L.A. Garcia, Human Cloning Never and Why Not, in HUMAN CLONING 85, 
94–95 (Barbara MacKinnon ed., 2000). 
191. See PENCE, WHO’S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING?, supra note 87, at 46 (“For 
millennia, the cultures of Western civilization would not accept children of unmarried 
women as beings with normal rights: they could not enter synagogues, marry, inherit 
property, and sometimes, vote. To say that bastards were socially stigmatized is to use a 
euphemism.”). 
192. See id. at 47 (“Today, we realize that children who were not born to two, married, 
heterosexual parents had no control over their origins. Once they arrive into the world, 
such children must be accepted as persons with all the normal rights.”). 
193. See George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M. Isasi, Protecting the 
Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable 
Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 153 (2002) (arguing that “cloning and inheritable 
genetic alterations . . . are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself . . . by 
taking human evolution into our own hands . . . .”). 
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and improving embryos that are not already available.194 Currently, some 
parents use PGD to screen embryos for genetic traits and select their 
preferred embryo based on its sex or other genetic traits.195 Moreover, 
existing opportunities for “collaborative reproduction” allow parents to 
choose which of their genes will combine to produce their child.196 Indeed, 
in the current reproductive market of IVF and sperm and egg donors, 
many would-be parents are prepared to pay astronomical amounts of 
money for the “perfect” combination of genetic traits.197 These attempts to 
craft genetically ideal children are misguided and ultimately futile, just as 
concerns about cloning and eugenics are both misplaced and unfounded. 
Macintosh points out that safe and effective means of genetically 
modifying an early embryo (as distinguished from collaborative 
reproduction via ART) do not yet exist, and that the discussion of how 
genetic engineering will change the nature of humankind is “speculative at 
best.”198 Moreover, such efforts ignore the profound influence of childhood 
environment on individual development, which will inevitably alter the 
expression of the child’s genetic traits.  
5. Conclusion 
As explained in this section, the primary arguments offered by 
opponents of cloning are fundamentally flawed. In the next section, I 
discuss the arguments against cloning that either refer specifically to the 
LGBTI community or are driven by a simplistic, binary approach to the 
nature/nurture debate. 
B. Heterosexist Arguments Against Cloning 
1. Arguments That the Heterosexual Family Is the Only 
“Real” Form of Kinship 
Opponents of reproductive cloning often argue that cloning allows for 
the expansion of nontraditional families, and that these families are bad 
for children and damage the fabric of society.199 James Q. Wilson, a former 
 
194. Daar, supra note 4, at 534. 
195. Id. 
196. Id.  
197. Tuller, supra note 59. In some other countries, the law does not allow free choice 
of egg donors. In Israel, for example, women receive egg donations from anonymous 
donors at set prices. Dan Even, Knesset Approves Bill Easing Restrictions on Egg 
Donation in Israel, HAARETZ, June 7, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knesset-
approves-bill-easing-restrictions-on-egg-donation-in-israel-1.294755. 
198. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 42 (discussing THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES, 107–10 (2004)). 
199. Cf. 143 CONG. REC. H713-02, H714 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
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member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, suggests that, if cloning 
becomes an option, it should be used only by married couples.200 Other 
scholars express concerns regarding whether LGB people are “unfit” 
parents. For instance, Ian Wilmut, the leader of the group that cloned 
Dolly, expressed his concern that if a child is cloned by gay parents, he or 
she will not live in an “appropriate environment.”201 Similarly, Leon Kass, 
former chair of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2002–2005 and 
one of the most vocal opponents of cloning, has implied that, because 
cloning would likely be used most frequently by unmarried individuals or 
couples with nontraditional family arrangements, cloning puts the very 
well-being of children at risk by perpetuating the “usually sad situation of 
the ‘single-parent-child.’”202 
The argument that cloning allows for a departure from traditional 
heterosexual reproduction and thus harms the child is not based on the 
presumption that such nontraditional families cannot exist without cloning. 
Clearly, they already do. Even in the absence of reproductive cloning 
techniques, nontraditional families, including LGBTI families, are already 
very much a reality.203 In the 2000 Census, 27.5 percent of LGB204 couples 
 
Vernon Ehlers) (arguing against cloning and stating that “[t]he good Lord ordained a time-
honored method of creating human life, commensurate with substantial responsibility on 
the part of the parents, the responsibility to raise a child appropriately”). 
200. Wilson, supra note 9, at 4. 
201. Ian Wilmut, Dolly’s False Legacy, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 74, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,989990-1,00.html (“Each of us can 
imagine hypothetical families created by the introduction of a cloned child—a copy of one 
partner in a homosexual relationship or of a single parent, for example. What is missing in 
all this is consideration of what’s in the interests of the cloned child. Because there is no 
form of infertility that could be overcome only by cloning, I do not find these proposals 
acceptable. My concerns are not on religious grounds or on the basis of a perceived intrinsic 
ethical principle. Rather, my judgment is that it would be difficult for families created in 
this way to provide an appropriate environment for the child.”). 
202. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 696. See also KASS & 
WILSON, supra note 11, at 82–83 (“A clone, because asexually reproduced, lacks two 
parents; though I have called it a single-parent child, it would be more accurate to say that, 
since it is the twin rather than the offspring of its ‘source,’ it has no parents, biologically 
speaking . . . . Giving birth to one’s mother does not exactly reproduce a normal mother-
daughter relationship.”); Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 682 
(“Thanks to the prominence and the acceptability of divorce and out-of-wedlock births, 
stable, monogamous marriage as the ideal home for procreation is no longer the agreed-
upon cultural norm. For this new dispensation, the clone is the ideal emblem: the ultimate 
‘single-parent child.’”). 
203. In the United States, there are approximately five million unmarried, cohabiting 
couples—the highest number in American history—yet they are entitled to only some of 
the legal safeguards available to married couples. See generally Pamela J. Smock & Wendy 
D. Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic Perspectives 
and Implications for Family Policy, 26 LAW & POL’Y 87 (2004) (summarizing and 
synthesizing research on who cohabits in the United States and with what consequences) . 
See also Erik Eckholm, Saying No to “I Do,” with the Economy in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 2010, at A15 (“Among the total population 18 and older, the share of men and women 
who were married fell from 57 percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 2009 . . . the lowest 
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identified themselves as parents to a child under the age of eighteen, 
indicating that more than a quarter million children are currently being 
raised in same-sex couple households.205 These statistics are probably 
underinclusive: because census data related to sexual orientation is still not 
well measured, this number probably does not include children raised by 
single LGB parents. 
Rather, arguments that cloning should be limited to married couples 
must be based on the presumption that the heterosexual family is the only 
appropriate venue for raising children.206 However, there is no evidence 
that the heterosexual family provides the only adequate, or even the 
superior, venue for childrearing. While scholars historically assumed that 
the children of married couples fare better than children who live in 
nonmarital or single parent households,207 recent studies suggest that this is 
not so clearly the case.208 In fact, it is difficult to isolate the effect of 
marriage from other relevant factors like education and financial status 
that contribute substantially to a child’s well-being.209 Some married 
couples may be better able to provide for their children not because they 
are married but because their marriage is recognized, and because any 
state benefits they receive as a result of this recognition may be passed on 
to their children. In the absence of compelling evidence, there remains 
little rational reason for preserving and strengthening the institution of 
marriage for the sake of child welfare.210 
 
percentage since the government began collecting data more than 100 years ago.”). 
204. I use the term LGB because the census does not ask about transgender identity. 
See JAIME GRANT, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, HOW BIG IS THE LGBT 
COMMUNITY? WHY CAN’T I FIND THIS NUMBER? 4, http://www.thetaskforce.org/ 
downloads/release_materials/tf_lgbt_community.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (“It is 
important to note that none of these random samples identify or quantify transgender 
people at all. There has been no random sampling of the transgender population in U.S. 
history.”). 
205. GARY J. GATES & JASON OST, THE GAY AND LESBIAN ATLAS 45 (2004). The 
actual number of LGBTI parents is probably larger than the census indicated. Id. Because 
the census only asks about the relationship between the people in the household, not about 
their sexual orientation, it likely did not capture how many single LGBTI parents live in the 
United States. Id. Moreover, some LGBTI parents may have chosen not identify 
themselves as LGBTI in the census. 
206. See also Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 380 (2007) (“In general, traditionalists believe that the family form 
that has been most historically and socially respected and that has stood the test of time—
the biological, heterosexual, ‘nuclear’ family—should occupy a privileged place today. 
[They believe that] this form should continue to be regarded, in law and custom, as the 
ideal model for our society.”). 
207. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Family Structure Children and Law, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 9, 9 (2007) (“The claim that ‘marriage is good for children’ has long helped ground 
arguments for the institution’s extraordinary state support.”). 
208. Id. at 14–21 (describing research on the effect of marriage on children). 
209. See id. at 14. 
210. But even if there were compelling evidence, the value of autonomy in choosing 
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At the same time, the available data provide absolutely no evidence 
that children of same-sex couples fare worse than their heterosexual 
counterparts.211 In fact, research has suggested that there is no connection 
between the presence of two opposite-sex parents and an optimal child-
rearing environment. Rather, the factors most likely to affect a child’s 
overall welfare include the child’s DNA, socioeconomic status, social 
support network, and ability to access social resources.212 Implicit in the 
assumption that non-heteronormative environments are harmful to 
children is the notion that there is also no benefit to being raised in such an 
environment. Yet a recent study examining the welfare of children of 
lesbian mothers from conception through adolescence found that children 
of lesbian parents rated better than average in social skills, academics, and 
general competence, and they registered significantly fewer social 
problems on average.213 Being a good parent, it seems, has nothing to do 
with the sex of one’s romantic partner. 
In arguing that cloning will harm children by creating nontraditional 
families, opponents of cloning disregard the reality that “kinship is a social 
and not a biological fact, a matter of culture rather than nature.”214 The 
traditional family structure as it exists today in the United States has 
evolved, just as all human marriage and kinship systems have, to be 
considered the exclusive forum for procreation and raising children.215 The 
model of the heterosexual nuclear family as the only form of kinship is 
 
one’s own family structure must not be underestimated. 
211. Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 15 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 241, 241 (2006) (reviewing the research and concluding that 
“[m]ore than two decades of research has failed to reveal important differences in the 
adjustment or development of children or adolescents reared by same-sex couples 
compared to those reared by other-sex couples. Results of the research suggest that 
qualities of family relationships are more tightly linked with child outcomes than is parental 
sexual orientation.”). 
212. See, e.g., Michael Rosenfeld, Nontraditional Families and Childhood Progress 
Through School, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 755, 770 (2010) (discussing how socioeconomic status 
has a greater impact on a child’s success in school than whether a child’s parents are 
heterosexual or not); Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual Orientation and State 
Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 388–89 (2006) 
(finding that there are a large number of factors other than the sexuality of a child’s parents 
which affect the welfare of the child, including “the overall quality of parenting as reflected 
in parental love, warmth, involvement and consistency; parental socioeconomic resources; 
quality of neighborhood and schools; (and) influences of peers and siblings”) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
213. Nanette Gartrell & Henny Bos, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family 
Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17-year-old Adolescents, PEDIATRICS (June 7, 2010), 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/abstract/peds.2009-3153v1. 
214. Elizabeth Freeman, Queer Belongings, in A COMPANION TO LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER STUDIES 295, 299 (Haggerty & McGarry eds., 2007) 
(discussing JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993)). 
215. Id. 
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predicated on a binary view of gender and sexuality.216 Beliefs and 
expectations about how each gender should behave and to whom they 
should be attracted become reinforced and re-entrenched in a community 
over time in such a way as to make certain behaviors seem “natural,” 
rather than culturally produced.217 Alternative ways of being in the world 
and in relation to other people are therefore foreclosed because the 
existing forms are so ingrained in custom and culture that they are 
believed to be biologically based.218 
In light of this evidence, it cannot really be a concern for child welfare 
that motivates the majority of cloning opponents. Rather, it is the fear that 
reproductive cloning diminishes the heterosexual monopoly on 
reproduction.219 
2. Arguments That Cloning Threatens the Elementary 
Structure of Kinship—Exogamy and Incest Taboo  
A second and perhaps more sophisticated argument against cloning 
builds on Claude Lévi-Strauss’s theory that exogamy and the incest taboo 
are the basic elements of culture.220 Drawing on this theory, psychiatrist 
Stephen Levick suggests that the practice of exogamy—in other words, 
marrying people from outside the group—and the prohibition on incest are 
the basic of foundations of our culture because they promote biological 
(genetic) diversity.221 His analysis implies that the practice of exogamy is 
 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. This is not to suggest that culture acts entirely independent of biology; in fact, 
they are mutually constitutive. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 66–67 
(1993) (“It must be possible to concede and affirm an array of ‘materialities’ that pertain to 
the body, that which is signified by the domains of biology, anatomy, physiology, hormonal 
and chemical composition, illness, weight, age, metabolism, life and death. None of this can 
be denied.”). 
219. Cf. 144 CONG. REC. S599-05, S603 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. 
Dale Brownback) (“Human cloning distorts the relationship between man and woman by 
negating the necessity of either one in the creation of new life and consequently also usurps 
the role of God in the creation of new life.”). 
220. Lévi-Strauss argued that the practice of exogamy—marrying a woman outside the 
group one belongs to—is the “universal feature of all societies.” CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, 
THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURE OF KINSHIP 18–22, 62 (Rodeny Needham ed., James Harle 
Bell & John Richard Von Sturmer trans., Beacon Press 1969) (1949). He believed that if 
small groups want to flourish, they must require their women to marry outside the clan so 
as to build alliances with other groups. These exchanges of women between men function 
to ensure peaceable relations between social groups. The incest taboo, Lévi-Strauss argued, 
is fundamental to exogamy because it prohibits sexual relations between first kin, thus 
necessitating a search for sexual partners elsewhere. Id. at 20, 62. 
221. LEVICK, supra note 10, at 229 (“[T]he evolutionary task performed by the merger 
of half the genetic material of one individual with that of another may be the most 
fundamental basis for the social nexus on which society is built. Only sexual reproduction, 
but not cloning, naturally accomplishes this.” (emphasis added)). 
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analogous to traditional sexual reproduction: it helps to create a more 
diverse gene pool by forcing people from different groups to mix their 
genes.222 Levick argues that, just as a group needs to practice exogamy to 
ensure its survival, so humankind must practice traditional sexual 
reproduction to endure.223 
Similarly, Kass utilizes the incest taboo to argue against the use of 
cloning. He asserts that “social identity and social ties of relationship and 
responsibility are widely connected to, and supported by, biological 
kinship. Social taboos on incest (and adultery) everywhere serve to keep 
clear who is related to whom . . . .”224 Kass also endorses bioethicist James 
Nelson’s argument that a child cloned from a woman’s DNA might 
develop a sexual desire for her father, and may desire her mother’s 
father—her grandfather.225 For Kass, the objection to incest cannot fully be 
explained by concerns about inbreeding—or, indeed, on any rational terms 
at all.226 Rather, Kass believes that humans naturally carry a “wisdom” that 
allows them to feel disgusted when something is bad for humanity.227 
Cloning and incest, as acts that ostensibly cause disgust, should therefore 
be illegal. 
However, other scholars have argued that any argument against 
cloning based on the health of the gene pool “is so questionable that it 
raises the question of why otherwise rational people would believe in it.”228 
While it is true that the mixing of genes is important to thwarting the 
diffusion of disease, this nevertheless does not justify banning reproductive 
cloning. The use of cloning as an alternative to biological reproduction 
cannot and would not cause any damage to the gene pool. It is likely that 
the large majority of people would not use cloning for reproduction and 
would instead rely on intimate sexual contact—the “old fashioned” way—
to have children. Cloning will be advantageous only to the minority of 
 
222. Id. See also id. at 297, n.92 (“[T]he exchange of genes in exogamy also provides 
social and psychological advantages that might be just as important in preventing incest as 
the risk of untoward genetic and evolutionary consequences.”). 
223. See id. at 230 (“Cloning puts into conflict the ‘selfish’ genes of the individual with 
the need for the survival of community and society absolutely necessary for the survival of 
humans as a social species. Reproductive cloning might turn out to be the Achilles’ heel of 
shortsighted selfish genes . . . .”). 
224. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 695 (emphasis added). 
225. Id. at 695 (citing James Lindemann Nelson, Cloning, Families, and the 
Reproduction of Persons, BIOLAW, June 1997, at S144). See also LEON KASS, LIFE, 
LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 159 (2002) 
(“And what will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting image 
of the woman with whom Daddy once fell in love?”). 
226. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 687 (“[W]e are suspicious 
of those who think that they can rationalize away our horror, say, by trying to explain the 
enormity of incest with arguments only about the genetic risks of inbreeding.”). 
227. Id. 
228. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 39. 
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people for whom other forms of ART are inadequate and who desire to 
have genetic ties to their children. Because cloning may be expensive and 
other alternatives will be available, it is likely that people who choose 
cloning will do so as a last resort. As such, cloning should not pose any 
major threats to the gene pool.229 Moreover, even if cloning were used by a 
larger section of the population, which is unlikely to happen, it would take 
more than a thousand years to affect the diversity of the gene pool.230 
Some scientists even argue that cloning would encourage diversity in the 
gene pool “to the extent it results in the descent of genes that otherwise 
would be lost owing to infertility or other causes.”231 
Both Levick and Kass misuse the notions of exogamy and the incest 
taboo by couching the social function of exogamy and incest in 
“biological” and “natural” terms. Expressions of disgust at the incest 
relationship are far from natural, despite what Kass would have us believe. 
In fact, Lévi-Strauss, in his work on the structures of kinship, is skeptical of 
the true biological origin and function of the incest taboo.232 For Lévi-
Strauss, the incest taboo, though universal in its existence, is cultural or 
social in its content. It is therefore not purely “natural” to avoid incest.233 
 
229. See JOHN HARRIS, ON CLONING 95 (2004) (arguing that if everyone were to use 
cloning it would prevent any increase in genetic diversity, but this is extremely unlikely). 
See also Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that “[a] realistic approach to 
the accessibility of cloning techniques for reproductive purposes leads to the conclusion 
that it would not be a mass phenomenon, but an option for a limited number of people 
[w]hich means that the risks for biodiversity might not be significant after all,” and 
suggesting that the assumption that biodiversity is of moral value may itself be flawed); 
Richard A. Epstein, A Rush to Caution: Cloning Human Beings, in CLONES AND CLONES, 
supra note 12, at 262, 275 (arguing that cloning will likely only be used by a small number of 
people, that it is different than inbreeding, and that it is not clear that cloning could cause 
much, if any, of a reduction in biodiversity); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional 
Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 997 (2002) (“[I]t simply defies belief to suggest that 
cloning would become so popular as to reduce, in any significant way, the existing level of 
genetic diversity.”). 
230. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 627 (“Finally, even 
if the clones of clones always did asexually reproduce, the species effects are too distant in 
the future—fifty-two generations of human reproduction is more than 1000 years—to 
function as an acceptable justification for interfering with an infertile couple’s procreative 
liberty now.”). 
231. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 39. 
232. LÉVI-STRAUSS, supra note 220, at 29 (“Even if the incest prohibition has its roots 
in nature it is only in the way it affects us as a social rule that it can be fully grasped. In form 
and in field of application it varies greatly from group to group. . . . In this case there is no 
need to add that the prohibition is less concerned with true consanguinity, which is often 
impossible to establish, if at all, than with the purely social phenomenon by which two 
unrelated individuals are classed as ‘brothers’ or ‘sisters,’ ‘parents’ or ‘children.’”). 
233. See id. Lévi-Strauss asserts, in fact, that arguments for a “natural” basis for 
sanctions against the mating of close kin are clearly undermined when one considers the 
practices of Australian aboriginals who are “probably the least concerned with biological 
proximity.” Id. at 13. As he puts it, unions are permitted among these groups such as 
“grand-uncle with grand-niece, the effects of which cannot be particularly favorable.” Id. 
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In Judith Butler’s words, “[K]inship is a kind of doing, one that does not 
reflect a prior structure but which can only be understood as an enacted 
practice.”234 Cultures reproduce rules about kinship from generation to 
generation; while they may be deemed absolute or “natural,” they are, in 
fact, simply a social construction. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum points out 
that the disgust Kass focuses on is a social construction—a dynamic notion 
that evolves between ages and cultures.235 
In relying on Lévi-Strauss’s theories, both Levick and Kass are 
attempting to preserve a traditional notion of the family founded in 
heterosexual reproduction through intercourse. Butler argues that Lévi-
Strauss’s incest taboo functions not only to defend exogamous 
reproduction of children, but also to “maintain a unity to be part of the 
‘clan’ through compulsory exogamy, as it is articulated through 
compulsory heterosexuality. Women from elsewhere secure the 
reproduction of cultural identity in this way.”236 Following this logic, Lévi-
Strauss’s kinship model preserves the existing dominant culture; for our 
purposes, heterosexual reproduction through intercourse. 
Underlying both Levick and Kass’s arguments is thus homophobia and 
fear of disrupting the heteronormative status quo. A closer look at Levick’s 
analysis reveals that he is less concerned by the problem of biodiversity 
and more focused on the belief that, although marriage is not essential for 
sexual reproduction, “it still can create what is arguably the best social 
context within which to rear children.”237 Levick is thus primarily 
concerned with the protection of the family (and marriage) which he 
deems “the most fundamental civilizing and regulative unit of society.”238 
He goes on to suggest that cloning might decrease “the influence of certain 
sexuality repressive forces in society,” which would result in increasing 
“the incidence of sexual perversion.”239 This reliance on heterosexual 
marriage as the sole basis for ensuring diversity in the gene pool reveals 
Levick’s argument to be fundamentally flawed. His commitment to 
repression of “perversion” hints at his baser motives. Indeed, in another 
place in his book, Levick considers the argument that cloning would be 
beneficial to same-sex couples and concludes that cloning should be 
permissible only to the extent that gene splicing exists, because only then 
 
234. Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, supra note 1, at 249 (citing 
DAVID SCHNEIDER, A CRITIQUE OF THE STUDY OF KINSHIP (1984)) . 
235.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 24–25 (2010). For 
example, Nussbaum notes that homosexual sex has not always been found disgusting by 
heterosexual males, explaining that in many cultures such as Ancient Greece and 
contemporary Western Europe, same-sex acts are not objects of disgust. Id. 
236. Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, supra note 1, at 247. 
237. LEVICK, supra note 10, at 229. 
238. Id. at 230. 
239. Id. at 230. 
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could same-sex couples be good parents.240 The irrationality of this 
argument merits no further discussion. 
3. Arguments That LGBTI People Will Purposely Clone 
Queer Children 
The argument that LGBTI people will clone themselves in order to 
perpetuate their own gay “kind”241 is presented by both opponents and 
proponents of LGBTI rights. Opponents imagine that cloning may result 
in the growth of the LGBTI population.242 Kass mockingly notes that some 
gay activists testified to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission that, 
“should homosexuality be shown to have a genetic basis, homosexuals 
would have an obligation to reproduce through cloning to preserve their 
kind!”243 In a similar vein, Eric and Richard Posner express concern about 
the spread of infertility by the use of cloning. Their concerns about 
infertility include an anxiety about cloning’s potential to increase “gay 
genes” in the population: 
The spread of infertility through cloning might be even more rapid 
if, as realism requires, “reproductive failure” were defined broadly 
enough to encompass the situation of a homosexual couple, for 
whom cloning might be an attractive alternative to adoption, 
artificial insemination (if it is a lesbian couple), or surrogate 
motherhood (if it is a male homosexual couple). Assuming that all 
or most homosexual orientation is genetic, the fraction of 
homosexual genes in the gene pool would be increased if cloning 
resulted in a disproportionate increase in reproduction by 
homosexuals, who might be thought “functionally” infertile to the 
extent that they do not reproduce sexually.244 
Even assuming that homosexuality is indeed genetic—a very controversial 
and simplistic assumption, as I discuss below—and even if LGBTI people 
will indeed choose to use cloning when they could rely on other ARTs, 
framing LGBTI individuals as inherently or “functionally” infertile is 
simple bigotry. LGBTI people may be or may not be infertile, like 
members of the general population. LGBTI people may choose not to 
 
240. Id. at 249–50. 
241. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 86. 
242. See, e.g., KEN HAM, How Should a Christian Respond to “Gay Marriage”?, in 
THE NEW ANSWERS BOOK 2, http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/nab2/christian-
respond-gay-marriage (“The idea is already with us that gay ‘couples’ should be freely able 
to donate their sperm to surrogate mothers or to clone their DNA to perpetuate their own 
genes. So if there is any genetic basis to homosexuality (i.e., ‘made that way’), then this too 
will increase the frequency of homosexuality in future generations.”). 
243. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 86. 
244. Posner & Posner, supra note 105, at 256 (internal citations omitted). 
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procreate coincidently, but this in no way suggests they are functionally 
infertile. They can choose to reproduce in “traditional” ways, to clone, to 
co-parent, or to adopt. Some LGBTI people have children from previous 
heterosexual marriages, and some are bisexual. No wonder, then, that in 
response to Eric and Richard Posners’ argument, Victoria Davion asserts 
that “[t]he homophobia involved in objecting to cloning on the basis that it 
might produce more homosexual people is obvious.”245 As many scholars 
have pointed out, the argument that infertility could be “spread” through 
cloning finds no support in reality.246 LGBTI people who would have had 
no children before being given the opportunity to use cloning and who 
now reproduce would actually extend and strengthen the gene pool. 
The argument that LGBTI couples will pass a “gay gene” on to their 
cloned children is merely a high-tech version of the traditional claim that 
gays need to “recruit” others using immoral measures in order to “pass on 
the disease” of homosexuality.247 For years, many courts embraced the 
narrative that adult gays were trying to recruit children. In Larry Catá 
Backer’s research on narratives of homosexuality in state courts between 
1960 and 1996, he discovered that state court judges frequently take the 
position (at least implicitly) that “young people become life-long 
‘homosexuals’ after being recruited by adults.”248 State court judges are not 
alone in this belief: during the oral arguments in Lawrence v. Texas, the 
landmark Supreme Court case that struck down anti-sodomy laws, Justice 
Scalia indicated “that the state would have an interest in preventing 
children from being steered into homosexuality.”249 
The recruitment argument relies on the belief that being gay is 
 
245. Victoria Davion, Coming Down to Earth on Cloning: An Ecofeminist Analysis of 
the Homophobia in the Current Debate, 21 HYPATIA 58, 67 (2006). 
246. See PENCE, CLONING AFTER DOLLY, supra note 113, at 88 (arguing that Eric and 
Richard Posner’s claim “has many scale-to-issue problems” and makes “many dubious 
assumptions”); Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Brave New Eugenics: Regulating Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies in the Name of Better Babies, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 257, 
300 (2010) (“[I]nfertility is not always heritable. It has many non-genetic causes, including 
scarring from venereal disease and delayed childbearing. Thus, it is scientifically inaccurate 
to assume that every man or woman who employs ART is transmitting infertility to the 
next generation. Moreover, even though some men and women do harbor genetic defects in 
their sperm and eggs, it is highly unlikely that [ARTs] will cause the infertile to outnumber 
the fertile and doom the species.”). 
247. See, e.g., Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 107 (discussing the fear experienced 
by homophobic parents that homosexuals will recruit their children). See generally William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the 
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (demonstrating that 
while the specific content of anti-gay rhetoric has shifted over time, the underlying bias 
driving such rhetoric has remained constant). 
248. Larry Catá Backer, Narrative and Jurisprudence in State Courts: The Example of 
Constitutional Challenges to Sex Conduct Regulation, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1633, 1640 (1997). 
249. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 105–06 
(2006). 
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unnatural. It implies that no one is born gay and that more LGBTI 
individuals “must be created through recruitment and toxic exposure to 
the gay lifestyle or its affirmation.”250 As such, cloning provides the LGBTI 
community with a means for self-perpetuation through technology that 
cannot be achieved in the “natural” way. Yet the internal logic of this 
argument is flawed. If it is true that no one is born gay, then no one is 
cloned gay, either; gayness, if unnatural, does not reside in DNA. A 
genetic basis for homosexuality has not been identified,251 and the question 
of whether one’s sexual orientation is the result of nature or nurture (or 
both) remains hotly contested both inside and outside the LGBTI 
community.252 In any event, cloning does not produce photocopies of 
humans, as discussed at length above. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the view that cloning would benefit the LGBTI 
community by allowing people to preserve gay culture and/or queer their 
social environments is also widespread among LGBTI-friendly 
commentators.253 Robertson notes that, because gay men who use cloning 
 
250. Phillip A. Bernhardt-House, The Werewolf as Queer, the Queer as Werewolf, 
and Queer Werewolves, in QUEERING THE NON/HUMAN 159, 164 (Noreen Giffney & Myra 
J. Hird eds., 2008) (invoking the literary figure of the werewolf to illustrate the argument 
that the queer community needs to artificially “create” more of its kind). 
251. See THOMAS C. CARAMAGNO, IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?: INTELLECTUAL 
STALEMATE IN THE GAY RIGHTS DEBATE, 104–05 (2002). 
252. Recent experiments show that it is likely that a hormonal and perhaps genetic 
component contributes to the development of sexual identity. See Kemp, supra note 153, at 
11–12. Research on twins suggests that while sexual orientation may be influenced by 
genetics, genes are by no means its sole determinant. See generally Peter S. Bearman & 
Hannah Brückner, Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent Same-Sex Attraction, 107 AM . J . 
SOC. 1179 (2002) (reviewing studies on the origins of sexual orientation based on social, 
genetic and hormonal influences and concluding that genetic or hormonal influences alone 
could not explain sexual preferences). The origin of homosexuality and how the community 
should represent it for the sake of its political and legal strategy has been a source of debate 
within the community itself. See generally Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics 
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN L. REV. 503 (1994) 
(describing the debate within the gay community and criticizing both sides). Notably, some 
gay rights activists have tried to utilize research showing a biological basis for 
homosexuality. Id. at 507–16. By emphasizing the biological aspects of sexuality, they hope 
to prove that sexual orientation is immutable and that gays and lesbian should therefore be 
a protected class for the purpose of equal protection claims. Id. By contrast, social 
constructionists argue, inter alia, that such a move transfers the power to decide who 
deserves protection by the law from the political arena back to science, and removes agency 
and choice from the equation. Id. at 550–553. 
253. Michael Shapiro points out that if sexual orientation is influenced by genes, 
cloned offspring may share the sexual orientation of their genetic parent. See Michael H. 
Shapiro, I Want a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy) that Married Dear Old Dad (Mom): 
Cloning Lives, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 188 (2000). As such, he argues, LGBTI parents 
may engage in “shaping behaviors” in order to ensure that any genetic predisposition for 
the favored sexual preference is realized. Id. at 189. While he acknowledges that “for those 
who believe that departures from the paradigm of nuclear family structure are already 
unduly and dangerously stretched when same-sex couples raise children, the addition of 
cloning may compound the problem,” he further notes that “it remains unclear just what 
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will still need to rely on an egg donor and surrogate, their primary interest 
in the technology may be in having a child with a particular genome, rather 
than having a genetically-related child; thus, they may choose to clone 
their own DNA “perhaps in part to increase the chances that the child will 
be gay and thus perpetuate gay culture.”254 One commentator even goes so 
far to suggest that “if ‘preserv[ing] the race’ is important to you, cloning 
gives you your best odds for getting one. But that’s the only thing cloning 
could eventually do for homosexuals . . . .”255 
Both the “preserve the race” argument and the recruitment-through-
cloning argument rely on a dichotomous conception of sexual orientation: 
just as one is biologically either male or female (a disputable assumption in 
itself256), so too one is either gay or straight. But gender and sexuality 
cannot be neatly summarized or disciplined into categories.257 Queer 
theorists point out that regardless of the origin of homosexuality (nature, 
nurture, or some combination thereof), sexual orientation is not an 
essential phenomenon, and the notion that sexual orientation can be 
categorized is itself socially constructed.258 Only after the medicalization of 
 
harms, if any, would be occasioned by this particular departure from the paradigm.” Id. 
Eskridge and Stein suggest that while some in the LGBTI community may feel that cloning 
offers them the possibility of perpetuating queer culture, the greatest benefit cloning would 
provide them is likely the opportunity to have children, and perhaps to perpetuate “queer-
friendliness”: 
While it would be foolish for them to have children in order to replicate their 
sexual orientation, few queer people want children for this reason only, and most 
queer people with children find the nurturing, sharing, and other generative 
experiences to be among the most rewarding of their lives—just as straight 
people do. Moreover, even though queer cloning would not necessarily produce 
more queer children, there is good reason to think it will contribute to a more 
“queer-friendly” culture in general. Social scientific studies and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that the (nonclone) offspring of gay men and lesbians are more 
likely than people in general to be queer-friendly. 
Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 105. 
254. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 637. 
255. Chandlur Burr, Cloning for Survival, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 15, 1997, at 9. 
256. See generally Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are 
Not Enough, in SEXUALITY AND GENDER 468 (Christine L. Williams & Arlene Stein, eds.,) 
(2002), available at http://frank.mtsu.edu/~phollowa/5sexes.html (arguing that the current 
two-sex system is inadequate to encompass the full spectrum of human sex expression, and 
proposing a five-sex system in its place). 
257. See also EVE SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 8 (1990) (“It is a rather 
amazing fact that, of the very many dimensions along which the genital activity of one 
person can be differentiated from that of another (dimensions that include preference for 
certain acts, certain zones or sensations, certain physical types, a certain frequency, certain 
symbolic investment, certain relations of age or power, a certain species, a certain number 
of participants, etc. etc. etc.), precisely one, the gender of object choice, emerged from the 
turn of the century, and has remained, as the dimension denoted by the now ubiquitous 
category of “sexual orientation.”). 
258. JAGOSE, supra note 169, at 10–16 (reviewing constructionist positions); DAVID M. 
HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 49 (1990) (explaining that even if a 
gay gene would be found it cannot adequately explain the categories of sexual orientation). 
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homosexuality and the invention of homosexuality as we know it, during 
the eighteenth century, did homosexual become an identity category.259 
Thus, the compartmentalization of society into “homosexual” and 
“heterosexual” is a relatively new phenomenon that serves to regulate 
sexual acts and desires, deeming some appropriate and good (and 
therefore natural) and others deviant and inferior.260 Advances in cloning 
or other biotechnologies, no matter how complex, cannot possibly 
perpetuate social constructs. Only the meanings we layer upon bodies, 
acts, and desires can do that. The recruitment-through-cloning narrative 
therefore stands on shaky ground, and it seems that arguments by LGBTI 
proponents are based on an essentialist view of what it means to be gay.261 
 
259.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (1988) (“[W]e must not forget 
that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was constituted from 
the moment it was characterized—[Carl] Westphal’s famous article of 1870 on ‘contrary 
sexual sensations’ can stand as its date of birth.”). See also SEDGWICK, supra note 257, at 2–
3, 8–9, 34–35 (1990) (explaining how the homosexual/heterosexual dichotomy emerged in 
the West, and noting that “the word ‘homosexual’ entered Euro-American discourse during 
the last third of the nineteenth century”).  
260. Cf., JAGOSE, supra note 169, at 16 (“To foreground only those processes that 
resulted historically in the formation of homosexuality is to imply that heterosexuality—
that frequently unmarked but no less historically contingent category—is somehow the 
more self-evident, natural or stable construction. This assumption is naturalized in a culture 
that commonly understands homosexuality to be a derivative or less evolved form of 
heterosexuality.”). 
261. Another relevant issue is the inverse of the former point. If cloning technologies 
enable us to pinpoint a “gay gene,” would more people abort their children? Indeed, law 
professor Radhika Rao argues that one reason to ban cloning is that instead of enhancing 
the rights of LGB people, it will be widely used to “to screen them out of the population.” 
Radhika Rao, What’s So Strange About Human Cloning?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1016 
(2002). See also Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 108–09 (“Some heterosexuals might 
use cloning or gene splicing to try to ensure that their children would be heterosexual.”). By 
and large, these concerns are unfounded, as cloning technology is unlikely to bring about 
any significant changes. First, even if a genetic connection between sexual identity and 
genes exists, because of the significant role that other factors play in the development of 
sexual identity, it is very unlikely that it will ever be possible to screen out LGBT people, 
much less that cloning technology would enable this. Id. at 104–05, 109. Second, screening 
techniques are already accessible through IVF and PGD, and yet the law does not prohibit 
the use of IVF. Moreover, genetic tests for some forms of intersexuality (namely Turner 
and Klinefelter syndromes) are currently available even for those experiencing non-IVF 
pregnancy, and there have been a large number of terminations. See generally Caroline 
Mansfield, Suellen Hopfer & Theresa M. Marteau, Termination Rates After Prenatal 
Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter 
Syndromes: A Systematic Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808 (1999) 
(reviewing studies from several different countries on the percentage of pregnancy 
terminations after prenatal diagnosis of Turner and Klinefelter syndromes, and finding a 
seventy-two percent average termination rate with diagnoses of Turner syndrome and fifty-
eight percent with diagnoses of Klinefelter syndrome). 
EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM 
56 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 35:1 
4. Arguments That Cloning Is Not a Natural Form of 
Reproduction 
A fourth argument commonly used against reproductive cloning is that 
it is an attempt to “play God” and is thus immoral on religious grounds.262 
Perhaps the argument that cloning, in particular, is akin to playing God 
stems from a concern not about human intervention in general, but about 
the limits that society should impose on the use of science in the creation 
of humanity. While IVF more closely imitates the “natural” reproductive 
process,263 cloning is considered a form of “artificial interference,”264 
creating a product that we can anticipate and manipulate in advance. Thus, 
arguments that scientists should not play God are better understood as 
warnings against hubris.265 The secular version of this argument is that 
cloning allows for “unnatural” intervention in the natural world: 
procreation through “human design and manipulation.”266 
Like so many of the arguments against cloning, the idea of cloning as 
playing God relies on a strict, binary understanding of the natural world, 
where everything that is not biologically “natural” is ipso facto immoral. In 
that, it is similar to social regulation and control of sexuality more broadly, 
which is established largely through this natural-unnatural, moral-immoral 
dichotomous reasoning.267 
The framing of cloning as unnatural is not only problematic: it is 
inaccurate. Cloning has clear precedents in nature.268 For example, 
 
262. See Bonnie Steinbock, Cloning Human Beings: Sorting Through the Ethical 
Issues, in HUMAN CLONING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 68, 69–70 (Barbara 
MacKinnon ed.) (2000) (“In his charge to [the National Bioethics Advisory Commission], 
President Clinton warned against the temptation to ‘play God.’”). See also GARETH JONES, 
CLONES, THE CLOWNS OF TECHNOLOGY? 77–78 (2001) (“Cloning can be condemned 
because it exceeds the limits of the delegated dominion given to the human race by God.”); 
NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 172, at 45 (“The warning against ‘playing 
God’ serves to remind human beings of their finiteness and fallibility. By not recognizing 
appropriate limits and constraints on scientific aspirations, humans reenact the Promethean 
assertion of pride or hubris.”). 
263. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 695–96 (“[A]rtificial 
insemination and IVF with donor sperm, or whole embryo donation . . . [is] a not altogether 
unproblematic practice . . . . [T]here is in each case (as in all sexual reproduction) a known 
male source of sperm and a known female source of egg.”). 
264. Richard Dawkins, What’s Wrong with Cloning?, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra 
note 12, at 54, 63 (telling a story about a panel in which he participated where participants 
expressed concerns about the “unnaturalness” of cloning). 
265. Steinbock, supra note 262, at 70. 
266. See, e.g., KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 26. 
267. Anal sex, for example, is considered “unnatural” because it does not lead to 
procreation. ALAN SOBLE, SEXUAL INVESTIGATIONS 10, 28 (1996) (explaining that natural 
law philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas have seen anal coitus as against nature because 
it does not lead to procreation). 
268. Parthenogenesis is an asexual form of reproduction by the females of some 
species whereby embryos or seeds grow and develop without fertilization from a male of 
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“twinning,” or the creation of identical (monozygotic) twins, occurs when 
the fertilized egg spontaneously divides, creating two cells that continue 
dividing on their own, and eventually resulting in two separate embryos in 
the womb.269 These two embryos are thus identical because they come 
from the same fertilized egg. In some mammals, twinning is the default; in 
humans, roughly one in every three hundred births is a result of 
twinning.270 Human clones (of each other, not of their parents) have thus 
always existed, and no one claims that they are unnatural. Indeed, 
Christine Hauskeller argues “[t]hat the artificial character is important for 
the meaning of ‘cloning’ is shown by the fact that the term is never used for 
the natural division of a zygote resulting in identical human twins.”271 
At the same time, the claim that cloning is playing God disregards the 
widespread use of other accepted technologies that ostensibly “interfere” 
with “natural” reproduction, such as the morning-after pill, IVF, 
surrogacy, postmortem reproduction, sex selection, genetic engineering, 
and even the transplantation of artificial organs. As their use becomes 
more common, they are accepted as more natural. What purpose is served 
by categorizing some technologies as natural while framing other, 
marginally different technologies as unnatural? 
A deeper examination reveals that underlying this concern about 
playing God is a heteronormative conception of the “natural”—and thus 
the “correct”—way to conceive a child. For Kass, for example, there is 
something of profound value in the “natural” process of heterosexual 
reproduction. He claims that the process of having children by “one 
female, one male, (usually) through coitus—is established . . . not by 
human decision, culture or tradition, but by nature.”272 Even in IVF and 
other forms of ART—which Kass treats as a evil—there is “a known male 
source of sperm and a known single female source of egg—a genetic father 
and a genetic mother—should anyone care to know (as adopted children 
 
the species. Parthenogenesis, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-partheno.html. Parthenogenesis is common among 
social insects like the honeybee and the ant and has also been observed in some snakes, 
fish, and monitor lizards. Id. Some research even suggests that human reproduction through 
parthenogenesis might be more “natural” than what we think of as traditional sexual 
reproduction today. Judith Longstaff Mackay explains: 
The most intriguing aspect of my research was why we have sex at all. After all, 
sexual reproduction in animals started only 300 million years ago. Life on earth 
got on pretty well for 3000 million [sic] years before that with asexual 
reproduction. . . . [S]exual reproduction . . . takes more time, it uses more energy, 
and mates may be scarce or uncooperative. 
Judith Longstaff Mackay, Why Have Sex?, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 623, 623 (2001). 
269. LIM, supra note 87, at 180–82. 
270. MICHAEL D. WEST, THE IMMORTAL CELL: ONE SCIENTIST’S QUEST TO SOLVE THE 
MYSTERY OF HUMAN AGING 214 (2003). 
271. Hauskeller, supra note 84, at 826. 
272. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 689. 
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often do) who is genetically related to whom.”273 He argues that a child 
made through cloning, rather than begotten through this natural process, 
will be morally and socially disadvantaged by having only a single genetic 
ancestor.274 He thus implies that having a child by heterosexual 
intercourse—or even by a process that imitates it—is the sole natural and 
moral way to reproduce. As Victoria Davion points out, this is one of the 
most homophobic and heterosexist assumptions about cloning because it 
clearly posits reproduction by a male and female via intercourse as 
superior to other forms.275 
Asexual and sexual reproduction both result in the birth of a child; the 
only difference is in the lack of unification between sperm and egg in the 
former. To describe cloning as unnatural is to glorify heterosexual 
reproduction. In the words of Dion Farquhar, 
The ontology of “natural” biogenetic married heterosexual 
reproduction depended on its binary other of “unnatural” 
sterility—the “case” of physiological or social pathology 
(homosexuals, unmarried people and so on). Now, a new 
“other” to “natural” reproduction has been introduced by 
biotechnology—“artificial” donor-assisted asexual 
reproduction—and it must quickly work to erase its 
otherness . . . .276 
Cloning technology calls into question the seemingly bright line between 
“natural” and “unnatural” forms of reproduction. In doing so, it has the 
potential to dismantle the nature-culture binary that is fundamental to 
some of the most common (and most discriminatory) arguments against 
cloning and against “alternative” sexual orientations. 
C. Conclusion  
A review of the key arguments against cloning demonstrates that the 
majority are either largely unfounded or have been adequately addressed 
and refuted in the scientific and theoretical literature. Some of the 
traditional arguments discussed most extensively in cloning literature do 
raise serious questions about the risks of a reproductive technology that is 
not yet fully understood. Concerns about the procedure itself should be 
taken seriously, and further research should be conducted to ensure that 
cloning technology is safe and efficient. Those arguments that are 
motivated by homophobic and heterosexist concerns, however, must be 
 
273. Id. at 695–96. 
274. See id. 
275. Davion, supra note 245, at 64. 
276. Dion Farquhar, Gamete Traffic/Pedestrian Crossings, in PLAYING DOLLY: 
TECHNOCULTURAL FORMATIONS, FANTASIES, & FICTIONS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 17, 
21 (E. Ann Kaplan & Susan Squier eds., 1999). 
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distinguished from more legitimate arguments against cloning with which 
they are frequently bound up. As a result, their heterosexist and 
homophobic motivations are disguised by neutral language and appeals to 
scientific reasoning. Yet, upon further examination, these arguments 
appear to be motivated largely by fears over the potential use of cloning by 
non-traditional families and the advantages it will provide for them, 
including the possible expansion of LGTBI families in the population. My 
intent in this Part has been to shift the focus from the natural and scientific 
to a consideration of the way in which legal, social, and scientific 
discourses shape the meaning of what we think of as moral, natural, and 
biological. In the final Part, I show how a binary view of nature, nurture 
and sexual orientation has been collapsed into the current legal regime, 
and try, using legal tools, to challenge the existing, discriminatory law. 
 
VI.  
A RIGHT TO CLONE?: CLONING AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR AN 
EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE 
At present, the federal government prohibits federal funds from being 
used for reproductive cloning research, and several states prohibit research 
on reproductive cloning and attempts to clone human beings.277 These 
restrictions arguably implicate the constitutional rights of LGBTI couples 
and individuals, including the right to equal protection under the law. This 
is a normative argument that sometimes stretches the current American 
constitutional law by looking at how this regime could look, and not what 
it currently looks like. I adopt a broader notion of equality than currently 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court because my aim is to provide a 
forward-thinking vision of the way the regulation of cloning could and 
should be interpreted, not just by the Court, but by the legislature and the 
public. 
A. The Current Ban on Funding Research Cloning and Potential 
Future Bans 
Currently, in the United States, there is no federal law prohibiting the 
use of, or research on, reproductive cloning.278 Even in the absence of 
federal legislation, however, the U.S. government has found many ways to 
block research on reproductive cloning. Immediately after the 
announcement of the creation of Dolly the sheep, then-President Clinton 
issued a presidential directive prohibiting the use of federal funds for 
 
277. See infra Part VI(A). 
278. Payne, supra note 6, at 956–57. 
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cloning humans.279 He also instructed the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission to issue a report on the ethical implications of human 
cloning.280 Several months later, that Commission called for a prohibition 
on human cloning, finding cloning to be unsafe for the cloned fetus and, 
therefore, unethical.281 It also acknowledged that human cloning raises 
ethical concerns and that these concerns should be addressed and debated 
before cloning is allowed.282 Following the issuance of the Committee’s 
recommendations, President Clinton urged the private sector to adopt a 
voluntary ban on cloning human beings.283 
In 2001, the Bush Administration issued a decision on stem cell 
research, stating that federal funds could not be used for the research of 
human embryonic stem cells, except for research on a limited number of 
cell lines that had already been created.284 This decision made it almost 
impossible for scientists to receive funding for human embryonic stem cell 
research.285 In 2002, the National Academy of Science recommended that 
the ban be extended for an additional five years.286 
Most recently in 2009, President Obama’s administration lifted the 
strict limitations on human embryonic stem cell research.287 At the same 
time, however, President Obama declared that his administration would 
never allow human reproductive cloning because “it is dangerous, 
profoundly wrong and has no place in our society or any society.”288 
Recently, a federal district court judge struck down Obama’s stem cell 
 
279. Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human 
Beings, 1 PUB. PAPERS 233 (Mar. 4, 1997). 
280. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 172 (recopying letter from the 
President sent on Feb. 24, 1997, requesting review of ethical issues associated with cloning). 
281. Id. at 108 (“The Commission concludes that at this time it is morally unacceptable 
for anyone in the public or private sector, whether in a research or clinical setting, to 
attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning. The Commission 
reached a consensus on this point because current scientific information indicates that this 
technique is not safe to use in humans at this time.”). 
282. Id. (“Moreover, in addition to safety concerns, many other serious ethical 
concerns have been identified, which require much more widespread and careful public 
deliberation before this technology may be used.”). 
283. Judith A. Johnson, Human Cloning, in CLONING: CHRONOLOGY, ABSTRACTS AND 
GUIDE TO BOOKS 19, 25 (Stephen D. Fairbanks ed., 2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Human 
Cloning]. 
284. Id. at 25–26. 
285. See, e.g., LIM, supra note 87, at 345 (“It is incredibly difficult to raise private 
money to sustain a reasonable research program.”). 
286. Johnson, Human Cloning, supra note 283, at 27 (“The panel stated that the ban 
should be reconsidered within 5 years, but only if compelling new data on safety and 
efficacy are presented and a national dialogue on the social and ethical issues suggests that 
a review is warranted.”). 
287. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009). 
288. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Lifts Bush’s Strict Limits on Stem Cell Research, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/us/politics/10stem. 
html?_r=1. 
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research order as violating the Dickey-Wicker Amendment,289 which 
prohibits the use of federal funds for research involving the destruction, 
endangerment, or creation (for research purposes) of human embryos.290 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has issued a stay, 
pending appeal.291 
In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has declared 
that the use of cloning is subject to its approval.292 The FDA is generally 
authorized to regulate biologic products, drugs, and medical devices.293 The 
agency has asserted that anyone involved in cloning research must submit 
an investigational new drug application.294 However, no such applications 
have been submitted, perhaps because the FDA has made it clear that it 
will reject these applications.295 The FDA’s jurisdiction over cloning has 
never really been explained296 and has been criticized and challenged by a 
few scholars who argue that the FDA does not have authority in this 
instance.297 In any event, it is clear that research on reproductive cloning in 
the United States currently has no chance of being funded and may never 
 
289. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 
(1996). 
290. Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. Aug 23, 2010) (“[T]he will of 
Congress, as expressed in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, is to prohibit federal funding of 
research in which human embryos are destroyed. Accordingly, it is in the public interest to 
enjoin defendants from implementing the Guidelines.”). 
291. Id. 
292. See Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. Rose, FDA Regulation of Human Cloning: 
Usurpation or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 99–100 (2001) (discussing and 
quoting statements from key FDA staff members asserting FDA jurisdiction over cloning). 
293. What Does FDA Regulate?, FED. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2011). 
294. See Letter from Stuart L. Nightingale, M.D., FDA Assoc. Comm’r for Med. 
Affairs (Oct. 26, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/ 
RunningClinicalTrials/ucm150508.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (“[T]he appropriate 
mechanism to pursue a clinical investigation using cloning technology is the submission of 
an investigational new drug application (IND) to FDA.”). 
295. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 84. 
296. Merrill & Rose, supra note 292, at 97 (“No ‘inside’ account of the FDA’s decision 
to assert jurisdiction over cloning has yet appeared. We may never know whether the 
Clinton White House pressured the Agency to act in order to forestall restrictive legislation 
or whether the Agency took the initiative despite administration reluctance. Nor has the 
FDA offered a full-blown defense of its legal reasoning, complete with consideration of 
alternatives and explanation of its rejection of plausible objections, as it would have been 
obliged to do if it had thought it necessary to comply with the rulemaking requirements of 
the APA.”). 
297. See, e.g., MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 84–85; Merrill & Rose, supra note 292, at 
101 (“None [of the FDA’s statements] said, for example, what applications of cloning 
technology the FDA believes it has the authority to regulate.”). But see generally Gail H. 
Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the Benefit of) Future Persons: A Different 
Perspective on the FDA’s Jurisdiction to Regulate Human Reproductive Cloning, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 1201 (2003) (arguing that the FDA does possess jurisdiction to regulate 
cloning). 
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be authorized by the FDA. 
In the background of these debates over government funding for 
cloning research lurks the spectre of an outright ban on reproductive 
cloning. The House of Representatives voted twice to ban human 
cloning,298 but the proposed law did not pass in the Senate.299 Several states, 
however, have enacted statutes governing cloning.300 These statutes vary in 
substance and in scope. Some prohibit only human cloning but allow 
therapeutic cloning, and some call for a complete ban on cloning of any 
kind.301 
B. LGBTI People Are Disparately Impacted by the Current 
Limitations and Would Be Similarly Harmed by a Total Ban on 
Reproductive Cloning 
1. Federal Funding Ban 
The ban on funding research cloning puts LGBTI couples at a 
disadvantage relative to opposite-sex couples who can reproduce without 
the involvement of a third party. This disadvantage is not merely a result 
of biological factors: the government has refused to fund the most 
promising method that would allow LGBTI couples to have genetically-
related children with minimum involvement of third parties. This 
inequality is therefore rooted not only in biology but in government action. 
Because the federal government funds research that enables opposite-sex 
 
298. H.R. 534, 108th Cong. § 302 (2003) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or entity, 
public or private, in or affecting interstate commerce, knowingly (1) to perform or attempt 
to perform human cloning; (2) to participate in an attempt to perform human cloning; or 
(3) to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo produced by human cloning or any 
product derived from such embryo.”); H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302 (2001) (same). See also 
Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2007, S. 812, 110th 
Congress (2007); Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2005, S. 
876, H.R. 1822, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Jeffrey Brainard, After Heated Debate, U.S. 
House Votes Again to Ban Cloning, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), Mar. 14, 2003, at A24 
(noting that the ban passed in the House, 241 to 155, and that House lawmakers “had 
approved a complete ban on cloning in 2001 by a comparable tally, 265 to 162”). 
299. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 77 (noting that while the ban did not pass in the 
Senate, “this failure did not reflect support for reproductive cloning; rather, some senators 
wanted to preserve the right of scientists to engage in research cloning.”) (emphasis added). 
300. For a comprehensive overview of therapeutic and reproductive cloning laws by 
state, see Human Cloning Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/HumanCloningLaws/tabid/14284/Default.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
301. In some states, cloning human beings for purposes of reproductive cloning is a 
criminal act. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1002 (2006) (performing or participating in 
human cloning is a Class C felony); IND. CODE § 35-46-5-2 (Supp. 2010) (engaging in human 
cloning is a Class D felony). In others, only a civil fine is imposed. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 333.16275 (2006) (engaging in or attempting to engage in human cloning can result 
in a $10,000,000 fine). 
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couples to have genetically-related children, banning funding to research 
that would similarly benefit LGBTI couples denies these couples equal 
protection of the laws. The ban on federally funding cloning research 
should thus be challenged as a form of unconstitutional discrimination. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees equal treatment under the law among similarly situated 
classes.302 At present, the ban on funding research on reproductive cloning 
places those couples who wish to reproduce asexually at a disadvantage 
compared to those who are not affected by the ban.303 I define the classes 
based on their ability to produce children who are genetically related to at 
least one partner with minimal third-party involvement. The unaffected 
class consists of opposite-sex couples who have the option to produce 
genetically-related children by coitus or through the use of currently 
available ARTs. The disadvantaged class includes all those couples who 
cannot produce children genetically related to at least one parent without 
significant reliance on third parties but-for the use of cloning. De facto, 
LGBTI couples would be prominent in the second class.304 
If the inability of an LGBTI couple to conceive a genetically-related 
child together with minimal reliance on third parties were simply a 
biological fact, it would not raise any equal protection or other 
constitutional issues. However, because emerging technologies in the field 
of reproductive cloning may offer the LGBTI community the chance to 
have genetically-related children (possibly even with a mix of both 
partners’ genes), bans on federal funding of research that would help to 
refine and ensure the safety and efficacy of these procedures 
unconstitutionally denies LGBTI people a right that is not similarly denied 
 
302.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
303. This is not to say that only couples are affected by the ban. Clearly, single 
individuals who wish to reproduce asexually are also disadvantaged by it. However, for the 
purposes of an equal protection challenge, it is most strategic to identify two groups who 
are similarly situated in nearly every way in order to demonstrate that a law discriminately 
targets or impacts one group relative to the other. If a challenge to a funding ban is 
successful, this will benefit single individuals as well. 
304. This class also obviously includes some infertile opposite-sex couples. However, 
the fact that this class includes some opposite sex couples does not diminish the legal 
implications of the disparate impact felt by same-sex couples. For example, miscegenation 
laws discriminated not only against black people but also against white people and other 
minorities, and yet the court found that bans on interracial marriage violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting 
Virginia’s argument that because “miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white 
and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance 
on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race”). 
Similarly, in the employment context, courts have found that while the claimed 
discrimination in hiring examinations did not apply only to members of a racial minority, 
the hiring practices indeed discriminated on the basis of race. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 
459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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to opposite-sex couples. 
One may argue that the government does not treat these two groups 
differently. The members of the unaffected class reproduce via coitus 
without the aid of funding or research from the state, while the affected 
class is simply biologically different. Thus, the affected class is asking not 
for equal treatment, but for positive rights: affirmative assistance in 
conceiving genetically-related children. Furthermore, LGBTI people enjoy 
access to the same benefits that are provided to opposite-sex couples: they 
are free to use ARTs and other medical interventions that improve 
fertility. 
Yet such a reading not only falls prey to the fallacious nature/culture 
dichotomy discussed above, it also ignores the current landscape of 
reproductive health research. In fact, the state already provides funding 
and research that benefits the unaffected class. The government has 
invested a great deal funding and research in enabling fertile and 
infertile305 opposite-sex couples to procreate in safe and healthy ways with 
minimum involvement of third parties. According to the data provided by 
the National Institutes of Health, since 2006, the United States has directly 
invested $300 million in research on infertility, and more than $1.8 billion 
on women’s health,306 a category that includes research on reproductive 
health.307 Such funding is no doubt dedicated, inter alia, to research on 
drugs that promote ovulation (clomiphene and gonadotropins) and allow 
couples to conceive genetically-related child without a third party’s organs. 
Opposite-sex couples who employ ARTs enjoy the fruits of research that 
enables them to procreate in safe and efficient ways, often without the 
involvement of third parties.308 Even those couples who do not use ARTs 
 
305. Infertility, according to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, is 
defined as engaging in coital unprotected sex for one year without conception occurring. 
Infertility, AM. SOC. REPROD. MED., http://asrm.org/topics/detail.aspx?id=36 (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2011). 
306. Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition and Disease Categories, 
NIH RESEARCH PORTFOLIO ONLINE, http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/#bpopup 
(estimated budget for FY 2010 and FY 2011 not included in calculation). 
307. See AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN’S HEALTH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, A 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE NIH WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 63–65 (1999), http://orwh.od.nih.gov/research/report.pdf (describing current 
NIH research on reproductive health and offering recommendations for a future research 
agenda). 
308. For example, the government encourages research on PGD. See, e.g., Study of 
the Efficacy of 24 Chromosome Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), 
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Dec. 12, 2010), http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01219283 
(announcing PGD clinical trials advertised by the National Institutes of Health). As noted 
above, supra note 54, PGD is a technique that can identify genetic defects in pre-embryos. 
The purpose of this procedure is to allow couples who have difficulty reproducing because 
of genetic problems to have a healthy baby with their own genes. Of course, such couples 
could instead simply rely on third-party organs. Thus, the main purpose of the technique is 
to allow a couple to have a genetically-related child without the involvement of third 
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rely on a variety of other medical tools and technologies over the course of 
their pregnancy, including ultrasounds, alpha-fetoprotein screening, 
amniocentesis, and chorionic and villus sampling, all of which have been 
supported by years of technological development and financial investment 
by the government. The American health system is thus deeply invested in 
supporting opposite-sex couples to reproduce without the involvement of a 
third party, while no funding is similarly devoted to the LGBTI community 
for these purposes.309 In challenging the ban on funding for cloning 
research, the LGBTI community would not be asking for an affirmative 
right; rather, it would merely be asking that the government not deny 
federal funding to research that would equally enable them to have 
genetically-related children. 
One also may argue that these classes are biologically different in a 
way that justifies the different distribution of funding. When the 
government funds research on breast cancer, a disease that affects mainly 
women, it does not discriminate against men. Indeed, sex discrimination 
jurisprudence recognizes some physical and inherent differences between 
men and women and uses them to justify different treatment on the basis 
of sex.310 However (and this is precisely the point), what society treats as 
inherent or natural physical or biological differences are in reality the 
result of social practices that collapse actual variations in favor of binary 
differences, becoming entrenched over time through medical and legal 
discourse. The notion of “biological difference” is in fact little more than 
misguided prejudice pressed into service as legal justification for outright 
sex discrimination.311 I am not arguing that biology is meaningless, but 
rather that the ban on cloning research shapes our understanding of what 
is biologically possible. It may be possible, biologically, for LGBTI couples 
to have genetically-related children with minimal involvement of third 
parties. It is the law, not biology, that impedes this opportunity; it is the 
law that shapes biology more than biology shapes the law. 
Finally, some might argue that the federal government’s decision to 
 
parties. 
309. To be sure, LGBTI individuals and couples benefit from government funding of 
reproductive technologies: they use ART and other reproductive medicines, and give birth 
in hospitals the same way that others do. Yet providing funding for research that allows 
opposite-sex couples to have genetically-related children without relying on third parties, 
and denying funding for the same exact purpose for other groups, is per se discrimination. 
310. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 
59, 62 (1997) (discussing the role of “inherent [sex] differences” in the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)). 
311. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability 
Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863, 871 (1988) (“Instead of 
attempting to distinguish real from stereotypical differences, [some feminists argue that] 
equality doctrine should challenge the male-biased norms that make difference, including 
physical differences, a problem for women.”). 
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ban federal funding of reproductive cloning is not amenable to an equal 
protection analysis.312 The Supreme Court has held that the “legislature’s 
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not 
infringe the right.”313 Thus, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld a 
statute that prohibited the use of federal funds for informing women about 
the availability of abortion services.314 The majority quoted a previous 
decision in which it held that “the government may ‘make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds.’”315 
I suggest, however, that the ban on funding research on reproductive 
cloning differs from these cases. When the government funds research on 
sexual reproduction but implements a ban on research on asexual 
reproduction (a ban that harms a specific group), it unequally distributes 
money for the same purpose. In another context, where the government 
directs funding toward one group but denies it to another, the Supreme 
Court has held that the government cannot discriminate in providing 
funding for the same purpose to different groups.316 Thus, the Supreme 
Court found that a Texas statute denying schools state funds for the 
education of children who were not “legally admitted” to the United States 
while simultaneously funding the education of citizens and documented 
immigrants violated the Equal Protection Clause.317 Similarly, the federal 
 
312. The question is not whether the state should positively support research on 
certain issues. The right to procreate is a negative right, assuring that the state does not 
interfere in people’s private decisions to have or not have children. JOHN ROBERTSON, 
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 23 (1994). 
This right does not include the obligation to assist in having children. See id. (arguing that 
there is no constitutional right to provide services or resources to assist in conception). My 
argument therefore focuses on the inequity in distributing valuable resources to only one 
group and thereby denying them to another. 
313. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983). 
314. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). But see Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 
U.S. 533 (2001) (limiting Rust to cases involving governmental speech). 
315. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). 
316. See Burt, supra note 6, at 501 (“[T]he use of federal funds for reproductive or 
research cloning outside specific circumstances remains forbidden. If government funding 
were equated with private philanthropy, it would be difficult to imagine a basis for 
challenging the government’s decision to spend its funds for some purposes but not for 
others, as it saw fit. In our constitutional scheme, however, the government has obligations 
that private philanthropists do not; the government is obliged to honor public norms of 
behavior that private parties are free to avoid.”). 
317. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Similarly, in the context of the Establishment 
Clause, the Court found that the “government should not prefer one religion to another, or 
religion to irreligion,” when it allocates funding to schools. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel 
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (holding that passage of a school-
redistricting law resulting in the creation of a special school district for practitioners of a 
“strict” form of Judaism violated the Establishment Clause of First Amendment). See also 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that Pennsylvania’s Nonpublic 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which allowed the state to reimburse nonpublic 
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ban on reproductive cloning arguably violates the Equal Protection Clause 
by conferring a benefit—reproductive health research leading to the ability 
to conceive without third-party involvement—on heterosexual couples that 
it does not confer on LGBTI couples. 
2. Total Ban on Cloning 
A ban on practicing reproductive cloning similarly discriminates 
against LGBTI couples relative to their heterosexual counterparts. The 
government does not interfere with opposite-sex couples’ right to use ART 
in order to have a genetic child. Fertile, opposite-sex couples are able to 
use the gametes of both partners in artificial insemination and IVF or even 
to use other people’s organs. If the choice of LGBTI couples to enjoy the 
exact same act with a different technique is denied, then the government 
treats these two groups differently. Furthermore, much of the cloning 
rhetoric discussed in this article—some of which comes from governmental 
bodies—suggests that bans on reproductive cloning may be motivated by 
discriminatory intent.318 While discriminatory intent can be difficult to 
prove (and may be exceptionally so in the context of a still unrefined 
technology), disproportionate impact may be easier to demonstrate. While 
current, facially-neutral state bans on cloning do not single out LGBTI 
people in particular, a compelling argument may be made that they 
disparately impact this group.319 There is no question that a ban on 
reproductive cloning would disproportionately impact LGBTI couples, 
perhaps more than any other group. Indeed, as Eric and Richard Posner 
have argued, this is one of the main groups that would benefit from cloning 
technology.320 By contrast, the ban has little or no effect on fertile (and 
 
schools for the salaries of teachers who taught secular material, violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment because the primary beneficiaries of the Act were “church 
schools”). While Grumet is an Establishment Clause case, the court did not invalidate the 
law solely because the state endorsed one religion, but rather because one group that was 
similarly situated was treated more favorably than others. Id. at 703 (“Because the religious 
community of Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of 
many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, we have no assurance 
that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one.”). 
Implicitly, the Court relied on reasoning based on equality as well as traditional 
Establishment Clause considerations. 
318. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a government act 
would not be unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, but a 
purpose to discriminate must be present.). 
319. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law 
itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by 
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and 
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the 
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”). 
320. See Posner & Posner, supra note 105, at 256 (noting that “cloning might be an 
attractive alternative to adoption” for homosexual couples). See also Daar, supra note 4, at 
528 (“A third possible benefit of cloning would be to assist single individuals and same sex 
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many infertile) opposite-sex couples. 
In any event, whether a ban on reproductive cloning violates equal 
protection or not, it is easier to establish that a total ban infringes upon a 
fundamental right, an argument I will explore in the following section. 
C. The Current Funding Limitations and Any Future Ban on Cloning 
Human Beings Infringes on LGBTI Individual’s Fundamental 
Right to Reproduce 
Arguably, a ban on using reproductive cloning, if safe, infringes on the 
private decision to have a child via cloning. While the right to procreate 
without government interference has been recognized by the Court as a 
fundamental right,321 it is not clear that this would be interpreted to apply 
to cloning. Some scholars have argued that the use of cloning is covered by 
the right to procreation, because its purpose is no different from that of 
sexual reproduction, and it resembles other forms of sexual reproduction, 
such as ART, which use a third party’s gamete.322 Conversely, others have 
suggested that such a right does not exist because the differences between 
sexual reproduction and cloning are too great to warrant the expansion of 
reproductive rights to cloning.323 Scholars on this side of the debate largely 
 
couples in their efforts to reproduce.”). 
321. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000) (“[T]his Court, in the course of a 
generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic 
protection to the woman's right to choose.”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating 
effects.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (“The decision whether 
or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally 
protected choices. . . .”); Angela Campbell, Ethos and Economics: Examining the Rationale 
Underlying Stem Cell and Cloning Research Policies in the United States, Germany, and 
Japan, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 47, 70 (2005) (“The constitutional right to procreative and 
reproductive freedom has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in a 
number of cases.”). See also ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 312, at 22–42 
(arguing that there is a constitutional right to procreate using ART). 
322. See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42 
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 695 (2000) (“Because cloning is merely an asexual form of procreation, 
it is arguably as much a fundamental constitutional right as our right to procreate by either 
passion or the petri dish.”); John A. Robertson, Human Cloning and the Challenge of 
Regulation, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 120 (1998) (“Whether described as “replication” or 
as “reproduction,” the resort to cloning is similar enough in purpose and effects to other 
reproduction and genetic-selection practices that it should be treated similarly.”); Pratheep 
Sevanthinathan, Heavy Regulation of Human Cloning as an Alternative to a Complete 
Ban, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 242 (2007) (“[I]n light of Skinner, Lifchez, and the 
abortion cases, there seems to be a constitutionally protected right to procreate and 
therefore there may be a right to reproductive cloning.”). 
323. Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans 
on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 666–67 (1998) (“[C]loning is too 
qualitatively different from normal reproduction and from the types of assisted 
reproduction protected by the Lifchez case to simply assume the same Constitutional 
protections apply.”); Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 699 (“The 
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rely on the arguments I addressed earlier in this paper, which, as I have 
explained, are founded on false assumptions.324 
However, even among scholars who support recognition of the right to 
clone as a fundamental right, there are disagreements regarding which uses 
of cloning should be more valued. John A. Robertson suggests that 
individuals are interested in cloning for two reasons: infertility and genetic 
selection/design.325 The first group includes those who are infertile or suffer 
from reproductive failure; for them, cloning is the only way to have a 
genetically-related child. Robertson places lesbian couples in this group 
because, while they might not be infertile as that term is traditionally 
understood, their right to choose a relationship that does not involve male 
reproductive organs should be protected if possible.326 Applying this 
rationale, many transgender and intersex individuals would also fall into 
this category, as cloning may offer their only opportunity to have a 
genetically-related child with minimum third party involvement. 
The second group Robertson identifies includes individuals who seek 
to use cloning solely for purposes of selecting the child’s genome.327 He 
argues that the people in this category have a weaker claim to 
constitutional protection, and that policymakers are entitled to prohibit 
them from cloning or at least to give priority to the first group. This camp 
includes fertile people who choose to clone their child, whether alive or 
dead, in order to have a twin of that child. Robertson includes gay men in 
this camp as well.328 He argues that because gene-splicing techniques are 
not likely to be available in the near future, gay men acquire no clear 
advantage by using cloning, since they will still require of the assistance of 
a surrogate mother and egg donor.329 
While I agree that good public policy will take into consideration the 
purposes of using cloning, I think Robertson places too much emphasis on 
reproductive failure as the basis for using cloning and focuses too much on 
genetics as the factor that determines one’s right to use cloning. Without 
gene splicing, cloning does not assist LGBTI people in having genetically-
related children any more than current ARTs. Cloning does, however, 
 
assertion of a negative ‘right to reproduce’ certainly makes sense when it claims protection 
against state interference with procreative liberty, say, through a program of compulsory 
sterilization. But surely it cannot be the basis of a tort claim against nature, to be made 
good by technology, should free efforts at natural procreation fail . . . . When the exercise of 
a previously innocuous freedom now involves or impinges on troublesome practices that 
the original freedom never was intended to reach, the general presumption of liberty needs 
to be reconsidered.”). 
324. See supra Part V. 
325. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 617–18. 
326. Id. at 635–36. 
327. Id. at 627–31. 
328. Id. at 636–37. 
329. Id. 
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reduce third-party involvement in the process. With regard to the 
fundamental right to procreate free from government intervention, I 
would suggest that the dividing principle should be the harm principle, 
rather than the question of who has a “right” to have genetically-related 
child. The harm principle suggests that the entire LGBTI community is 
disadvantaged by their limited options, and that they therefore have a 
compelling interest in cloning that should be recognized even if they are 
not “infertile” for the purposes of other ARTs. Accordingly, as long as the 
use of cloning does not harm anyone, there is no reason to interfere with 
the private decision to use cloning as a method for having children. The 
law does not prohibit the use of surrogacy arrangements and organ 
donation, both of which have the potential to result in exploitation.330 
Cloning, by contrast, may actually reduce the involvement of third parties, 
thereby reducing the chance of exploitation. If surrogacy is not banned in 
the United States, there is no reason to ban other technologies that might 
serve to reduce any harm that may be caused by surrogacy and similar 
arrangements. Denying LGBTI people the use of cloning infringes upon 
their right to be free from state interference in reproductive and relational 
decision-making. 
More to the point, the right to procreate without the state intervention 
is not based solely on a right to make private choices. One of the rationales 
the Supreme Court relied on in Roe v. Wade331 is that the proper basis for 
women’s right to private sexual choices “is not privacy but equal social 
standing.” 332 Restrictions on abortions contributed to women’s inequality 
as a class. Thus, as at least one scholar has suggested, “The equality 
interpretation of Roe—and particularly the notion that limits on abortion 
are a form of class legislation—will be increasingly important as we 
encounter new reproductive technologies like cloning . . . .” 333 Under this 
 
330. See, e.g., supra Part II(B). 
331. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
332. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 844–6 (“Roe v. Wade was premised on three ideas: 
First, a fertilized ovum does not obtain constitutional rights from the moment of 
conception. Second, the state nevertheless has legitimate and powerful interests in the life 
and potential personhood of the developing embryo or fetus. Third, those interests, 
although quite important, must yield, at least in the earlier stages of the pregnancy, to 
preserve the rights of women.”). 
333. Id. at 855. Balkin, however, speculates that “[c]loning and other genetic 
technologies are not necessary to ameliorate women's inequalities with men, and indeed 
one can easily imagine how these technologies might someday be used to undermine 
women's equality.” Id. at 856. Balkin concludes that cloning may pose some risks for 
women and will not serve as an equalizer for women because it will increase demand for 
eggs and wombs, creating pressure for women—especially poor women—to serve as egg 
donors and gestation mothers, possibly with some risk to their health. Balkin does not 
consider the great advantage that cloning offers to LGBTI people, and also does not 
acknowledge how cloning may offer great advantages to women by releasing them from the 
need for sperm donors, or by allowing them to get pregnant at an older age. See, e.g., Marie 
Aline Seabra Ferreira, The Sexual Politics of Human Cloning: Mothering and Its 
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framework, a ban on cloning, which directly disadvantages the LGBTI 
community and further perpetuates existing inequalities, should be 
invalidated. 
D. Laws That Discriminate Against LGBTI People Merit Heightened 
Scrutiny 
1. Federal Funding Ban 
The mere fact that a group is treated differently than other groups 
does not immediately suggest that the Equal Protection Clause has been 
violated. By their very nature, laws categorize people into groups, 
benefiting some at the expense of others.334 The Supreme Court uses a 
three-tiered approach to determine whether a law that disadvantages a 
class of people violates the Equal Protection Clause. In general, a law will 
be upheld so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”335 However, if the law is alleged to disadvantage a “protected” 
class (classes delineated by race or national origin being the key example) 
or to obstruct a fundamental right, the Court will typically apply a higher 
level of scrutiny.336 A law that disadvantages all African-Americans vis-à-
vis other Americans, for example, will only be upheld if the law is 
“narrowly tailored” to a “compelling governmental interest.”337 In the 
middle tier, a law disadvantaging a group that receives intermediate 
scrutiny—women, for example—will be upheld only if it is substantially 
related to an important government interest.338 
 
Vicissitudes, 4 J. ASSOC. RESEARCH MOTHERING 113 (2002) (arguing that cloning can be 
the signifier of a real equality for women and bring about real change in sex roles, as 
women will no longer need to be immediately connected to motherhood because men can 
have children independently; because of this, women will no longer be seen as automatic 
care providers and will not be enlisted into procreative projects by virtue of their anatomy). 
See also supra note 12. 
334. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1942) (“Under our 
constitutional system the States in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation 
need not provide ‘abstract symmetry.’”); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914) 
(“They may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems according to the needs 
and as dictated or suggested by experience.”) (internal citations omitted). 
335. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
336. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (“Unless a 
statute provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ because it interferes with a ‘fundamental right’ or 
discriminates against a ‘suspect class,’ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so 
long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”). 
337. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1985). 
338. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional 
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”). 
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It is not clear what level of scrutiny would be accorded LGBTI 
individuals under an equal protection analysis. At present, gays and 
lesbians are not recognized as a protected class, and laws alleged to 
discriminate against them receive only rational basis review.339 However, 
two federal courts recently suggested in dicta that classifications based 
upon sexual orientation should be reviewed using a standard more 
searching than rational basis.340 
Significantly, the U.S. Attorney General recently announced that 
“classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a more 
heightened standard of scrutiny.”341 While the Supreme Court, not the 
Department of Justice, ultimately decides what level of scrutiny to apply in 
challenges to laws that discriminate against a particular class, this 
announcement nevertheless provides valuable support for future claims 
that discrimination against LGB people merits a heightened level of 
review. 
Even if courts will not apply heightened scrutiny to the federal ban on 
funding for reproductive cloning research, a court may decide to apply 
 
339. See also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 
(2010). Yoshino also notes that it is possible that the Supreme Court will give formal 
heightened scrutiny to gays and lesbians, but suggests that the Court has “every incentive” 
to apply the “rational basis with bite” standard instead of introducing a new class of 
individuals who benefit from strict scrutiny. Id. at 761–62. 
340. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“Although Proposition 8 fails to possess even a rational basis, the evidence presented at 
trial shows that gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to 
protect.”); Collins v. Brewer, 727 F.Supp.2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2010) (“Some form 
of heightened scrutiny might apply to plaintiffs’ claims, but it is unnecessary to decide 
whether or which type of heightened scrutiny might apply to plaintiffs’ claims. . . . 
Moreover, the court applies a ‘more searching form of rational basis review’ when a 
classification harms politically unpopular groups or personal relationships.”). Furthermore, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied a heightened standard of review in a 
challenge to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the government policy that banned openly gay 
soldiers from serving in the military. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 807–09 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act constitutes an intrusion “upon 
the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates [substantive due 
process rights], and is subject to heightened scrutiny.”). While the Ninth Circuit applied 
heightened scrutiny only to the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim and not her equal 
protection claim, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, especially in the field of 
reproduction, shows that “equal protection and substantive due process . . . [are] regularly 
interlocking and powerfully complementary sources of protection.” Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 1893, 1902 n.32 (2004). Tribe thus argues that “due process and equal protection, 
far from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly 
interlocked in a legal double helix.” Id. at 1989. Thus, an argument might be made for 
extending strict scrutiny to equal protection claims brought by gay and lesbian plaintiffs. 
341. Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act, Feb 23. 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-
222.html. 
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“rational basis with bite.”342 Under this framework, the court may 
invalidate legislation under rational basis review when the legislation is 
motivated by animus toward a specific group.343 Unfortunately, such 
animosity will be hard to establish in the cloning context because 
restrictions on cloning are likely to appear neutral on their face, as they 
prohibit the use of cloning by all individuals, not just gays and lesbians.344 
Because it is not clear what level of scrutiny a court would apply, when 
I analyze equal protection claims in the following section I consider the 
likely outcome under both rational basis and heightened scrutiny. 
2. Total Ban on Cloning 
Although it cannot be predicted with any certainty, it is not impossible 
that a challenge to a total ban on cloning would be examined under some 
form of heightened scrutiny, based either on the infringement of a 
fundamental right or its disproportionate impact on the group most 
affected by the prohibition to clone (the LGBTI population). First, as 
stated before, if the ban on human cloning disproportionately affects 
LGBTI couples, it may receive a higher standard of review for the reasons 
given above. Second, as stated above, the right to be free from government 
interference has long been recognized as a fundamental right that triggers 
heightened scrutiny. Based on this theory, a future ban on reproductive 
cloning constitutes a restriction on exercising a fundamental right and will 
be evaluated by a court using strict scrutiny. If the use of ART by 
opposite-sex couples, especially when using a third party’s gamete, is a 
fundamental right, cloning should be likewise. Therefore, when I analyze 
the ban on cloning, I will use heightened scrutiny. 
E. There Is No Legitimate State Interest to Support the Current 
Funding Ban or Any Future Cloning Ban 
1. Federal Funding Ban 
Having addressed the level of review the Supreme Court is likely to 
 
342. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 339, at 759–63. 
343. Id. The Supreme Court has applied a heightened version of rational basis review 
in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the Colorado state 
constitution that would have prevented cities, towns, and counties in Colorado from 
recognizing gays and lesbians as a protected class), and Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (overturning the City of Cleburne’s denial of a special use 
permit to a group home for “13 retarded men and women”). 
344. See Foley, supra note 322, at 709 (“The possible discriminatory impact of a 
cloning ban on homosexuals and women would not be enough, ipso facto, to warrant 
invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause; a discriminatory purpose would have to be 
demonstrated.”). 
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apply to a constitutional challenge to the law banning the funding of 
cloning research and to a total ban on cloning itself, I turn now to the 
question of whether the ban on funding cloning research serves a 
legitimate state interest (as required under rational basis review) or is 
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest (as required under 
heightened scrutiny). The two government committees commissioned to 
investigate cloning concluded that cloning is unethical because it is risky. 
While both found that cloning implicates other ethical issues, their 
conclusions were primarily based on concerns about safety.345 The 
government would thus likely argue that the ban is meant to prevent the 
harm that would occur in the process of cloning research—for example, 
harm to cloned human fetuses that are not yet viable and that may die as 
part of the ordinary course of research, or to eventual human subjects who 
agree to participate in the gestation of cloned children. However, the risks 
involved in cloning research are not fundamentally different from those 
implicated in research on other reproductive technologies.346 While cloning 
research may raise some unique issues of safety, in other ways it may be 
safer than coital reproduction because DNA with known abnormalities is 
less likely to be cloned.347 Because several U.S. agencies carefully regulate 
such research to ensure its safety, concerns about physical safety will rarely 
provide a sound basis for prohibiting cloning by couples seeking to have 
biologically-related children for rearing.348 
Even if a court finds that this safety rationale is legitimate or even 
compelling, the federal ban on funding for reproductive cloning is arguably 
not related—much less narrowly tailored—to that interest. To the 
contrary, it may even be counter to such an interest. The ban on research 
funding will not prevent the technology from being developed. Rather, it 
will negatively impact the way in which the technology develops.349 Cloning 
is currently researched in other countries and in private laboratories in the 
United States.350 Due to the lack of support by federal funding, the ban in 
 
345. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 172, at ii (“At present, the use 
of this technique to create a child would be a premature experiment that would expose the 
fetus and the developing child to unacceptable risks. This in itself might be sufficient to 
justify a prohibition on cloning human beings at this time . . . .”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 99–105 (“[C]loning-to-produce-children is not now safe . . . . 
[C]oncerns revolve around potential dangers to the cloned child, as well as to the egg donor 
and the woman who would carry the cloned child to birth.”). 
346. See, e.g., MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 64–69. 
347. John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371, 
1411 (1998). 
348. Id. 
349. Daar, supra note 4, at 569. 
350. See Annas, Andrews & Isasi, supra note 193, at 165 (stating that the ban on the 
use of federal funds for cloning has had little effect on private fertility research and clinics). 
See generally Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 1–2 (discussing American 
researchers who transferred a cloned human embryo in Cyprus because the law in the 
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particular states, and the FDA’s possible prohibitions on use, “[a] ban in 
any particular U.S. state will merely move operations across state lines,”351 
or to private laboratories within the United States with no government 
supervision at all.352 As a result, the much-discussed risks to the cloned 
child may, in fact, be intensified by potentially irresponsible, unregulated 
studies.353 Furthermore, while government-funded research must comply 
with the Common Rule, which provides guidelines for the protection of 
research subjects, private researchers are not bound by these rules.354 The 
ban on using federal funding for cloning research has therefore simply 
shifted the development of knowledge to other places and lessened the 
government’s control over the quality and safety of cloning technology. It 
seems clear, therefore, that the ban on funding research cloning does not 
further any legitimate government concern and may, in fact, be 
counterproductive. As such, the federal ban may not survive even rational 
basis scrutiny.355 A less harmful means of addressing this issue would be to 
 
United States possibly prohibited human cloning and noting that the company stated they 
did not conduct the research in Cyprus or the United States); Nell Boyce & David E. 
Kaplan, The God Game No More: The Feds Crack Down on a Human Cloning Lab, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., July 9, 2001, at 20 (reporting on attempts to clone human beings in 
New York, which were stopped after the intervention of the FDA, and noting that the 
laboratory subsequently moved overseas). 
351. Id. at 569. 
352. Id. at 569–70 (“But we are also aware of hints at secret research being conducted 
on reproductive cloning. Those hints are coming from places outside the United States, but 
we are not immune from clandestine efforts at human cloning within our borders. Last 
summer at a symposium sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Brigitte 
Boisselier, a chemist with Clonaid, announced that she had made progress toward human 
cloning. Though Dr. Boisselier did not discuss the location of her research efforts, later 
reports revealed that she had been operating in a laboratory in Nitro, West Virginia. The 
‘laboratory,’ as it turns out, was a single classroom in the Nitro Community Center, a 
facility that also houses a day care center and the Nitro Police Department.”). 
353. LIM, supra note 87, at 321–22 (“Unreasonable government restrictions may lead 
undesirably to clandestine activities in some offshore laboratory . . . .”).  
354. See ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, CRAFTING A CLONING POLICY 120–22 (2002) 
(explaining that all public agencies are required to comply with the Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects, known as the Common Rule, a uniform requirement in 
cases involving the participation of human subjects). While the FDA requires research on 
cloning to comply with these rules, its jurisdiction to do so is doubtful, as discussed supra 
Part VI(A). See also REBECCA DRESSER, HUMAN CLONING AND THE FDA: THE HASTING 
CENTER REPORT (2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go2103/is_3_33/ai_n9103292/ 
?tag=content;col1 (“Human cloning fits awkwardly, if at all, into the regulatory 
definitions.”). 
355. Further, the ban on research cloning harms LGBTI individuals in particular, 
because the absence of government regulation also means no one ensures that research 
relevant to LGBTI people is being conducted. One way to divide research funding and to 
supervise the direction of the research would be to distribute funding by categories. See 
BONNICKSEN, supra note 354, at 132 (suggesting that the federal government could open 
categories of funding for cloning research). This division of funding would ensure that the 
specific and practical needs of the beneficiaries of cloning technologies, including the 
LGBTI community, are met. For example, if the government provided funding, it could 
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heavily regulate cloning research, directing funding to responsible and 
supervised studies. 
2. Total Ban on Cloning 
Because a total ban on human reproductive cloning would not simply 
displace research to other states or private entities, the state interest in 
banning reproductive cloning may be greater than its interest in banning 
only funding for cloning research. Moreover, the government may be more 
easily able to articulate a state interest in banning reproductive cloning 
that does not apply to research funding, such as the effect that cloning will 
have on the adoption market. Under rational basis review, an equal 
protection challenge to a ban on cloning—at least given the current state 
of the technology—is thus not likely to succeed. If a court applied 
heightened scrutiny, however, the scope of the ban on cloning would be 
relevant to the determination of whether a statute is narrowly tailored: a 
general ban may be too broad, while ban on specific uses of cloning may be 
constitutional. 
Assuming that cloning eventually becomes safe and efficient enough 
for use in human reproduction, the government may likely nevertheless 
justify a ban by relying on at least some of the arguments discussed 
throughout this paper. As I have offered responses to those arguments 
already, I focus now on an argument the government may put forth that is 
less easily countered: that the effect of cloning on adoption provides a 
compelling state interest for banning the use of reproductive cloning. 
Some scholars have expressed concern that efficient reproductive 
cloning might adversely affect the adoption market.356 Currently, in the 
United States, three quarters of women seeking to adopt are sterile or 
have some kind of infertility problem, and most individuals try fertility 
treatments before adopting.357 The opportunity to have a genetically-
related child might cause some to choose cloning if it were available. Anita 
L. Allen suggests that the high demand for, and low availability of, white 
 
ensure that one category included research on gene-splicing technology and its combination 
with cloning. The LGBTI community might also benefit from the creation of a category 
dedicating research funds to the exploration of different methods of cloning, such as SCNT 
and parthenogenesis. As long as such supervision is denied by the ban, the harm to those 
who make use of asexual reproduction continues to grow. While it is an open question 
whether the government has a constitutional obligation to direct money to research specific 
issues, it is definitely an appropriate aim of fair legislation. 
356. See Neil Levy & Mianna Lotz, Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic 
Fallacy, 19 BIOETHICS 232, 247 (2005) (“If cloning were to become widely available, the 
primary motive for adoption would be removed.”). See also Allen, supra note 18, at 57. 
357. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SERIES 23 NO. 27: ADOPTION 
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 
18-44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002 2, 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_027.pdf. 
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children in the United States available for adoption in the United States 
will cause some potential parents to choose cloning over adoption.358 In 
addition, LGBTI people currently make up a substantial portion of the 
adoption market.359 Thus, if a large portion of the LGBTI community 
chooses cloning rather than adoption, a significant number of children 
waiting to be adopted could be left without adoptive parents.360 Of course, 
any effect that cloning may have on the adoption market remains 
speculative. We do not know how expensive cloning might be, how 
successful and appealing the technology will be, or any of the numerous 
other factors that could influence the popularity of cloning compared to 
adoption.361 
Will a possible reduction in adoption rates provide the government 
with a legitimate or even compelling reason to justify a prohibition on use 
of cloning? The government has an interest in adoption based on the need 
to ensure that every citizen has a home and every child a legal guardian. 
But if cloning could be banned on the basis of an expected reduction in 
adoption rates, IVF could be banned as well. If the government wishes to 
make adoption more attractive, there exist many more moderate and less 
harmful ways to do so. First and foremost, states that prohibit LGBTI 
parents from adopting could lift their bans. Additionally, the bureaucracy 
accompanying the adoption process could be decreased and practices that 
may deter some prospective parents, such as open adoption, could be 
reduced or eliminated. Finally, the government could offer additional 
financial incentives for people who adopt, or at least subsidize adoption 
 
358. Allen, supra note 18, at 57. 
359. GATES, BADGETT, MACOMBER & CHAMBERS, supra note 14, at 6. 
360. Some experience with other ARTs supports this assumption. Data suggests that 
the number of adoptions decreased after ART became an option See, e.g., Raquel Bernal, 
Luojia Hu, Chiaki Moriguchi & Eva Nagypal, Child Adoption in the United States: 
Historical Trends and the Determinants of Adoption Demand and Supply, 1951-2002, at 11 
(Dec. 26, 2007) (unpublished report on file at Northwestern University Dep’t. of 
Economics), available at http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~cmo938/adoptAEA.pdf 
(“The ratio of women who delivered biological children with ART to the number of 
women who adopted unrelated children domestically has increased from 15% in 1992, 34% 
in 1996 and to 60% in 2002 . . . in other words, ART likely had a sizeable impact on the 
demand for domestic infants in recent years.”). A recent study suggests that public policy 
has a significant influence on whether individuals choose adoption over IVF. For example, 
increase in the adoption subsidies correlates with a raise in the number of adoptions. See 
generally Gumus & Lee, supra note 102, at 21, 24–25. Conversely, Glenn Cohen and Daniel 
L. Chen found no empirical support to the assumption that states that mandate covering 
IVF in health insurance experience decreases in the number of adoptions. Cohen & Chen, 
Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease 
Adoption Rates and Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 554 (2010). 
361. In addition, there are reasons that people choose to adopt that might safeguard 
the adoption market from the effects of cloning. For example, some people adopt for 
humanitarian and religious reasons while others adopt for more pragmatic reasons like age 
or the desire to avoid pregnancy and childbirth. 
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fees. 
F. Conclusion 
Almost certainly, my legal arguments would not be accepted by the 
Supreme Court in its current incarnation. This is not to say, however, that 
the analysis is incorrect. By the time that cloning is safe and ready for use, 
the Court may offer greater protection for LGB (or LGBTI) individuals, 
or may look more favorably upon reproductive technologies. Just as with 
IVF, cloning may slowly come to be more accepted over time. The 
composition of the Court will continue to change, and the jurisprudence on 
reproductive rights and assisted reproductive technologies may shift as 
well. It is inevitable that some courts will have to adjudicate cases 
regarding ART, perhaps resulting in the creation of rights that do not now 
exist. Finally, I have attempted to offer an argument that may be useful not 
only in litigation, but also before Congress or state legislatures. Biology as 
it is currently understood should not be allowed to control our 
understanding of what is scientifically and legally possible. 
IX.  
CONCLUSION 
Prospective parents in the LGBTI community face a number of 
obstacles. Cloning—to the extent that is safe and available—could present 
a better alternative than the options currently available to those who 
prefer a genetically-related child. It could provide an easier way to have 
such a child with minimal involvement of third parties. Combined with 
gene splicing, it might allow for LGBTI couples, or even close friends, to 
have a child who carries the mixed genes of both parties. In order for such 
possibilities to become a reality, however, we need further research. 
Members of the LGBTI community should express their interest in this 
research to ensure that they are not ultimately excluded from the 
opportunity to use it. 
At the same time, cloning should not be treated as the key to LGBTI 
equality. In the midst of recent debates over same-sex marriage, some 
commentators have suggested that reproductive cloning would work to 
undermine arguments against same-sex marriage.362 Some gay-rights 
 
362. Marcy Darnovsky, Female Sperm and Gay Guinea Pigs, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 
2008, at C9, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/12/ 
EDBNVHRRR.DTL. (“[A] few researchers and pundits are proposing that same-sex 
procreation with bio-engineered gametes will undermine one of the key arguments of 
same-sex marriage opponents.”); LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN, CLONING AND BEYOND 
IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD 188 (1997) (“[I]t is interesting to note that a major argument used 
by the Religious Right in its opposition to same-sex unions is based on the notion that 
marriage is supposed to serve the purpose of procreation. According to this line of 
reasoning, gay unions should not be sanctioned because they are biologically barren. If we 
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advocates argue that allowing LGBTI individuals to give birth through 
cloning with a same-sex partner would actually help the fight for marriage 
equality by making them part of the group that is able to reproduce genetic 
children not unlike heterosexual couples who use ARTs.363 Professor 
David Orentlicher goes so far as to suggest that the use of gene splicing 
could make “the gay family . . . look more like the heterosexual family, and 
this could help diminish societal stigmatization of gays. Prejudice is rooted 
in large part in perceived differences. Lessening the differences between 
gays and heterosexuals might therefore help combat discrimination by 
heterosexuals against gay persons.”364 
Cloning should not be used as a means to promote same-sex marriage 
by making queer families more closely resemble traditional families. 
Ending discrimination against the LGBTI community should not depend 
on establishing a similarity to heterosexuals but should instead be based on 
the recognition of each individual’s autonomy and freedom to practice 
whatever form of gender or sexual orientation they desire. As stated by 
Marcy Darnovsky, Associate Executive Director at the Center for 
Genetics and Society: 
Anti-gay sentiment is not caused by the inability of same-sex 
couples to have biologically related children, but by fear and 
intolerance. The solutions to homophobia will not be found in test 
tubes and Petri dishes, but in challenging and changing our laws, 
policies and culture.365 
If cloning were to become universally available for the LGBTI 
community, it does not follow that everyone in the community should be 
expected to have children, much less genetically-related children.366 As 
more LGBTI couples and individuals begin to behave according to 
heterosexual norms, this may result in the creation of a subordinate class 
of people, discriminated against for not complying with the (now larger 
and even more powerful) dominant culture. It is for this reason that I have 
subtitled this Article “Cautious Optimism,” as we must be mindful of the 
unintended consequences that may attend the push for reproductive 
 
take the Religious Right at its word, the ability of gay women, or gay men, to co-procreate 
should validate their right to become married.”). 
363. Id. 
364. Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 651, 653. 
365. Darnovsky, supra note 362, at C-9. 
366. Some queer theorists have expressed a similar concern with regard to same-sex 
marriage. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND 
THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999). Warner argues that the gay movement has become a 
normalizing movement toward a “post-gay” pseudo-dignity, awarded by the heterosexual 
dominant culture for disavowing sex and politics surrounding sex. This results in the 
establishment of a hierarchical order in which one queer ethically dominates another, 
allowing the dominant culture to decide who gets to accept whom.  Id. at 41–80. 
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cloning by the LGBTI community. Nevertheless, it remains important to 
fight for political goals even as a group remains committed to critique and 
transformation. 
In lobbying for cloning rights and regulation, the LGBTI community 
should take steps to ensure that the use of reproductive cloning does not 
serve to create new, internal social hierarchies among those members of 
the community who do and do not have genetically-related children. At 
present, cloning opponents continue to rely on homophobic fears and 
heterosexist assumptions about what families “should” look like. 
Unfounded theories about a gay agenda must be challenged for what they 
are—outright bigotry and fear-mongering. More sophisticated criticisms 
focused on maintaining diversity in the gene pool, protecting the welfare of 
the child, and addressing ethical issues surrounding the sometimes slippery 
slope of using artificial processes in reproduction should be responded to 
by relying on sound reasoning and the best evidence available to cloning 
advocates. The LGBTI community should work to simultaneously expose 
the base homophobic assumptions behind such arguments and to debunk 
the myth that homosexuality is immoral, unnatural, and harmful to society. 
In the foreseeable future, the debate over cloning is likely to remain 
complicated and tense. There is still much to be learned about cloning 
before it can be declared safe and efficient. As technology so rapidly 
changes and develops, it is likely that new reproductive methods that are 
similar to cloning or with a similar mission will become available. These 
technologies will likely create new challenges, new vocabularies, and more 
ethical debates. Yet the opposition to new reproductive technologies, 
especially those that would further the expansion of nontraditional 
families, would likely fall victim to similar arguments and opposition. 
However, heterosexist arguments should not provide the grounds on which 
the feasibility of cloning or other reproductive technologies are 
determined. While every technology should be treated and considered for 
itself, this Article provides tools to deconstruct these arguments. Public 
dialogue on cloning regulation should include the LGBTI community as 
we work together to create a safe, effective, and promising new 
reproductive future. 
 
